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Abstract
This thesis examines the way in which Plato and Platonic theories appear overtly 
and opportunistically in Chaucer’s writings. It looks at some of the more evident ways 
in which the poet invokes the philosopher, but also argues that Chaucer ‘cherry-picks’ 
what he wants from Plato, and (in some cases), changes the fundamental premise of the 
philosophical tenet upon which the original is based in order to make a creative 
statement. A theme of the Platonic notion of contrarieties will run throughout the thesis; 
at times it will necessarily discuss at some length the philosophical heritage inherited by 
the late fourteenth century. I will look firstly at ways in which Plato appears in 
Chaucer’s more famously philosophical works before focusing on some of the less 
‘popular’ Canterbury Tales, and will, in turn also draw attention to issues in Chaucer 
that can be seen to have been initiated by ancient philosophy, insofar as Chaucer is 
likely to have received them, or to have been aware of their arguments. At no time does 
this thesis argue for a direct transmission or connection between the writings of Plato 
and those of Chaucer. Rather, I argue that in Chaucer we see peculiar elements of 
Platonic theory (either an appropriation or a challenge thereof), and that such a 
philosophical approach from a reader both adds to a critical debate regarding the 
relationship between Chaucer and philosophy, and deepens an appreciation of the way 
in which some of Chaucer’s more maligned texts are, in fact, some of his most 
rewarding.
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1Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to address the Platonic, Aristotelian and neo- 
Platonic themes that operate in the background of several of Chaucer’s Canterbury 
Tales. It is not an attempt to discover new ‘sources and analogues’ of Chaucer’s 
writings. This project is not an attempt to incorporate the entire Chaucer corpus into its 
frame of reference. Furthermore, this thesis offers neither any kind of sophisticated 
critical reading of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus (or any other philosopher), nor an 
examination of the line of transmission of their work to Chaucer’s library.
Instead, this thesis deals with the way that Chaucer adopts a very flexible, 
almost opportunistic relationship with Platonic references, such that Plato appears in 
Chaucer in some very unexpected places, and serves as means to some very unexpected 
ends. As the title of the thesis might suggest, Chaucer teases out Plato insomuch as he 
can, and offers a uniquely Chaucerian understanding, assimilation and integration of 
philosophic principles to the audience, many of whom would be unfamiliar even with 
their society’s own debt to Platonic or neo-Platonic theory. Plato becomes a kind of 
literary “Play-Dough”: a pliable and endlessly re-workable base from which Chaucer 
works to build his own creative art. This thesis operates on the premise that the 
unknowable intention of such an act by Chaucer is irrelevant to its presence in his work; 
‘unexpected Plato’ forms the basis of much of what can be read in Chaucer. Being able 
to recognise it as such can change the experience of reading Chaucer’s work.
Most criticism of Chaucer’s philosophical heritage tends to concentrate on 
‘Boethian’ qualities observed either secondarily in some of the Tales, or primarily in 
other examples of Chaucer’s work, such as A Treatise on the Astrolabe or Troilus and 
Criseyde. I argue below that the texts offered as evidence deal directly and indirectly 
with the philosophical issues raised either by the ancient schools or by the more 
contemporary schools upon which the ancients exercised their greatest theoretical
2influence. Furthermore, I argue that these philosophical themes change the way in 
which some of the tales can be read, thereby identifying important implications of 
otherwise troublesome elements of the Tales in general.
Chapter One deals with the notion of a ‘philosophical’ Chaucer, and the ways in 
which Plato may appear in places that haven’t been addressed in depth by critical 
attention. It looks at some more obvious places where readers find philosophical 
references (The Book o f the Duchess, The Parliament o f Fowls, for example), but also in 
some places where Plato is more creatively (and curiously) appropriated by Chaucer.
Chapter Two deals specifically with the argument of contrariety in regard to the 
binary models of sex and gender. It explores the possibility that The Pardoner’s Tale 
may identify inherent problems with the two-sex model and could be read to illustrate 
mythical, historical and classical examples of texts that challenge the notion of human 
existence in this limiting and oppositional structure.
Chapter Three discusses how the problem of a “two-extreme” model is further 
developed by The Physician’s Tale and its notion of the body. This chapter outlines the 
medieval connection made between the body and the State, and investigates the ways in 
which the text’s treatment of that relationship challenges medieval theories of physical 
and political contrariety.
Chapter Four continues the discussion of the physicality of human existence by 
examining the nature of the body’s relationship to the soul, as well as the nature of the 
soul itself. This chapter, focusing primarily on The Second Nun’s Tale, seeks to 
investigate how the text addresses medieval notions of the soul and how those notions 
lead to a rigidly hierarchical structure of being among all things.
Having examined in Chapter Four the contemporary arguments regarding the 
status of the human soul, Chapter Five discusses the fallibility of the human senses. In 
particular, this chapter looks at the pre-eminence of sight and optical theory in medieval
culture, and examines how The Franklin’s Tale addresses certain philosophical and 
optical themes in relation to contrariety and epistemology.
Finally, Chapter Six discusses how The Squire's Tale addresses the medieval 
anxiety about poetry and fiction as worthwhile pursuits, or ways of communicating 
epistemological truths. The chapter attempts to demonstrate how poetry is presented as 
a medium through which all of the fundamental principles of contrariety previously 
discussed can be mediated.
Philosophical Chaucer 
Unexpected Plato in Chaucer’s Writings
5When Chaucer mentions ‘Philosophical Strode’, he is doing more than name- 
dropping (Troilus v.1857). He is, in effect, at once acknowledging the possibility that 
one can be both poetic and philosophical as well as showing himself to be explicitly 
interested in offering his poetry to a distinctly philosophical consideration.1 Critics who 
consider both Chaucer and philosophy seem mostly to be drawn primarily by existing 
critical approaches and modem criticism to two familiar and comfortable conclusions: 
that Chaucer operates through a medium of Aristotelian or Boethian frames of 
reference, and that the majority of his seriously philosophical discussions are treated in 
works other than The Canterbury Tales. When modem critics speak of ‘philosophical 
Chaucer’, they tend to aim at the obvious targets: The Book o f the Duchess, The 
Parliament o f Fowls, and the almost obligatory discussions regarding the philosophical 
aspects of The Knight's Tale, Troilus and Criseyde and the equally philosophical 
elements of The Nun’s Priest’s Tale and The Clerk’s Tale. That is not to say, of course, 
that important (albeit until recently sporadic) critical attention has not been paid to the 
philosophical content of some of the other texts and tales; nonetheless the breadth and 
scope of the consideration has generally fallen into the categories just mentioned. Tales 
that do get discussed in purely philosophical terms are usually considered in light of 
their inherent or latent reference to ‘The Philosopher’ and his ultimate authority and the 
seemingly ubiquitous nature of Aristotelian concepts in late medieval culture. For 
instance, The General Prologue presents the Clerk as having twenty books of Aristotle 
(1.294-5). The Clerk’s Prologue introduces the narrator correspondingly as a 
professional philosopher: the Host says that he must be studying ‘som sophyme’ (iv.5). 
Jerome Taylor has even argued that Aristotelian logic is a specific background for The
1 Riverside Chaucer, p. 1058.
2 See also V J .  Scattergood, in Oxford Guide to Chaucer: The Shorter Poems, ed. by A. J. Minnis 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 485-494, 503, for a discussion on Chaucer’s debt to Seneca; 
and J.D. Burnley, Chaucer's Language and the Philosopher's Tradition (Cambridge: Brewer, 1979) for 
philosophers with whom Chaucer seems to have a direct link, of which Seneca is a prime example. In the 
case of Platonic Ideas, of course, these are typically filtered through a very wide range of other authors.
6Clerk’s Tale. Glending Olson argues that Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics may lie 
behind some ideas about 'pley' in The Clerk’s Prologue (IV. 10).4
Boethius is often seen to bridge the gap between the purely philosophical and 
the philosophically practical, as critical approaches to Chaucer’s presumed world-view 
are often expressed in term of their greater or lesser degrees of Boethianity, and much 
criticism has focused on how and to what degree Chaucer can best be read either as a 
proponent of, a challenger to, or an ambivalent social commentator on Boethian 
concepts of Free Will, Fortune, Providence, Plenty and, of course, Love. Theseus’ 
speech in The Knight’s Tale (1.2987-3089) presents the essentially neo-Platonic idea of 
the Chain of Love. This speech -  significantly -  is Chaucer’s addition and not found in 
Boccaccio’s original. Rather, Chaucer probably got the idea about the Chain from 
Boethius (Consolation o f Philosophy, II.8) and from Roman de la Rose (16707-81).5 
Finally, there is the concept of Love itself and the considerable body of criticism 
dedicated to an ongoing (and arguably irresolvable) debate regarding Chaucer as a 
Christian poet of courtly love.
This approach seems to favour the obvious and more contemporary resurgence 
of Aristotelian thought, without fully acknowledging the ‘Twelfth Century Renaissance’ 
of Platonist study centred primarily on the School of Chartres. Using the Timaeus, this 
flowering of scholastic activity produced concepts of Nature as a harmonious order in a
3 ‘Fraunceys Petrak and the Logyk of Chaucer's Clerk’, in Francis Petrarch, Six Centuries Later, ed. by 
Aldo Scaglione (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), pp. 364-83.
4 See Olson’s ‘Plays as Play: A Medieval Ethical Theory of Performance and the Intellectual Context of 
the Tretise of Miraclis Pleyinge’, Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 26, (1995) pp. 195-221; or 
‘Toward a Poetics of the Late Medieval Court Lyric’ in Vernacular Poetics in the Middle Ages: Studies in 
Medieval Culture, ed. by Lois Ebin (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publishers, Western Michigan 
University, 1984), pp. 227-248.
5 Riverside Chaucer, p. 841. That notes also cites critics who, before Knapp, thought that the pessimism 
in the speech indicates the influence of nominalism 'failure to reconcile God's justice and the arbitrariness 
of human destiny'. In contrast Knapp sees The Knight’s Tale overall as realist and ultimately Platonic: 
Chaucer and Social Contest, (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 19. Interestingly, Minnis (Chaucer and 
Pagan Antiquity, pp. 125-31) points to the fact that The Knight’s Tale depicts a pagan and not a Christian 
world view. The interest Chaucer shows in relating some of his writing to classical philosophy raises the 
question of how far, in works like The Knight’s Tale, he is exploring attitudes that do not rely on a 
Christian set of ideas. Perhaps, like his Physician, Chaucer is willing to entertain the idea that a very 
learned worldview can be acquired without dependence on the Bible.
7divinely-created Universe, through a creative fusion of classical and Christian thought, 
and remained an important inspiration for works such as The Parliament o f Fowls?
Alain de Lille's Nature, Chaucer’s source for the goddess in The Parliament o f Fowls, is 
essentially Platonic; filtered through, particularly, the twelfth-century Renaissance, the 
School of Chartres, and specifically Alain de Lille.
There is, of course, a great deal of evidence that leads critics to pursue the 
questions that dominate the study of Chaucer’s relation to philosophy. By way of 
introduction, it seems appropriate to acknowledge (but also to challenge) some of this 
criticism as well as the approaches taken to its evidence. Even Mark Miller’s recent 
book, Philosophical Chaucer, while striking new ground and providing one of the most 
comprehensive discussions of an overriding and consistent philosophical current in the 
Tales, adopts the criteria of traditional critical Boethian and Aristotelian frames of 
reference -  critical avenues that are by now commonplace. Granted, the route that 
Miller takes is slightly different, but much of the scenery seems familiar and the 
destination of the conclusion remains the same: ‘[love emerges] as itself structured 
around a Boethian antinomy of the will’.7
J.A.W. Bennett’s book on The Parliament o f Fowls traces Chaucer’s use of 
Somnium Scipionis in the first sections of The Parliament but also observes that 
Chaucer ‘shapes it to his own purposes’, in particular by pursuing his line of enquiry 
about the nature of passion; whereas as Bennett says, ‘Certainly for Cicero, Platonist as 
he was—or as he was whilst writing the Somnium —any judgement that placed a 
premium on passion would have been incomprehensible’.8 Bennett seems to feel, as 
this thesis will argue, that Chaucer uses the philosophy knowledgably but cavalierly—or 
creatively, depending on one’s perspective. Despite Bennett’s attention, the more usual
6 See the outline of the history of the idea and its appearance in literature in J.A.W. Bennett, The 
Parlement o f Fowls: An Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), pp. 194-212.
7 Mark Miller, Philosophical Chaucer (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 35.
8 Bennett, p. 35.
8modem critical approach tends to concentrate on the tide of Aristotelian thinking, rather 
than the undercurrent of Platonic theory that remains a constant, albeit quieter influence.
This is not to suggest that previous discussions regarding Chaucer’s 
philosophical disposition, including Miller’s, are not important, thought-provoking or 
inherently valuable as discourses through which an engagement with Chaucer is 
challenged and constantly re-defined. This thesis will suggest, rather, that there are 
ways to think about a ‘philosophical Chaucer’ that do not necessarily rely on his 
seeming inseparability from Boethian constmcts, or his function as a love-poet, or, 
indeed, as a poet who is concerned primarily with the medieval question of Free Will. 
Readers can, and I would suggest that readers should, begin to broaden the parameters 
by which they are willing to consider Chaucer’s philosophical explorations.
Critical Approaches to a Philosophical Chaucer
Miller’s work is not the first attempt to address the general question of the nature 
of Chaucer’s philosophies beyond The Knight's Tale and Troilus. For example, in his 
‘’’Commune Profit” and Libidinal Dissemination in Chaucer’, Yasunari Takada 
investigates at length the learned medieval debate between the respective worth of the 
political and philosophical lives (originally the religious concepts of the vita activa and 
vita contemplativa) in relation to Chaucer’s work. Among other points, he contends that 
Petrarch (drawing on Cicero’s Somnium Scipionis) relies on the idea ‘that even by virtue 
of the political life (vita activa) the soul can attain the heavenly beatitude which is 
commonly taken to be reserved for contemplative life’ .9
Takada’s discussion stems from the problematic fact that:
9 Yasunari Takada, ‘“Commune Profit” and Libidinal Dissemination in Chaucer’ in The Body and Soul in 
Medieval Literature, ed. by Piero Boitani and Anna Torti (Cambridge: Brewer, 1999), pp. 107-21 (p. 
108).
for the man of action like “the rulers of the commonwealth” leading the life of 
action (vita activa) philosophizing or doing philosophy is a pure luxury, which 
can be enjoyed only in scholarly leisure (otium), not in activities of any 
negotiation (negotium). But there have been men of action virtuous enough to 
attain blessedness. How should modem readers deal with and define these non­
philosopher’s virtues?10
In other words, Takada begins with the recognition that a moral dilemma exists 
when considering the spiritual health of people who are too busy doing things to have 
time to sit about and think about the higher virtues. On one hand, Takada is articulating 
the medieval debate regarding the salvation of the souls of non-philosophers. Takada’s 
approach to the discussion, on the other hand, is unique in that it recognises and 
explores neo-Platonic elements of the debate that had to this point been overshadowed 
in Chaucer criticism by what has been seen as Aristotle’s superior importance.
Takada suggests that the dilemma becomes even more problematic because of 
the categorical nature of the four virtuous subspecies (political virtues, cleansing 
virtues, virtues of the purified mind and exemplary virtues) of each of the fundamental 
four cardinal virtues (prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice), each of which has 
been prescribed to be attainable through a different, hierarchical mode of life. As one 
moves further up the scale of hierarchical virtue, one begins to identify and then to 
separate body from soul until, ultimately, ‘the human mind is in perfect accord and 
unity with the divine Mind’.11 However, it is Takada’s understanding that ‘in 
accordance with his strategy in the Commentary, Macrobius sets store not so much by 
the differentiation of the virtues as by the equal efficiency of the virtues in attaining 
heavenly beatitude. Heavenly beatitude, which the Neo-Platonic tradition held as the
monopoly of philosophers, is now made equally open to the man of action, and this
1 *)revolutionary turn was made possible by the virtues of the ‘political virtues’. Takada’s 
approach, though arguably over-schematised, is certainly critically stimulating.
10 Takada, pp. 109-110.
11 Takada, p. 110.
12Takada,p. 111.
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Ultimately, however, Takada adopts, like many other critics approaching the concept of 
‘philosophical Chaucer’, the premise that Chaucer, as a man of action, will be found to 
be philosophical (and therefore capable of beatitude) in as far as his action -  his poetry 
-  can be interpreted as demonstrating philosophical ideals.
Other critics choose to confront the expected categories of Chaucer’s 
philosophies. Raymond P. Tripp, Jr., for instance, deals with the philosophical concepts 
of ‘contraries’ and ‘plenitude’ in his ‘The Darker Side to Absolon’s Dawn Visit’ in a 
work that directly challenges claims that Chaucer was ‘Boethian’. ‘Suicide, 
assassination, murder, nails driven through the skull, pigs eating babies, conflagrations, 
etc. seem also to be part of God’s much touted “plenty”. Murder and death are plainly as 
much of this world as love and life.’13 Tripp wants to move to an argument that 
discusses in philosophical terms the uncontrollable nature of Love and the unfortunate 
fate of anyone (such as the Franklin’s Arveragus and Dorigen) who attempts to ‘gain 
“soveraynetee” over love through a marriage which is really no marriage, but a 
contractual compromise of mutual tolerance’.14 Tripp makes clear and well-supported 
arguments, but cannot seem to present alternatives to the Boethian approach to 
philosophical Chaucer. Instead, he interprets the material in a new way, still conforming 
to the expected results: Chaucer is Boethian, but perhaps not in the way that critics have 
come to expect.
Chaucer would, of course, have come across several distinctly Platonic ideas in 
Boethius while translating it. For example, his translation includes the passage, V prosa 
6, where Boethius alludes to Plato’s ideas about whether the universe is eternal.15 In 
Boethius, there is a reference to Plato’s discussion of whether the universe is eternal,
13 Raymond P. Tripp, Jr., ‘The Darker Side to Absolon's Dawn Visit’, The Chaucer Review, 20 (1986), 
207-229, (p. 208).
14 Tripp, p. 210.
15 Boece (51-99), p. 466-7. All further references to Chaucer’s work are from The Riverside Chaucer, ed. 
by Larry D. Benson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). Whenever possible, these citations will 
appear parenthetically by line and page numbers.
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without beginning or end. Boethius concludes that, properly speaking, God is eternal 
but the world is perpetual. The world has the ‘property of time’ and God does not.
This sort of passage, familiar to Chaucer, which he had actually translated, 
would have brought Platonic philosophical conundrums (here about the nature of time 
and eternity) into his thinking.16 His familiarity with Boethius, in particular, means that, 
though he knows of Plato, he is receiving ideas from Platonic tradition which prove 
inspirational for him, such as the idea of the flight of the soul out of the body and away 
from error and sorrow (Troilus) but not necessarily associating them directly or 
exclusively with Plato. Just as it is possible to argue that Chaucer may not be 
associating Platonic theories directly with Plato, it may also be possible to argue that, at 
times, Chaucer is not only aware of the Boethian debt to Plato, but is also willing to 
appropriate Plato more directly and without some of the philosophical rigidity 
associated with Boethius.
Beyond Boethius
With an altogether different approach, Holly Wallace Boucher tackles the 
difficult question of the stature of the poet in the fourteenth century and in relation to 
medieval philosophical and theological worldviews, and the decline of that stature 
between what she characterises as Dante’s ‘colossal confidence’ and the uncertain and 
ill-defined role that she claims Boccaccio and Chaucer to have shared. According to 
Boucher, Dante ‘implies that divine secrets are invariably revealed to those who 
blamelessly seek them out: words, by their relation to Logos, possess the inalienable 
power of signs to signify the re a l... Dante and the Queste poet held a common attitude 
toward fiction; they believed their poetry bore a simple and intelligible relationship to
16 I prosa 4, 22-42 (p. 401) also includes Plato’s general ideas from the Republic that cities should be 
ruled by wise men. Ill metrum 11 (pp. 436-7) is about inward sight, freed from the errors introduced by 
the body, which is called ‘the doctrine of Plato’ (Chaucer's translation, III metrum 11,43). In III prosa 12 
(pp. 437-9), Boethius begins with the words (Chaucer's translation) ‘I accorde me gretly to Plato’ and 
agrees on the need to seek truth without the ‘contagious conjunccioun of the body’.
12
17the truth and was an image of the divine order’. However epistemologically 
empowered Dante and the Queste poet appear to be to Boucher, Bocaccio and Chaucer, 
later poets, suffer from the ‘profound’ influence of Ockham’s Nominalism. In short, she 
claims that the necessary link between sign and signified becomes ‘unravelled’ by the 
proposition that the ‘individual is always prior to the universal in the order of knowing’. 
Whereas Dante had a direct connection between the words he used and the truths they 
were meant to reveal, writers by Chaucer’s time had only the ‘ambiguity of symbol 
patterns’ and a Logos that was now ‘only partially available through language’.18
James Dean’s critical perspective is opposed to the strongly Boethian reading 
offered by D.W. Robertson’s interpretation of Troilus and Criseyde. He clearly wishes 
to suggest that The Book o f the Duchess promotes the ‘special powers of the craft of 
poetry’ that ‘allow both poet and listener to re-create the past and in some measure 
bring it to life’.19 With Boucher, however, the discussion is moving towards a renewed 
acknowledgement that it is acceptable to discuss Chaucer’s philosophical traits in non- 
Boethian, non-Aristotelian, non-amorcentric terms. Boucher represents a very small 
proportion of the critical community who are willing to approach philosophical Chaucer 
with this latitude and who are willing to attempt to consider his work outside of (and not 
just in reaction to) the accepted standards of early twentieth century Chaucerianism.
It is illuminating to stand aside from the questions of Aristotelian and Boethian 
influence in Chaucer. Of course, Chaucer relies heavily on the availability of 
Aristotelian manuscripts and mentions ‘The Philosopher’ more often than any other 
thinker. That is not to say, however, that Aristotle is his only philosophical frame of 
reference or, indeed, that one should necessarily ascribe to him any degree of unique 
intellectual eminence above some of the other philosophers (mentioned and implicit)
17 Holly Wallace Boucher, ‘Nominalism: The Difference for Chaucer and Boccaccio’, The Chaucer 
Review, 20 (1986), 213-220 (p. 214).
18 Boucher, pp. 214-15.
19 James Dean, ‘Chaucer’s Book o f the Duchess a Non-Boethian Interpretation’, Modem Language 
Quarterly, 46 (1985), 235-249 (p. 236).
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whose theories, names or influence appear in Chaucer’s works. Avicenna, Averroes, 
Augustine, Ambrose, Anselm, Bradwardine, Dante, Galen, Socrates and Plato all make 
explicit appearances in Chaucer’s texts. Shepherd Godfrey is among several critics who 
have demonstrated how the contemporary theories of Ockham, Bradwardine and Wyclif 
are also confronted in Chaucer’s texts.20 Clearly, Chaucer is neither limited to nor solely 
influenced by the dominance of Aristotelian thought in the late fourteenth century. 
Despite their considerable respective influence on Chaucer’s environment, knowledge, 
subject matter and style, to describe Chaucer as Aristotelian or even Boethian is 
nonetheless to ignore important, and more subtle, philosophical concerns that Chaucer 
may have addressed.
Specifically, this chapter will suggest that there are several other valid ways to 
consider ‘philosophical Chaucer’, and that each perspective brings a new dimension to 
our appreciation of the complexity of his work; these will form the subjects of later 
chapters of this thesis. And although it would not be reasonable to discuss at length the 
influence of all of the philosophers mentioned above, this chapter intends to outline and 
to investigate briefly the curious ways in which Plato and his theories pop up somewhat 
unexpectedly throughout Chaucer’s writing. This thesis does not intend to ‘unravel the 
knot’ or to reveal any secret decoder to the hidden meanings of Chaucer’s philosophical 
works, or even to suggest that such hidden meanings exist to be decoded in the first 
place. Rather, it intends only to acknowledge and to explore the appearance of Plato in 
some of Chaucer’s work in the broadest sense before moving on to explore them at 
length with regard to some of The Canterbury Tales. In doing so, this thesis hopes to 
recognise a significant -  and, for the most part, ignored -  Platonic undercurrent to 
Chaucer’s work and to demonstrate that there is much more Plato in Chaucer than 
modem audiences may have initially appreciated. This chapter will later consider
20 Shepherd Godfrey, ‘Religion and Philosophy in Chaucer’, in Geoffrey Chaucer, ed. by Derek Brewer 
(London: Bell & Sons, 1974), pp. 262- 89.
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passages from The Parliament o f Fowls, Troilus and Criseyde, the Legend o f Good 
Women and the Canon Yeoman *s Tale, to explore how far, even if we cannot reasonably 
suppose that Chaucer was a Platonist in the narrowest sense, we can at the very least 
acknowledge Chaucer’s intriguing interaction with Platonic ideas and sources, and pay 
some critical attention to the interpretive questions these raise.
The Case o f Troilus
To consider the implications of a ‘philosophical Chaucer’ is not a new conceit. 
The proposition that Chaucer wrote about, and possibly in reaction to, the influence of 
late fourteenth-century philosophical discourses has been a vibrant topic of academic 
debate since Kittredge. However it is Lewis’ 1932 article ‘What Chaucer really did to II 
Filostrato’ and the seminal Allegory o f Love that develops from it that provide a 
common point of reference for most of the subsequent discussions, either as 
augmentations to the arguments made by Lewis or as challenges to the theories 
presented therein. An important example is Elizabeth Salter’s 1966 article entitled 
“Troilus and Criseyde”: a reconsideration’. In it, Salter acknowledges C.S. Lewis as a 
magisterial authority: ‘If there is still a need to ‘reconsider’ Troilus and Criseyde’, she 
says, ‘it is not because his directions were substantially wrong, but because many of 
these directions have not been fully explored’.21 In setting Lewis’ The Allegory o f Love 
as the quintessential and almost final critical exercise on Troilus, Salter then divides the 
attention to the poem between those who wish to demonstrate further the poem’s
significance, and those who ‘are set to disturb traditional attitudes by exercising
00ingenuity at the expense of common sense and sensibility’. Salter clearly considers 
herself to be of the former distinction; she seems to present herself as someone who can
21 Elizabeth Salter, ‘Troilus and Criseyde: A Reconsideration’, in Critical Essays on Chaucer’s Troilus 
and Criseyde and his Major Early Poems, ed. by C. David Benson (Open University Press, 1991), pp. 92- 
109 (p. 92).
22 Salter, p. 93.
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expand on the insights provided by Lewis, the essay itself printed as part of a collection 
of essays memorialising Lewis’ death in 1963.
Salter presents Lewis’ ‘What Chaucer really did to II Filostrato’ as the point of 
critical origin for the ideas that later developed into the motivational force behind The 
Allegory o f Love. Lewis’ The Allegory o f Love seeks to concretize a concept of 
consistent medieval courtly love, to explore its allegorical appearance in germinal works 
such as Le Roman de la Rose, and to delineate the special role that authors, including 
Chaucer, play in English poetry in contributing to the ‘family’ of literature begotten by 
the romance and its ideals. In the Allegory, Lewis establishes implicitly one of the two 
premises for what is usually meant by the term ‘philosophical Chaucer’: ‘Chaucer is a 
poet of courtly love’ who, by the time of writing Troilus, ‘has few rivals, and no 
masters’.24 Chaucer’s role in The Allegory o f Love is as a poet who demonstrates the 
pinnacle of fourteenth-century love poetry and who, by doing so, personifies the ‘truly 
medieval and universal’.25
In ‘What Chaucer really did to II Filostrato’, Lewis sets the stage for Allegory 
by explaining how a universal concept of what it is to be ‘medieval’ validates and 
adjusts much of Chaucer’s work. In it, Lewis attempts to demonstrate the nature of 
Chaucer’s treatment of his source texts as a concerted effort by Chaucer to apply a 
system of medievalization to them. Although persuasive and exhaustively researched, 
the 1936 theory itself seems somewhat weakened from the perspective of modem 
criticism by the fact that it assumes that there is a homogenous concept of ‘medieviality’ 
(or, more accurately, a constant and medievally-universal concept of Love) with which 
the source texts can be brought into line. ‘As a poet of courtly love’, Lewis suggests, 
Chaucer had no choice but make modifications to texts that ran counter to the ‘code of
23 C.S. Lewis, The Allegory o f Love: A Study in Medieval Tradition (Oxford: Open University Press, 
1936), p. 161.
24 Lewis, p. 197.
25 Lewis, p. 179.
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courtly love’ to which Chaucer must have subscribed. When Lewis speaks of Chaucer 
writing ‘for an audience who still looked at poetry in the medieval fashion’, he makes 
two assumptions. Firstly, he assumes that Chaucer’s intentions when writing or his 
consideration of an audience were knowable and consistent. Secondly, he assumes that 
any audience’s expectations of his work were likewise categorical. Each of these two 
assumptions seems a step too far. This is criticism premised on the concept of a 
coherent and shared philosophical ‘world view’ in any particular period. In regard to the 
former claim of Chaucer’s intention can we not also reasonably consider Chaucer to 
have taken an inconsistent approach to the purpose of his own writing? Can the Chaucer 
of ‘Troilus’ be defined wholly as a poet of courtly love, or can we not attribute a greater 
scope of flexibility to his motivation? In regard to the claim that there existed a 
definable and universal medieval audience, surely the same questions can be raised. 
Underlying both theses is the concept of a homogenous ‘medievality’ that must have 
permeated both author and audience of the late fourteenth century. In order for the 
theory that Chaucer ‘medievalized’ his sources this concept implies the consistent 
systemisation of beliefs, intentions and expectations to which all aspects of his writing 
can be seen to adhere. This seems unlikely if not wholly unreasonable. And although it 
is hard to argue with the evidence that Lewis presents, or the persuasive manner in 
which he presents it, the underlying principle that there is a constant concept of 
‘medievality’ to which Chaucer directs all of his treatments of II Filostrato seems 
fundamentally problematical, and it is against this consistency that these opening pages 
will argue.
In fact, this thesis intends to argue that Chaucer’s work is almost wholly 
inconsistent, and that his treatment of certain sources such as Plato is definable more by 
his varied use and sometimes self-contradictory nature than by any overriding and 
universal sense of authorial or audiencial expectation. Chaucer could not apply a system
17
of ‘medievality’ to his sources because the invariable model for comparison existed 
neither in the expectations or intentions of author, nor in those of the audience. Instead, 
it seems far more likely that Chaucer employs what Joseph Mogan calls a ‘theme of 
mutability’ in his works, but to a greater extent, perhaps, than Mogan is willing to 
attribute to Chaucer.26 Whereas Mogan identifies a theme of the world ‘in all its 
transitoriness’ throughout Chaucer’s creative and translational works, it seems 
reasonable to apply that same recognition of inconsistency in his approach to the works 
themselves. If, as Mogan suggests, a fundamental lack of stability permeates Chaucer’s 
work, perhaps it might be useful to tolerate such mutability from the author as a whole. 
To return to a more recent Salter, the most prudent approach to the project of exploring 
a philosophical Chaucer seems to be one that expects from him ‘a work of variable and
77fluctuating allegiances’. Such an approach allows us the critical freedom to 
acknowledge allegiances to certain philosophical trends one moment without 
compromising a recognition of antithetical proposition in the next. As a result, the 
previous conclusions that seemed inevitable -  ‘philosophical Chaucer’ is a poet who 
deals mostly with the philosophical concerns of love or agency, both of which are 
normally discussed within the framework of either a concordance or a disharmony with 
Boethian or Aristotelian constructs -  are no longer the only conclusions that the critic is 
allowed to accept, however well-founded they may be. In other words, to admit the 
appearance or even the spectre of Plato is not necessarily to deny the embodiment of 
Aristotle or vice versa. Moreover, this thesis will argue that Chaucer enhances the 
‘Platonic’ implications of Troilus by adding to the Boethian passages images of light 
and transcendence that he took over from Boccaccio’s Teseida.
The ending of Troilus, something Chaucer deliberately added to the plot of II 
Filostrato, comes immediately from Boccaccio's Teseida but, of course, the idea of the
26 Joseph Mogan, Jr., Chaucer and the Theme o f Mutability (The Hague: Mouton, 1969).
27 Elizabeth Salter, Fourteenth Century English Poetry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 140.
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soul ascending to the spheres, once it escapes at death from the body, has Platonic 
origins. John Steadman's Disembodied Laughter, considers the background and use of
*y o
this motif. It is, however, also already a central motif in Boethius' Consolation o f 
Philosophy, especially in IV metrum 1 and, associated there with Boethius' version of
9Qthe myth of Orpheus, in III metrum 12. The end of Troilus seems to show Chaucer 
trying to bring together a pagan philosophical model of body and spirit with a Christian 
world view. Thus his hero has an essentially Platonic escape from the body and the 
world of matter, and mocks at suffering, but Chaucer ends the poem with a prayer to the 
Trinity, and a reference to a loving God, who became incarnate.
Unexpected Plato: The Canon Yeoman's Tale
Without the shackles of Lewis’ insistence on consistency, the modem reader is 
free to embrace the contrariety in Chaucer’s methodology as well as in the works 
themselves. It is with this approach -  neither dismissive of nor determined by 
Aristotelian, Boethian or amorcentric opinions of Chaucer or his work -  which I intend 
to proceed.
Given such an approach, it seems fitting to begin with an unconventional 
reading of one of Chaucer’s most neglected tales: the Canon Yeoman's Tale. The tale 
itself is not overly philosophical in tone, construct or message; it is, for the most part, a 
fairly innocuous tale that spends its entire first half discussing the moral ramifications of 
a life spent seeking the Philosopher’s Stone, and the dangers involved in the practice of 
alchemy. The tale, again, for all of its obvious morality, speaks little to philosophical 
concerns outside the issues of alchemy, which, according to Islamic and Western 
traditions, sees some of its earliest origins in Plato’s Timaeus. The linking of alchemy in
28 John Steadman, Disembodied Laughter: Troilus and the Apotheosis Tradition: A Re-examination o f 
Narrative and Thematic Contexts (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).
29 John B. Friedman, Orpheus in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 90- 
117.
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the tale to its Platonic roots cannot reasonably be seen as anything other than
coincidental, as the popularity of medieval alchemy is well documented if by nothing
else than by the sense of gravity in the Yeoman’s tale. To find Platonic roots to
medieval alchemy is neither original nor challenging to the text. The real challenge,
especially in respect to the critical project at hand, is to explore the personal appearance
Plato makes towards the end of this tale, in a dialogue between him and one of his
students who wishes to be told the secrets of the Philosopher’s Stone:
Also ther was a disciple of Plato,
That on a tyme seyde his maister to,
As his book Senior wol bere witnesse,
And this was his demande in soothfastnesse:
‘Telle me the name of the privee stoon.” (VIII [G].1448)
Plato attempts first to bewilder the student, using terms that were beyond the
disciple’s knowledge, never quite getting to the principle elements of the alchemist’s
tool (1453-1459). When pressed for ‘the roote’, Plato answers:
“Nay, nay,” quod Plato, “certain, that I nyl.
The philosophres sworn were everychoon 
That they sholden discovere it unto noon,
Ne in no book it write in no manere.
For unto Crist it is so lief and deere 
That he wol nat that it discovered bee,
But where it liketh to his deitee
Men for t’enspire, and eek for to deffende
Whom that hym liketh; lo, this is the ende.” (VIII [g ].1466)
In other words, Plato refuses to reveal the principle elements of Magnesia until 
such time that God determines that it will inspire men; until such time as this, the 
philosophers’ secret stays firmly with the philosophers themselves. It is interesting that 
Plato makes an appearance at this point in the Yeoman’s tale. As the penultimate voice 
of the tale, and, indeed, the final authority on the moral justification for avoiding the 
snares of alchemy (to pursue the secret is to make God your enemy) (VIII [G]. 1476), the 
text places Plato as the keynote speaker in a series of ethical denunciations. It may not 
be entirely surprising that Plato should appear as an authority on the matter. Plato, or at 
least the theories he presents in the Timeaus as they appear through Islamic and Latin
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texts, are well-established authorities for alchemy. According to Professor Hamed 
Abdel-reheem Ead, Professor of Chemistry at the Faculty of Science-University of 
Cairo, Plato was among the listed alchemists by Ibn al-Nadlm and appears in various 
forms throughout Arabic alchemical texts. Of course, the theories of Plato available to 
the late fourteenth century alchemists are not as accessible or as influential as those of 
Aristotle. Compared to works written or inspired by Plato, Aristotelian alchemical texts 
are abundant. He is consequently seen by most critics as one of only two quintessential 
Greek contributors to the subject; his availability and popularity allowed great access to 
the Aristotelian advancements on the quadrilateral theory of the earth’s elements, the 
cornerstone by which medieval alchemy and all of its less honourable pursuits 
flourished.
Given the prevalence of Aristotle as the alchemical authority and the relative 
rarity of popular recognition of Plato’s contributions to the subject, Plato’s appearance 
here becomes remarkable. As the author of the explanatory notes to the Canon 
Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale, Reidy points out that ‘this dialogue between Plato and a 
disciple is based on a passage in a Latin translation of an Arabic commentary on an 
allegorical alchemical poem, Epistle o f the Sun to the Crescent Moon’ (Muhammad Ibn 
Umail, ca. 900-960). However, Chaucer probably invented most of the dialogue found 
in the Canon Yeoman’s Tale. He may have come across Plato’s influence through the 
marginalia of a contemporary medieval text.31 With only this loose reference behind it 
and, for the most part, a dialogue composed by Chaucer himself, the text at this point 
begs several questions. Why is Plato used as the terminal testimony in the tale against 
the temptations of alchemy? Why does Chaucer seem to invent substantial lines of 
dialogue and give Plato such a dominant voice? Finally, one cannot help but wonder 
how Chaucer discovers Plato in the first place. Deeply eclipsed by the shadow of
30 ‘Alchemy in Islamic Times’, <http://www.levity.com/alchemy/islam01.html> [accessed 13 February 
2006].
31 Riverside Chaucer, p. 951.
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Aristotle’s spectre over the Middle Ages, how does this tiny shimmer of Platonic 
enlightenment find its way to the author and, ultimately, to the audience? Surprisingly -  
or perhaps expectedly if we are to expect the unexpected from Chaucer’s texts -  this 
enticing flicker of Platonic influence is not unique either in its existence or in the 
inexplicable nature of its appearance. Plato, so it would seem, pops up more often in 
Chaucer’s writing than critics might otherwise anticipate.
Unexpected Plato: The Legend o f Good Women
As another example of ‘unexpected Plato’, one needs only but turn to perhaps 
one of Chaucer’s least overtly philosophical texts: The Legend o f Good Women. The 
tales are, of course inherently moral tales that could be used to demonstrate worthy 
characteristics of legendary women as validly as they are certainly used to demonstrate 
Chaucer’s skill as a maturing writer and storyteller. As critics make their way through 
the well-established lives of the ‘good women’, the reader might find it hard to resist the 
temptation to be swept away by the style and magnitude of the text. The endeavour of 
the work itself, to re-tell already well-known legends, almost necessitates a piece of 
poetry that runs thick with already familiar images and storylines.
Line 525 of the F Text prologue (G514) introduces the ambiguous character of 
Agaton. In the footnotes and explanatory notes to the text, Benson suggests that this 
reference is to the Agathon mentioned in Plato’s Symposium, during which a group of
'VJfriends enter into a story-telling competition, one of which stories is that of Alceste. 
Again, the mention of Plato’s Agathon is remarkable for several reasons, each of which 
should be enough to prick up the critical ear. Initially, readers can be intrigued by the 
changes that Chaucer’s text makes to the source material, especially the invention of 
Alcestis becoming a star (F525). Plato’s version simply states that Alcestis ‘is one of the 
very few to whom, in admiration of her noble action, [the gods] have granted the
32 Riverside Chaucer, p. 1605.
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privilege of returning alive to earth; such exceeding honour is paid by the gods to the 
devotion and virtue of love’.33 Although there is no doubt about Alcestis’ virtue, 
Chaucer’s text seems to augment the reward that she received for her actions. Whereas 
Plato only commits Alcestis to a flower, Chaucer chooses to place her in the stars. He 
could, of course, be exploring the name itself, placing Alcestis where he thinks she 
belongs. He could, on the other hand, be choosing to honour the commitment to love 
that Alcestis makes by rewarding her with what he deems to be a more appropriate 
accolade.
The text does not cease to intrigue the critical imagination with the ‘stellfyed’ 
Alcestis; one is tempted to ask of the Platonic reference in the prologue similar 
questions to those addressed to the Canon’s Yeoman: why Plato, and how? Is it simple 
coincidence that the participants of the Symposium are called, like the poet in the 
Legend o f Good Women, to honour Love? Is it oversimplifying things to notice that the 
premise of the Symposium is a group of hungover gentlemen deciding that instead of 
carrying on where the previous night’s party left off, they would instead have a story­
telling competition? And what of other themes, such as trisexuality -  a theme to which 
this thesis will return -  are their presence in the Symposium and (arguably) in Chaucer 
simply accidental? Like so many other facets of Chaucer’s texts, the answers to these 
questions are elusive at best. At the very least, the reader can see once again how Plato 
permeates Chaucer’s text, even if it is something of a challenge to attribute any kind of 
reasonable explanation. That Plato does appear can be without question; in texts such as 
the Legend o f Good Women, the possible reason behind that appearance or the 
significance of it are still to be resolved.
33 Symposium, in The Dialogues o f Plato, trans. by B. Jowett, 4 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), I, 
479-556. All further references to the Symposium will be to this edition.
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Platonic Chaucer
It is a little easier to explore Platonic theories in Chaucer’s openly philosophical 
works such as Troilus and Criseyde. Troilus is clearly a work concerned with 
philosophical matters such as fate, destiny, agency and love; and these matters have 
been extensively covered by important critics. It may seem fruitless to attempt a new 
approach.
In his comparison of some lines of Troilus with their probable source, Winthrop 
Wetherbee concludes that Chaucer’s changes to the original text imply a Platonic 
influence in the alterations made. ‘Throughout the poem’, Wetherbee states, ‘we will 
see Troilus’s idealism providing the occasion, and at times the material, for the art of 
Pandarus, which translates it into a form that, while paying lip service to the ideal, is 
finally literal to the extreme. Geoffrey’s architect is an artist in a lofty traditional sense, 
a version of the poeta platonicus\ but Pandarus is a mere craftsman, whose wholly 
practical design will be realized within the four walls of an actual (and already existing) 
house’.34 The observation itself is keen, but the real interest here is the claim that 
Chaucer made the alteration to Boccaccio intentionally. In order to do so, of course, he 
would have had to have been aware of the distinction in the roles and stature of poets, 
and, to some extent, subscribe to (or at least be willing to experiment with) the idea that 
such a distinction is valid and worthy of the alterations themselves. According to 
Wetherbee, ‘the effect of Chaucer’s allusion to Geoffrey is thus to foreordain at the 
level of artistic principle the subversion of Troilus’s love and the poem’s moral and 
spiritual vision, which will be the efforts of Pandarus’s artistry’. Wetherbee notes that 
the comparison between Pandarus’ activity and that of an architect refers directly to the 
‘tradition of the Timaeus and late classical neo-Platonism’ and that the correlation that
34 Winthrop Wetherbee, Chaucer and the Poets (London and Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 
p. 79.
55 Wetherbee, p. 79.
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the role of the poet is devalued in accordance to the role assigned to poets in Plato’s 
structure.36
In other passages, Troilus explores this well-known Platonic relationship 
between poetry and artist. For instance, In Book II, Pandarus instructs Troilus on the 
writing of his letter to Criseyde. His opening lines of advice are straight-forward 
enough:
Towchyng thi lettre, thou art wys ynough.
I woot thow nylt it dygneliche endite,
As make it with thise argumentes tough;
Ne scryvenyssh or craftyly thow it write;
Biblotte it with thi teris ek a lite;
And if thow write a goodly word al softe,
Though it be good, reherce it nought to ofte. (1023)
Pandarus tells Troilus to keep it simple: to not be too haughty, nor too business­
like, nor too flamboyant or colourful. He is instructing the lover to construct the letter as 
any other craftsman would construct their ware: with precision and balance. In fact, 
with regard to the advice to use the same well-found words sparingly, he carries on to 
instruct Troilus as if he were a harpist who was capable of playing the best music ever 
heard:
“For though the beste harpour upon lyve 
Wolde on the best sowned joly harpe 
That evere was, with alle his fyngres five 
Touche ay o stryng, or ay o werbul harpe,
Were his nayles poynted nevere so sharpe,
It sholde maken every wight to dulle,
To here his glee, and of his strokes fulle.(1030)
In these lines, Pandarus continues the same neo-Platonic comparison that 
Wetherbee has identified: a writer, a poet, is someone whose art can be codified, can be 
instructed and can be perfected by adherence to the strict rules laid out either by Plato or 
by contemporary conceit. To be an effective love poet is to be nothing more than a 
trained musician who can hit a variety of notes in order to strike the right accord with
36 Wetherbee, p. 79.
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his audience, whoever that may be. To Pandarus, the secret of success in writing the
love letter is to use the right tone, the right words in the right combination to win the
heart of the desired. As Wetherbee has argued, at this point in Pandarus’ instruction,
there is no ‘inner life [...] no archetypal preconception of what he seeks to realize. His
imagination is wholly oriented toward the material world and operates pragmatically’.37
If the reader is to follow Wetherbee’s lead implicitly, the instruction would end here.
However, the text continues, and the tuition takes a brief but unexpected turn:
“Ne jompre ek no discordant thyng yfeere,
As thus, to usen terms of physic
In loves termes; hold of thi matere
The forme alwey, and do that it be lik. (1037)
At this point, the text seems to be suggesting that the external archetypal model
of good poetry does exist, and that it differs significantly from other types of
communication. Pandarus warns Troilus not to mix the terminology of love with that of
medicine, Finally, he insists that the matter of the letter must match its form; what is
produced by Troilus’ hand must match the form of a ‘love letter’ that exists and to
which all love letters must be compared in order to establish their worth. If there is any
doubt over this implied correlation, one only needs to read the next few lines.
For if a peyntour wolde peynte a pyk 
With asses feet, and hedde it as an ape,
It cordeth naught, so were it but a jape. (1041)
In terms of Platonic reference, the reader can approach these final few lines of 
advice from at least two perspectives. Firstly, the text suggests that the material 
realisation of a love letter must match its form, much like the painting of a fish must 
match what a fish actually looks like. If, like a painter who paints the feet of an ass and 
the head of an ape onto the body of fish, a poet utilises inappropriate parts and 
assembles his love letter incorrectly, the letter will not match its form. Consequently, 
the painting and the letter will be nothing more than a joke to its respective audience.
37 Wetherbee, p. 79.
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Seen from this perspective, there is some leniency to allow the text to attribute to poetry 
some kind of transcendent reference. The existence of a form of love poetry implies that 
it is possible and worthwhile to attempt to grasp and to realise an approximation of that 
form. Poetry can, according to the language of those few lines, direct the poet’s 
activities toward understanding an unknowable form.
In a much larger sense, the passage reinforces what Wetherbee suggests: the text 
agrees with a devaluing of the poetic effort as a meaningful exercise, with Platonic 
connotations. Firstly, the reader must acknowledge the comical nature of the lines. The 
image of a fish with an ass’ feet and an ape’s head is comical -  and the poet tells us that 
such a representation would, in fact, be nothing more than a joke. That joke not only 
belittles the erroneous representation, but also belittles the potential of that craft as a 
whole. Neo-Platonically speaking, what enlightenment could possibly come from an 
activity that has the potential and perhaps the propensity for such absurdity? That is, of 
course, not to say that philosophy does not suffer from the same threat; philosophical 
thinking that is likewise incongruous with reality is just as dangerous. It is not, however, 
fimny or absurd and the implications of the unnatural absurdity somehow seem to 
render misrepresentation in painting (and therefore in writing) a more heinous crime. At 
the very least, the comical nature of the ape-ass-fish destroys any gravity or reverence 
for the work; a fate that seems uniquely applied to the arts.
More directly, the passage devalues the poet by the fact that the poet is being 
compared to a painter, someone who, in the Platonic sense, is someone who makes 
copies of copies of things (a topic that will be discussed later in this thesis). The 
analogy, of course, is flawed -  there is no material example that Troilus is meant to 
recreate as the painter would recreate a fish he saw in the stream. However, the 
comparison still serves to relegate Troilus the love poet to an artisan whose best can still 
only be thrice removed from the reality of a perfect form. In this regard, the poet has no
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chance of ever attempting to represent the form itself, and therefore cannot produce a 
piece of poetry that could assist himself or anyone else to glimpse the unknowable. 
According to several passages associated with Pandarus, the poet, like the painter, is 
forever confined to reproducing art that has this world as its subject and is not capable 
of moving his soul towards the neo-Platonic heavens. Interestingly, this is not always 
the way that poetry, or its inherent capacity for philosophical worth, are represented by 
Chaucer’s texts.
In fact, Monica McAlpine argues that Troilus has aspects that point to arguments 
counter to those proposed so far by Lewis and Wetherbee. Initially, McAlpine states 
that ‘when I speak of Chaucer’s use of the conventional medieval concept of tragedy, 
then, I mean the bivalent, type and I use the term “de casibus tragedy’” .38 The two 
motivations of tragedy are that it can be a reactionary force of balance for unethical 
action, or that it can be the external product of the power of Fortune, thus eliminating 
any responsibility or sense of guilt or empowerment. According to McAlpine,
Chaucer’s texts (as well as most late-medieval writers) ‘vacillate’ between the two 
concepts of tragedy (once again suggesting that the only consistent concept of 
‘medievalization’ was inconsistency itself). By making such a claim, McAlpine 
addresses Lewis’ claim that there ever was a consistent and knowable sense of 
medieviality to which Chaucer’s texts could be seen to adhere.
She seems to be arguing for a legitimacy of genre for the comical writing, and is 
adamant that such writing is not necessarily to be seen to be of any less philosophical 
worth. McAlpine states that ‘[Chaucer] answers, point by point, the world view de 
casibus tragedy implies in order to construct an alternative world compatible with 
Boethian philosophy in which both genuine tragedy and genuine comedy can occur’.39 
In other words, McAlpine is questioning any theory (such as Lewis’ or, indeed, Plato’s)
38 Monica McAlpine, The Genre o f Troilus and Criseyde (London and Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1978), p. 20.
39 McAlpine, p. 45.
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that would only permit one significant mode of expression or, in Lewis’ case, only 
subscribe to one unified theory of medieval ideology and culture. By constructing such 
a world where both aspects of a binary comparison have equal worth, Chaucer’s texts 
prepare the way for a more tolerant view towards poetry in relation to neo-Platonic 
terms of value. McAlpine restates what we know to be the case in regard to the neo- 
Platonic hierarchy of thought and activity. However, she adds a dimension not 
previously attributed to Chaucer’s texts, but clearly evident in those of some of his 
sources. Specifically, she addresses one of the philosophic tenets of Boethius’ 
Consolation o f Philosophy, which, simply put, defines (and therefore allows for) the 
existence of a ‘philosophic poet’.
The highest aspiration of Boethius’ art is to construct an image of that divine 
nature which Philosophy proposes as the ultimate object of both man’s knowledge and 
his existence. It is through philosophic arguments and songs, with their interdependent 
definitions, inferences and proofs, that Philosophy attempts to weave a literary whole 
which is an image of the Platonic sphere or circle which is, in its turn, a traditional 
image of the divine nature’.40 Boethius acknowledges that all of man’s mental and 
physical activities should have the same purpose, but also realises that nothing that is 
created physically on earth can, in fact, be a perfect representation of an other-worldly 
form. What is important to Boethius, as McAlpine states, is the endeavour: ‘every 
product of man’s imagination should embody both the aspiration to represent this 
ultimate reality and a confession of its own inevitable failure fully to realize that 
aspiration’.41
To some extent, this human endeavour is what seems to be important to 
Chaucer’s texts as well. At the very least, it would appear that some of Chaucer’s 
writings are trying to address the issue. They are, to use McAlpine’s words in a slightly
40 McAlpine, p. 76.
41 McAlpine, p. 77.
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changed context, trying to ‘contain within its very structure what Plato called the 
antidote to the dangers of poetry: the knowledge of what such things really are’ 42 It can 
be argued that Chaucer’s writing contains Platonic ideas on more than a coincidental 
level. Several of the chapters to follow, specifically the discussion of The Squire's Tale, 
will address the issue of whether the text can be read as an attempt to promote the 
inherent philosophical value of poetry and raise the epistemological estimation of the 
poet and his craft, as prescribed by Platonic political theory.
Plato in The Parliament o f Fowls
Close readings of Chaucer’s text will later constitute the body of this thesis. This 
introductory chapter, on the other hand, concerns itself primarily with the way in which 
Plato or his ghost pop up in Chaucer’s text when we least expect them to. It is to this 
purpose that we must return. As a final exercise in developing the reader’s critical 
willingness to recognise Plato in Chaucer, this chapter turns its attention to The 
Parliament o f Fowls. As with so many other Chaucerian texts, the ‘philosophy’ of the 
tale appears somewhat predictable. If the reader assumes that ‘philosophical Chaucer’ 
will only be found in the debate over Love or in Aristotelian or Boethian echoes, then 
The Parliament o f Fowls is a work that challenges such presuppositions.
Critics can even return to Takada’s points on Chaucer’s texts, in order to adopt 
the same approach already applied to the Canon Yeoman's Tale, the Legend o f Good 
Women and Troilus and Criseyde. For instance, it may be worth considering whether 
one of the effects of The Parliament o f Fowls, as indeed, all of The Canterbury Tales 
discussed in the following chapters, is to question the distinctions of opposition once 
taken for granted (male/female, body/soul, action/contemplation, etc.). There are 
venerable philosophical traditions that might encourage Chaucer and his audience to 
find a balance of opposites, rather than the doctrine of a single truth, an acceptable
42 McAlpine, p. 85.
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approach to such binary opposition. Russell A. Peck asserts that ‘the concept of Love as 
a binder of elemental contraries within nature into a concordant harmony’ is something 
Chaucer would have known through his familiarity with Boethian principles. Kathryn 
Lynch argues that ‘Chaucer carefully leaves his an art of balance and juxtaposition, in 
which no side ever dominates too fully’. We can expand Takada’s ambitious attempts to 
recognise in Chaucer’s work a poetic effort to reconcile (at least in terms of 
metaphysical significance) ‘the two distinct entities of body and soul, with their 
opposing orientations, embodiment and disembodiment respectively’.43 There is no 
logical reason why a similar exercise in exploration cannot be applied to the other 
fundamental institutionalised dichotomies of medieval (and perhaps even of 
contemporary) culture. To do so is not only to attempt to legitimise both sides of a 
conceptually binary construct -  it is not, as Takada suggests, simply a matter of 
releasing the lesser of two opposites from a definition based solely on ‘its negative 
relationship’ with the greater contrary.
By attempting to legitimise equally both pairs of any contrariety, we also begin 
to play with the concepts inherent in the Platonic principle of plenitude, in which all 
manifestations of nature are seen as significantly positive (if not wholly equal) parts of a 
continuum, rather than as essentially negative comparisons to a positive ideal or form. 
J.A.W. Bennett suggests that ‘by accepting the doctrine of plenitude, [Chaucer] took the 
only possible way of putting in its proper place the view of the body as the prison of the 
soul, to which Cicero’s Somnium gives classic expression; and thus provided us with an 
epitome of the philosophic development of the entire Middle Ages’.44 It might be 
slightly ambitious to claim that this one concept grants such an encompassing and 
complete insight to the entire scope of medieval philosophical development. 
Nevertheless, Bennett’s statement illustrates a recognition of the centrality of the debate
43Takada,p. 111.
44 J.A.W. Bennett, The Parlement o f Foules (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), p. 13.
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between Plato’s other-worldly forms, which had enjoyed so much favour across many 
discourses prior to the twelfth century, and the newly awakened (and neo-Platonically- 
flavoured) Aristotelianism of the thirteenth. Bennett goes on to say that to accept the 
portrait of Nature supplied in the Parliament ‘is to reject dualism’, and that the 
developing knowledge and understanding of Aristotelian principles allowed poets to 
ascribe ‘new attributes’ to Nature and ‘set forth the new vision of Nature in bright new
, 45images .
However philosophically important Dame Nature is in the work, Peck suggests 
that ‘the section between Geoffrey’s reading and his encounter with Dame Nature is the 
most ignored portion of the poem. Yet, in some ways, it is the most important’.46 Even 
to the laziest critical eye, it is clear that there must be something important about the 
pre-dream information provided by The Parliament o f Fowls narrator. Nearly one 
hundred lines of ‘pre-dream’ plot -  compared to the almost unbelievably short 5 lines of 
‘post-dream’ narration -  must have some degree of significance. And yet, very little 
critical time is spent on these lines: what has been written recently tends to concentrate 
on the structure and its indebtedness to ancient themes. If we go as far back as Bennett’s 
1957 chapter on the proem in his discussion of the Parliament as a whole, we find a 
somewhat more substantial critical treatment of these curious lines. Bennett appears to 
focus on a conventional conception of Chaucer as being predominantly a ‘love poet’: 
certainly one not unaware of (but equally unconcerned with commenting upon) matters 
of philosophy. Bennett presents Chaucer’s attitude towards the philosophical premises 
assumed in the proem as marked by a nonchalance that borders on the blase: ‘Chaucer 
summarizes his doctrine, neither shunning it nor glossing it over. It was, after all, as 
familiar to him as it was to the Donne of the Anniversaries; and he was to put it into the
45 Bennett, p. 109-110.
46 Peck, p. 298.
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mouth of his Theseus, as cheerful and extrovert a character as could be desired’ 47 In 
fact, throughout Bennett’s exploration of the proem to the Parliament, this picture of 
Chaucer’s indifferent approach to the narrator’s possible philosophical concerns 
continues. His overall judgement is to see that Chaucer’s interest in philosophy was 
secondary, almost as if the overwhelming impact of philosophy on his thirteenth- 
century literary influences was to impress him intellectually rather than to stimulate him 
philosophically:
all we need to remember is that he must have read the poets of the new 
movements with something of the same intellectual thrill that they themselves 
had felt when the new speculations first spread through the ruelles and lecture- 
rooms of Italy and France. No phrase but Miranda’s ‘brave new world’ [...] will 
convey the wonder with which poets and schoolmen alike had gazed through 
Aristotle’s glass, when St. Thomas had polished and refocused it.48
Whereas Bennett points out Chaucer’s awareness of philosophical matters, he 
does not seem to want to explore the possibility that these issues, issues of neo-Platonic 
dualism, Aristotelian realism and the problems that the developments and synthesis of 
these systems propagated, in contemporary discourses, were treated as much as matters 
of intellectual concern for the narrator of Chaucer’s work as they were for those of 
Macrobius and Cicero.
It seems somewhat dismissive to regard the proem to the Parliament simply -  or 
even mainly -  as either a necessary exercise in medieval dream-poetry structure, an 
obligatory acknowledgement of auctoritas, or as the proposition of a neo-Platonic 
straw-man thesis on man’s concern with ‘the common weal’ to be addressed and 
dismissed in the narratio. There is an alternative approach, one which finds Plato a 
presence in more than just a superficial manner. Neo-Platonic Plato -  and the question 
of whether Chaucer writes in conjunction with or opposition to him -  can be seen to 
appear in some important and often ignored parts of the poem.
47 Bennett, pp. 35-6.
48 Bennett, pp. 46-7.
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For instance, if we consider the Dream o f Scipio as Chaucer’s text presents it,
we see several alterations by Chaucer that significantly alter the way the story is
received. Interestingly, many neo-Platonic references from the Dream remain: we are
told of the nine spheres of the heavens and of the celestial ‘musik and melodye’ (62)
commonly referred to in neo-Platonic astrological writings. We read that Chaucer’s
Affrican agrees with Cicero’s where each admonishes Scipio to busy his soul with
matters concerning the commonwealth’ (what Chaucer would refer to as the ‘commune
profit’).49 However, whereas the narrator of Chaucer’s dream tale is given only this
political direction, Cicero’s Afficanus continues by expanding on why such a focus is
important to the journey of the soul. For Cicero, focusing on one’s civic duty keeps
one’s soul ‘in constant action and exercise’ causing it to ‘rise above [the body], and in
contemplation of what is beyond, detach itself as much as possible from the body’
(p.77). According to Cicero, the more active we are on earth exercising our souls in
civic duty, the easier our souls will be able to make the journey to the neo-Platonic
‘home’ of transcendent existence.
Chaucer’s text has no such requirement for the soul’s health that it should return
to the World Soul after bodily death. By eliminating his source’s extended reasoning
behind why humans should focus their energies on attending to the ‘commune profit’,
Chaucer’s text is creatively re-focusing the argument away from the neo-Platonic and
other-worldly distinctions between body and soul and, instead aims the path of human
salvation in the direction of our this-worldly ability and obligation to contribute to a
peaceful, harmonised civilisation. Cicero asserts that:
the souls of those who have surrendered themselves to the to bodily pleasures, 
becoming their slaves, and who in response to sensual passions have flouted the 
laws of gods and of men, slip out of their bodies at death and hover close to the 
earth, and return to this region only after long ages of torment, (p. 77)
49 Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream o f Scipio, trans. and ed. by William Harris Stahl (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1952), p. 72. All other citations from the Commentary will be from this 
edition.
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Chaucer’s version seems to agree with and repeats the sentiment of Cicero’s
passage, adding only the conditions of purgatory and Christian divine Grace that would
have been unavailable to the ancients:
But brekers of the lawe, soth to seyne,
And likerous folk, after that they ben dede,
Shal whirle abouth th’erthe alwey in peyne,
Tyl many a world be passed, our of drede,
And than, foryeven al hir wikked dede,
Than shul they come into that blysful place,
To which to comen God the sende his grace. (78)
As the final words spoken by Affrican, this passage rings with a certain degree 
of foreboding: one is left with a severe warning of what is to happen if the correct focus 
is not placed in our earthly duty to contribute to a civilised community. By the time the 
audience reaches this dramatic end to the narrator’s reading session, Chaucer’s text has 
engaged with neo-Platonism on a number of levels: seemingly picking and choosing, in 
typically Chaucerian ambivalence, which bits are useful, which bits are interesting and 
which bits are altogether worthless to his own construction.
Finally, as night falls, Chaucer’s narrator loses the ability to read Cicero any 
longer, a final reference to the neo-Platonic enlightenment to which the reader has just 
been instructed that he must seek through attention to the ‘commune profit’. This ‘lak of 
lyght’ forces the narrator to retire to bed, and to a quick and dream-filled sleep (87). The 
allegory of light as a symbol of the Good has been associated with Plato since the Cave, 
and with Plotinus since his theory of enlightenment. As Chaucer’s tale shifts from 
‘reality’ of one dream to the abnormality of another, one wonders whether, once again, 
this use of Plato is coincidence or conscious.
What is far more important than any concrete solutions is the question of the 
tolerance of the possibility of Plato in Chaucer’s texts, and the recognition that he 
comes and goes freely and without any direct allegiance to the undeniable themes or 
constructs of Chaucer’s texts. His unexpected appearance in much of Chaucer’s work
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does not necessarily indicate a zealous and consistent rebuttal of the dominant 
Aristotelian theories that overshadowed the late fourteenth century. Rather, modem 
readers must be willing to accept that Plato works his way through Chaucer’s texts in 
some unusual and unexpected ways, sometimes almost intangible yet palpable and 
intrinsic to the overall perspective of these complex works.
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When Neither Man nor Woman is Enough
Contemporary and Medieval Problems with Reading The Pardoner's Tale
37
But two things cannot be rightly put together without a third; there must be some bond 
of union between them. And the fairest bond is that which makes the most complete 
fusion of itself and the things which it combines; and proportion is best adapted to affect
such a union.
Timaeus 31b9
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The critical attention enjoyed by The Pardoner’s Tale was relatively moderate 
until the recent work of Robert Sturges delved into the mysterious nature of the 
Pardoner’s most obvious ambiguity.1 Sturges explores each and every possibility of the 
Pardoner’s sexual and medical situation, discussing at great length the critical options 
that had been presented, as well as those that had been, for the most part, ignored by 
Chaucerian scholarship. When this critical history is taken into account, along with 
many other recent investigations of Chaucer’s works in relation to their presentation of 
issues of gender or sexuality, evidence begins to accumulate that might suggest the 
flexibility of such texts’ general approach towards the subject matter. Today the corpus 
of Chaucerian ‘gender’ studies grows and grows. Recent additions to this body of work, 
such as Stephanie Trigg’s Congenial Souls, Glenn Burger’s Chaucer’s Queer Nation 
and Sharon Farmer and Carol Braun Pasternack’s Gender and Difference in the Middle 
Ages, add to the considerable scholarship already available from the studies of Cadden, 
Hansen, Rigby and Crane. And however comprehensive and seemingly inexhaustible 
these resources are, Catherine S. Cox is among the latest to explore the issues of gender 
in Chaucer’s work, and one of the few to make implicit connections between those 
issues of gender specifically in Chaucer and the specific philosophical foundations upon 
which they are based. Cox draws our attention directly to the Aristotelian (and 
ultimately Platonic) theories that formed the basis of an entrenched opposition between 
male and female. Gender, then, becomes the far more elaborated, more fully and rigidly 
dichotomised social production and reproduction of male and female identities and 
behaviours -  of male and female persons -  in a cultural system for which ‘male/female’ 
functions as a primary and binary model affecting the structure and meaning of many 
other binaries whose apparent connection to chromosomal sex will often be exiguous or
1 Robert Sturges, Chaucer’s Pardoner and Gender Theory: Bodies o f Discourse (New York: St. Martin’s, 
1999).
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nonexistent.2 She also reminds us that the ‘The negativeness accorded the feminine is 
manifest in the hierarchical value structure attached to conventional (Aristotelian and 
Platonic) ideologies of gender difference’.3 Cox’s critical approach to the Pardoner is 
limited mostly to discussions of his relation to portrayals of femininity; in the few pages 
allotted to discuss the Pardoner outright, the ambiguity of his sexuality is taken for 
granted and used to introduce a similar argument for the Summoner. There seems to be 
a general acceptance by Cox’s piece that the Pardoner is problematic sexually, but little 
discussion as to whether the causes for those problems might stem from philosophical 
sources, beyond discussions of the accessibility of Galen’s seven-celled womb. The 
following chapter hopes to address that lack of philosophical scrutiny, and to explore 
the central utility of recognising the medieval prejudices based in ancient philosophy 
which lead to the problems of understanding and articulating the Pardoner’s gender.
Problems with the Two-Sex Gender Model
One might be inclined to think that, in modem approaches to the discourses of gender 
and sex, critics are becoming less inclined to look at a world of infinite complexities 
through the bipolar lenses of Aristotelian and Freudian predecessors. Many aspects of 
modem society are no longer being seen as representative of an innate polarity, but as 
varying degrees of representation along a spectrum of possibilities. One such area of 
polarised outlook that has received much recent scholarly attention is the issue of the 
construction of the binary norms of ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ that have dominated 
the way in which we think about gender.4 It is no longer appropriate to see the world of 
gender as consisting of only two possibilities; it has become impossible to ignore the
2 Catherine S. Cox, Gender and Language in Chaucer (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 
1999), p. 4.
3 Cox, p. 9.
4 See especially Greg Walker and Elaine Trehame’s Writing Gender and Genre in Medieval Literature: 
Approaches to Old and Middle English Texts (Cambridge: Brewer, 2002); Glen Burger’s Chaucer’s 
Queer Nation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003); and of course Joyce Salisbury’s Sex in 
the Middle Ages: A Book o f Essays (New York: Garland, 1991).
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evidence that suggests that human gender exists along a continuum of degrees between 
masculine and feminine. One might be inclined to think that since current gender studies 
have rendered either extreme untenable, that the same would apply to sex. One would, 
for the most part, be wrong.
When looking at what is being written today regarding sex and the role of 
gender studies in criticism, it is encouraging to see the theoretical dissolution of 
normative sexual and gender classifications.5 Most contemporary critics are unreserved 
about the utility not only of examining current social constructions about gender and 
how they affect what we read (and do not read) in medieval literature, but also remind 
the audience of the necessity of ‘unhinging gender identity from sexual identity’ when 
considering the relationship of the reader to the texts.6 However helpful these relatively 
new developments are in shedding light on the material available, the structure adopted 
by many of the proponents of this new direction in sex and gender studies seems itself 
somewhat inadequate to describe the fullness of human experience, at least in terms of 
human sexuality.
If, as Frantzen states, women are not enough and men are not enough, there 
remain some interesting and as-of-yet unanswered questions regarding contemporary
5 It is, of course, imperative to separate the two things, gender and sex. Whereas Partner reminds us of the 
overall utility of separating the two terms, Frantzen articulates what those differences imply: ‘What 
“gender” makes plain, and what is concealed by “sex,” is the relation of sexual identity to power; gender 
is a more powerful analytical concept than sex [...]. Gender also challenges the assumption that 
heterosexual relations, since socially normative, are also natural: gender defines the spaces between 
heterosexual roles and reconfigures the old opposition between male and female. Just as woman was 
“naturally” secondary, the homosexual was “unnatural” and so secondary to the “natural” phenomenon of 
heterosexuality. Gender exposes the dependence of such first principles on other assumptions’, Allen J. 
Frantzen, ‘When Women Are not Enough’, Speculum, 68 (1993), 445-471 (p. 446).
6 Nancy F. Partner, ‘No Sex, No Gender’, Speculum, 68 (1993), 419-443 (p. 423). For discussions about 
the unseen or unrepresented in medieval texts and as a thread in modem literature criticism, see Joan 
Cadden, ‘Sciences/Silences: The Natures and Languages of “Sodomy” in Peter of Abano’s Problemata 
Commentary’, in Constructing Medieval Sexuality, ed. by Karma Lochrie, Peggy McCraken and James 
A. Schultz (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 40-57; Tison Pugh, ‘Queer Pandams? 
Silence and Sexual Ambiguity in Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde', Philological Quarterly, 80 (2001), 17- 
35; and especially Danielle Jacquart and Claude Thomas, Sexuality and Medicine in the Middle Ages 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985). For an excellent discussion of Chaucer’s Absolon as a problematic 
figure for gender and sex, see Greg Walker, ‘Rough Girls and Squeamish Boys: The Trouble with 
Absolon in The Miller’s Tale’, in Writing Gender and Genre in Medieval Literature (Cambridge: Brewer, 
2002), ed. by Elaine Trehame, pp. 31-61, though the issue of intersexuality is never raised (nor, would it 
seem appropriate in the context of his discussion).
41
approaches to sex. For instance, why do modem critical approaches accommodate a 
blurred distinction between the presumed polarities of gender and yet continue to insist 
on discussing sex within the restrictions of a binary system, even if that system has, for 
the most part, been stripped of its interrelated metaphysical values? With so much 
discussion about the unfairness to women of the ‘one-sex’ model imposed by authors 
and critics in the past, why does contemporary academic culture now limit itself to the 
‘two-sex’ model appropriated by most contemporary sex and gender studies? Most 
critics seem willing to allow a certain degree of leeway in their discussion of medieval 
gender roles; there are countless essays investigating medieval issues of ambiguous 
gender. However, in all of modernity’s Foucaultian talk of the social aspects of sexual 
identity and the elusive nature of definite gender roles, modem criticism seems to have 
become unwilling to let physical sexual ambiguity be an answer unto itself.
Problems arise with the concept of a rigidly binary sexual model when we 
consider the anatomic hermaphrodite.7 By their very nature, the hermaphrodite 
embodies the possibility of a triangular relationship rather than a polarised set of 
possibilities.8 To complicate matters further, the literal and literary concept of the 
hermaphrodite cannot be seen simply to have existed as a consistently sexed perception 
throughout history. In fact, the hermaphrodite has always been problematic both to 
science and to literature, due either to their complicating nature within a binary sexual 
construction, or to their fundamental and necessary resistance to such a two-sexed 
model. Furthermore, it is possible that this intellectual stubbornness to be defined by or
7 For the purposes of this essay, it is helpful to describe the hermaphrodite in purely sexual (and 
apologetically clinical) terms: someone who, as the Concise Oxford Dictionary states, has ‘both male and 
female sexual organs.’ And although the term ‘androgynous’ can be used to describe a physiological 
condition, this thesis will consider that particular term in a sociological context only. For discussions 
regarding Chaucer’s works and theories of androgyny, see Pugh’s ‘Queer Pandarus? Silence and Sexual 
Ambiguity in Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde’, above, or Jewell Parker Rhodes’ ‘Female Sterotypes in 
Medieval Literature: Androgyny and the Wife of Bath’, Journal o f Women's Studies in Literature, 1 
(1979), pp. 348-52.
8 For the sake of readability, the possessive pronoun used to refer to the hermaphrodite will be ‘their’, as 
the use of ‘its’ seems to dehumanise the subject and ‘s/he’ or ‘his/hers’ are unsightly and stylistically 
distracting.
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to be confined within sex categories that imply a necessarily exclusive sexual duality 
actually prevents occurrences of intersexuality from being accurately described and 
dealt with as medical and literary subjects. Why, for instance is a modem critical 
audience so inclined towards using terms exclusively descriptive of homosexuality or 
castration when describing Chaucer’s Pardoner, when it might be just as plausible to 
employ terminology that embraces the fact that the Pardoner might be a medieval 
hermaphrodite?
When dealing specifically with the hermaphroditism of the Middle Ages, 
understanding the possible difficulty of its representation helps us to realise that the 
language used to describe their existence may be confused with other types of 
experience (namely, homosexual or bisexual behaviour) which are in fact exclusive 
terms in a binarily opposed sexual division. It then becomes interesting to re-examine 
cases within medieval culture that heretofore have been interpreted as homosexual, 
bisexual or completely incomprehensible behaviour, all of which describe polarised 
genders and sexualities, where it may well be that some of these cases can, in fact, be 
better understood as examples of hermaphroditism.9 Therefore, I intend first to examine 
the medical and philosophical precedent for the medieval concept of the hermaphrodite, 
and then to discuss an historical case - the John/Eleanor Rykener cross-dressing case of 
1395 - and a literary example: Chaucer's Pardoner in light of the problematic expression 
of their sexuality. Each case presents itself as a specific example in which an alternative 
reading of the evidence may, in terms of understanding their gender and their sex, either
9 Current language tags seem unable to deal satisfactorily with a tri-sex model, because of the fact that all 
currently available terminology is confined to a binary system. Terminology such as ‘heterosexual’, 
‘homosexual’ and ‘bisexual’, though representative of a wide-ranging triad, still only describe the sexual 
possibilities of two extremes (one who associated themselves sexually with the same, the other or both), 
and that the term ‘asexual’ removes itself from the equation as it denotes the absence of sexuality. To say 
that someone considers themselves to be a man or a woman, and that to express that that someone 
sexually prefers men (homosexual) or women (heterosexual) or both (bisexual), is not the same as to say 
that someone is or that someone sexually prefers another who is neither man nor woman, but another 
person of a third legitimate sex, a hermaphrodite. While ‘intersexed’ seems to be the best possible 
solution to describe the sex of a hermaphrodite, ‘intersexed’ and ‘intersexual’ still resonate with elements 
of duality and seem somehow insufficient to describe the sex and sexual activity of an intersexed person.
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re-evaluate them in terms of their relationship to a binary sexual system, or take them 
altogether out of the realms of the diverse androcentric scale of sexuality and into a 
uniquely sexed world of their own: that of the medieval hermaphrodite. It is only after 
such an investigation into the problems of medieval representation of hermaphroditism 
that we will be able to speculate whether the medieval concept of intersexuality could 
have been one that allowed for multiple, not binary, understandings. Not only may a 
medieval observer have seen hermaphroditism as a function of male sexuality, but they 
also may have seen it as a reflection of the spectrum of sexuality that we so readily 
allow today in other gender-laden discourses.
Man and Woman as Opposites
When we endeavour to discuss at any significant length the medieval tendency
to group things in pairs of opposites, no two manifestations of contrariety are as readily
available, or as widely discussed in modem studies as those of Man and Woman. Within
the discourses of sex and gender, we see that the medieval concept of contrariety is
confused and ultimately indecisive. On one hand, an argument exists that the late
medieval concept of sexuality allowed for an infinite degree of variation between male
and female. On the other hand, a great deal of evidence exists that suggests that the
medieval concept of sexuality is completely defined by ideas of opposition, that there
are, in the mind of the medieval person, two opposing sides of the sex coin: male and
female. One side -  the male side -  is defined as having the ‘greatest, best, fairest, most
perfect’ that what it is to be human has to offer.10 On the other hand, woman is seen as
the degenerate man -  a model of incomplete development and nothing more than the
manifestation of a degree of privation of the inert human potential: ‘But the female is
10 Timaeus, 92c9-10, in The Dialogues o f Plato, trans. by B. Jowett, 5 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1953), in, pp. 706-780 (p. 780). All other citations of the Timaeus will be from this edition. Although this 
passage actually refers to God, the superlative sentiment applied the Intellectual applies as well (in a 
lesser degree to that above it and to a great degree to that below it) to any Thing that is seen as the 
exemplar of its species. As men are identified as the best a human can be, these attributes can be said in 
relative terms to apply to men as opposed to women.
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opposite to the male, and is female because of its inability to concoct and of the 
coldness of the sanguineous nutriment’.11 Perhaps this discussion of the medieval 
concept of sex would be best initiated if it starts with a system of opposition that is, to 
some medieval mindsets at least, easy enough to comprehend: that of distinguishing, 
categorising and evaluating anatomic sex in reference to a systematic devaluation of the 
female human as a oppositional privation of the human male. By first establishing what 
it means to be female -  in the medieval frame of reference, of course, to what it means 
to be male -  we can then move on to discuss how the medieval concept of the 
hermaphrodite can be seen either as a variation of the deficient male (thus placing it in 
line with the two-sex model of gender), or as the legitimate and necessary third element 
of mediating sexuality between two opposing contraries.
In order to understand how women were perceived primarily as degenerate men, 
it may be helpful first to appreciate what the contemporary understanding of the 
physiological origin of women was, and how this affects the way in which their 
metaphysical nature is perceived. As with so many of the medieval evaluative concepts, 
the fourteenth century concept of what it meant to be ‘woman’ has its basis in much 
older thought. Women suffered a detrimental philosophical evaluation based on a 
presumed physiological deficiency from the very beginning.
Plato deals with the creation of human beings most famously in three dialogues: 
Symposium, the Republic and Timeaus. In the Symposium, the earliest of the three 
works, Plato tells us that the original human being was a circular, four-armed and four­
legged creature, who was all sexes in one:
11 Generation o f Animals, 766b 17-8 (p. 1186), in The Complete Works o f Aristotle, trans. by A. Platt, ed. 
by Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), I, pp. 1111-1218. Aristotle goes 
on to declare that ‘those of a moister and more feminine state of body are more wont to beget females, 
and a liquid semen causes this more than a thicker; now all the characteristics come of deficiency of 
natural heat’ (776b30-3).
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The sexes were not two as they are now, but originally three in number; there 
was man, woman, and the union of the two, having a name corresponding to this 
double nature, which had once a real existence, but is now lost, and the word 
'Androgynous' is only preserved as a term of reproach [.. .]Now the sexes were 
three, and such as I have described them; because the sun, moon, and earth are 
three; and the man was originally the child of the sun, the woman of the earth, 
and the man-woman of the moon, which is made up of sun and earth.12
The gods, fearing of the power of this creature and its potential to usurp their
own position, sliced the creature in two and, eventually, manipulated the remnants such
that the two halves would desire each other and be naturally inclined to perpetuate the
species. Where once there were three sexes, there now remained only two, as
Men who are a section of that double nature which was once called 
Androgynous are lovers of women; adulterers are generally of this breed, and 
also adulterous women who lust after men: the women who are a section of the 
woman do not care for men, but have female attachments; the female 
companions are of this sort.13
For some reason, the physiological associations of a tri-sex model have been 
incorporated into a sociologically binary model. This version of the creation myth does 
not address the physical degeneration of men into women; nor does it account for the 
development of hermaphrodites. Women, according to this model, are physiologically 
equal to men, and intersexed individuals are not recognised.
Moving from a mythological argument of sexual degeneration to a social 
argument of gender opposition, it only gets slightly better for women in the Republic. 
When considering the woman’s place as possible warriors in his Republic, Plato asks ‘Is 
she capable of sharing either wholly or partially in the actions of men, or not at all?’14 
His response is, again, a relative judgement that is subtly misogynistic: ‘all the pursuits 
of a man can naturally be assigned to women also; but in all of them a woman is weaker 
than a man’.15
12 Symposium, 189d6-el90b3 (p. 521).
13 Symposium, 191d5-e3 (p. 523).
14 Plato, the Republic, 453a3-5, in The Complete Works o f Plato, trans. by B. Jowett, 5 vols. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1953), n, pp. 1-500 (p. 306). All further references to the Republic will be from this 
edition.
15 Republic, 454d9-el (p. 310).
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Plato’s third account of the creation of Woman in the Timeaus is hardly 
encouraging:
On the subject of animals, then, the following remarks may be offered. Of the 
men who came into the world, those who were cowards or led unrighteous lives 
may with reason be supposed to have changed into the nature of women in the 
second generation.16
The original women, according to Plato, were degenerate men, men who were found
lacking in morality in a previous life. As a sign of their cowardliness or lack of
masculinity, they were not returned to their star of origin but, rather, sent back to an
earthly existence as something that was less than the potentiality expressed by being a
male. To be female was to be second-best, runner-up.
Aristotle does not offer much more hope for women. His account of the
physiological factors involved in the procreation of a female of any species set out his
stall, so to speak. Females are formed, in short, when there is not enough heat created in
the ‘sanguinea’ to form a strong enough heart to nourish the developing embryo:
But the female is opposite to the male, and is female because of its inability to 
concoct and of the coldness of the sanguineous nutriment [...] And those of a 
moister and more feminine state of body are more wont to beget females, and a 
liquid semen causes this more than a thicker; now all of these characteristics 
come of deficiency in natural heat.17
Aristotle has established three important distinctions that will reside in most 
aspects of the medieval evaluation of gender. First, he establishes that men and women 
are opposite: they have different states of body that pose them against one another on a 
binary system of categorisation (active/passive, form/matter, dry/wet, hot/cold, etc.). 
Secondly, he claims that the conception of a female offspring is because of an inability 
of the female during her role in procreation. It is her inability to generate enough heat in 
the heart of the developing child that results in yet another female being bom. Finally, 
he establishes that the root of all of these problems is an inherent deficiency in the 
female body: it lacks the heat and the relative dryness of males (specifically, the female
16 Timaeus, 90e5-91al (p. 778).
17 Generation o f Animals, 766a30-b34 (p. 1186).
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sperm is too wet and cold) and therefore are incapable of proper reproduction. In the
Generation o f Animals, he concludes:
The reason [that male babies are more often deformed in humans than females] 
is that the male is much superior to the female in natural heat, and so the male 
foetus moves about more than the females, and on account of moving is more 
liable to injury [...]. For females are weaker and cooler in nature, and we must
1 filook upon the female character as being sort of natural deficiency.
Aristotle’s condemnation of women does not end with their role in procreation;
he addresses their role in society as well, with equally damaging medieval ramifications.
In fact, he goes as far in his Politics as to assign to women a similar (but not quite
identical) role to slaves in the State:
In the first place there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each 
other; namely, of male and female, that the race may continue (and this is a 
union which is formed, not of choice, but because, in common with other 
animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an 
image of themselves), and of natural ruler and subject, that both may be 
preserved. For that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature lord 
and master, and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a 
subject, and by nature a slave, hence master and slave have the same interest.19
Women are placed by this passage into the role of a suitable means to a just end: 
the physical vessel capable of carrying out Man’s unique intellectual insight into the 
importance of regeneration. In such a comparison, Woman is akin to the slave, as she 
exists only to actualise the just will of the master. Aristotle makes some half-hearted 
distinction between women and slaves when he allows that, unlike slaves and the 
women of the Barbarians, women of the State make things for a purpose.20
Chaucer recognises Aristotle’s influence over a contemporary evaluation of 
woman in society. For instance, in the Tale ofMelibee, Melibee paraphrases 
Aristotelian advice that ‘in evil counsel women far outstrip men’ (vil.1089) during his 
discrediting of the worthiness of women’s counsel. His misunderstanding of the 
Philosopher’s guidance is soon corrected by Prudence, as are the other four reasons
18 Generation o f Animals, 775a5-15 (p. 1199).
19 Politics, 125a25-34 (pp. 1986-1987).
20 Politics, 1252b2 (p. 1987).
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Melibee gives for not listening to his wife. Blamires argues that the discussion of the
‘dos and don’ts’ are influenced heavily by established medieval ‘protocols of counsel’,
and that Melibee’s inability to follow those protocols is accentuated by Prudence’s strict
adherence to them.21 The debate over whether Chaucer was expressly antifeminist is not
the subject of this passage or this thesis; it cannot be addressed at any length here. What
needs only to be recognised is the awareness of the text in regard to the Aristotelian
authority over medieval sociological constructs.
In fact, by the time the issue of gender reaches the early Middle Ages, women
have made some inroads into philosophical estimation, but not much. Augustine seems
to put a Christian slant on the arguments presented by Plato and Aristotle. From a
Christian point of view that necessarily prohibits reincarnation, Augustine cannot accept
the Platonic premise that women are men who have been somehow punished for the
misdeeds of a past life.22 Instead, Augustine’s references to women’s place below men
all refer to biblical precedent for the rule of man. In one of many examples (notably
from City o f God and On the Literal Translation o f Genesis) where Augustine takes the
righteous place of man above woman as a matter of fact, he states:
We cannot, however, interpret ‘male’ and ‘female’ as symbolising something 
else in each individual man: for example, the distinction between the ruling 
element and the ruled.23
However much we would like to excuse Augustine for being nothing more than 
a passive product of his environment, the fact remains that he subscribed to and 
proliferated the theory that women were by nature inferior and subservient to men. On a
21 Alcuin Blamires, Chaucer, Ethics and Gender (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 66-7. See 
also Blamires’ discussion on the legacy of perceived physiological difference between men and women in 
Woman Defamed and Woman Defended: An Anthology o f Medieval Texts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1992), pp. 38-45.
22 Timaeus, 90e6-91al (p.778).
23 Augustine, The City o f God Against the Pagans, trans. by R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), XIV.22 (p. 622). Another lengthy discussion can be found in On the Trinity, XII.9, 
wherein Augustine regards women as the image of God only when joined with a husband. Otherwise, she 
is ‘referred separately to her quality as help-meet, which regards woman herself alone, then she is not the 
image of God; but as regards the man alone, he is the image of God as fully and completely as when the 
woman too is joined with him in one’ (Augustine, On The Trinity, trans. by Rev. Marcus Dodds 
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1873), p. 292.
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more sophisticated and metaphysical level, woman’s souls were considered to be
associated with a lower level of the mind than those of men’s, thus making it impossible
for women ever truly to visualise God.24 It is hard to grant Augustine any feminist
amnesty, however, when we read in Augustine passages such as:
As the master, the man gave a name to his woman, his inferior, and said, “Now 
this is bone from my bones, and flesh from my flesh.” “Bone from my bones” 
perhaps on account of fortitude. “Flesh from my flesh” on account of 
temperance. For these two virtues, we are taught, pertain to the lower part of the 
mind that the prudence of reason rules.25
When Augustine refers to the Biblical statement that ‘she was made as man’s 
helper’, ‘He is ruled by wisdom, she is ruled by the man’ and ‘the order of things makes 
her subject to man’ we can hardly ignore the fact that he, too, presents us with a natural, 
righteous and inescapable hierarchy between men and women. Again, one can see 
how, in the Tale o f Melibee, this sentiment is addressed, as Prudence defends herself by 
stating that ‘if wommen were nat goode, and hir conseils goode and profitable, oure 
Lord God of hevene wolde nevere han wrought hem, ne called hem help of man, but 
rather confusioun of man’ (vn.l 103). Prudence is at once reinforcing the subjugation of 
woman to man and, simultaneously, empowering that position as one of divine 
providence. In other words, Prudence’s use of the biblical passage reiterates the fact that 
God made Woman to be Man’s helper for a reason: their counsel and help is not only 
worthwhile, it is part of God’s plan.
Knowing as we do how influential Plato and Aristotle are throughout the 
thought of Aquinas, it should come as no surprise that Aquinas does not greatly advance 
the position of women. His views, summarised in the four articles on ‘The Production 
of the Woman’ in the Summa Theologica, both rely on and dispute Aristotelian claims 
about women. In Question One (Whether the woman should have been made in that
24 On The Trinity, XII. 13.20, pp. 300-1.
25 Augustine, Anti-Manichean Writings, II. 13.18, in St. Augustine on Marriage and Sexuality 
(Washington, DC: Catholic University Press of America, 1996), p. 38.
26 Anti-Manichean Writings, n. 11.15, pp. 39-40.
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first production of things?), Aquinas concludes that woman is misbegotten only when
viewed in reference to man, because
[...] the active force in the male seed tends to the production of a perfect 
likeness in the masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from defect
9 7
in the active force or from some material indisposition.
In the other four points of the question, their objections and his answers,
Aquinas concludes that it is logical and proper for woman to have been made from man 
(for many reasons, not the least of which is that man might love her more if he knows 
that he had a hand -  or a rib -  in her creation), that it is logical and plausible that the rib
70
was taken from Adam without pain and was then augmented by God into Eve, and 
that it is perfectly all right that God made Woman as the by-product of Man; it is His 
right as the supreme being to forego normal laws of nature and, should He so choose,
70‘produce either a man from the slime of the earth, or a woman from the rib of man’.
Paul E. Sigmund argues that, while the Aristotelian and Augustinian notion insisting 
that women are meant only to assist men in procreation is present in his work, Aquinas 
denies that a woman is a malformed or ‘misbegotten’ man. Instead of being the product 
of any conceptual mistake, women are, he says, according to Aquinas, the result of a 
force of nature that is ‘directed to the work of procreation’. Clearly, nevertheless, we 
see that the fundamental physiological conception of ‘woman’ is predicated on the 
belief that to be a woman or to produce one in reproduction is the direct result of some 
kind of privation.
For some reason, there existed in the medieval concept of anatomic sex a 
reluctance to allow the Platonic, Aristotelian and neo-Platonic theory of graduation that
27 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, ed. and trans. by Timothy Suttor, 61 vols (London: Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1970), Q92.A1. All other references to Summa Theologica will be from this series, with 
section relative editors and translators duly identified.
28 Interestingly, Aquinas takes the time to rationalise why the rib was selected. Had Eve been made from 
a part of Adams’ head, she would have some claim to ‘authority over man’; had she been grown from his 
feet, she would have been subject to Adam’s ‘contempt as his slave’ (Summa Theologica, Q92.A 3).
29 Summa Theologica, Q92.A 4.
30 Anti-Manichean Writings, II. 11.15, p. 40.
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would normally apply to the extremes of any set of opposites. Arthur O Lovejoy states
that Aristotle was a firm believer that
Nature refuses to conform to our craving for clear lines of demarcation; she 
loves twilight zones, where forms abide which, if they are to be classified at all, 
must be assigned to two classes at once. And this insensibly minute gradation of 
the differentness is especially evident at precisely those points at which common 
speech implies the presence of profound and well-defined contrasts.31
He is, of course, referring to passages in Aristotle that refer to the natural 
occurrences that seem to blur the lines between plant and animal.32 Lovejoy also cites a 
passage from Generation o f Animals, in which Aristotle describes ‘testacea’, which are 
‘partly like and partly unlike those in the other classes’.33 Whereas Lovejoy implies that 
these two passages demonstrate a theoretical tolerance for species inhabiting a sort of 
‘middle ground’, he fails to notice that the application of the categorical leniency seems 
only relevant to species that appear to cross the demarcated lines between other species; 
there is no indication that the same tolerance is to be shown for problematic examples 
within any given species. In fact, when Aristotle specifically discusses the production of 
a hermaphrodite at a later point in the Generation o f Animals, his assessment of the 
causation of the ‘monstrosity’ is not tolerant at all.34 According to Aristotle, 
hermaphrodites occur when an excess of the male generative material is gathered more 
‘than is required by the nature of the part’.35 However scientific and disinterested his 
account for the creation of an intersexed individual is, his evaluation of their nature is 
far more subjective. In short, a hermaphrodite is ‘contrary to nature’; one set of its sex 
organs ‘is attached like a tumour’ as a result of insufficient nourishment. Whatever
31 Lovejoy, Arthur O., The Great Chain o f Being: A Study in the History o f an Idea (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 56.
32 Aristotle, History o f Animals, in The Complete Works o f Aristotle, ed. by Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 774-993, 588b4-18 (p. 922).
33 Generation o f Animals, 761al2-13 (p. 1178).
34 Most of Book IV of Generation o f Animals deals with congenital irregularities, all of which Aristotle 
classifies as ‘monstrosities’. For the specific discussions of the human hermaphrodite, see 772b26-37 (pp. 
1195-6). See also Augustine’s On The Trinity, xn.8 (p. 290), as he uses the same word to describe the 
same condition.
35 Generation o f Animals, 772bl3-15 (p. 1195).
36 Generation o f Animals, 772b26-31 (p. 1195).
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claims of continuity and inter-species flexibility Lovejoy wishes to make in defence of 
Aristotle, they cannot apply to the seemingly special case of the hermaphrodite. As 
Lorraine Datson and Katherine Park remark, ‘This model expressed the characteristic 
Aristotelian interpretation of sexual difference, which presented male and female less as 
points on a spectrum, in the Hippocratic manner, than as polar opposites admitting no 
meaningful mediation’.
With Platonic thought, however, we have seen a complete reliance on the 
necessity of mediating principles. It is, after all, Plato who declares that ‘two things 
cannot be rightly put together without a third [...]. And the fairest bond is that which 
makes the most complete fusion of itself and the things which it combines’.38 How then, 
do the diverse medieval communities make the transition from this insistence on a 
common ground between opposites that would necessitate the existence of the 
hermaphrodite to the Aristotelian denouncement of this mediation as a cancerous 
abnormality against nature?
37 Lorraine Datson and Katherine Park, ‘The Hermaphrodite and the Orders of Nature’, in Premodem 
Sexualities, ed. by Louise Fradenburg and Carla Freccero (London: Routledge, 1996), 117-137 (p. 119).
38 Timaeus, 3 lb9-11 (p. 718).
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The History o f the Concept o f the Hermaphrodite
Chaucer’s Pardoner raises questions about how his period regarded intersex states. The 
ensuing pages will necessarily consider philosophical theories available to Chaucer’s 
world, literary treatment of intersexuality (especially in Ovid), and possible implications 
of contemporary awareness in Chaucer’s society of intersex individuals. Exploring for a 
short while the attitudes towards the intersex state which would have informed the 
medieval awareness of and disposition towards intersexuality may help to explain the 
surprisingly nonchalant manner in which the subject is introduced by the character of 
the Pardoner. Chaucer’s casual, almost indifferent introduction of the Pardoner as a 
sexually ambiguous character suggests that modem readers may have more questions 
regarding the acceptance of him than Chaucer or his audience might have had. If 
nothing else, the Pardoner raises some questions about the social normality of sexual 
ambiguity, and it is to those questions that this thesis will return shortly.
Although the scientific recognition of living organisms with two sets of genitals 
dates back to antiquity, the medieval mythological concept of hermaphroditism springs 
primarily from Ovid's tale of intersexuality in Metamorphoses (8 AD).39 In general, we 
know that Chaucer was deeply knowledgeable about Ovid’s work, as it is mentioned in 
the prologue to the Man at Law’s Tale (11.93). Ovid’s Metamorphoses is mentioned 
throughout the Tales, and is a source for the Manciple’s Tale and parts of The Book o f 
the Duchess, and The Legend o f Good Women. The Ovidian tale refers to 
Hermaphroditus,40 who, although decisively male-sexed, had ‘a resemblance to his 
father and to his mother’.41 While swimming in a stream, he is attacked by the naiad 
Salmacis:
39 See above and, for more information, Beryl Rowland’s ‘Animal Imagery and the Pardoner's 
Abnormality’, in Neophilologus, 48 (1964), 56-60 (p. 57).
40 Originally, the gods in question were Hermes and Aphrodite - thus giving us the term ‘hermaphrodite’.
41 Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. by Frank Justus Miller (London: William Heinemann, 1928).
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For their two bodies, joined together as they were, were merged in one, with one 
face and one form for both. As when one grafts a twig on some tree, he sees the 
branches grow one, and with common life come to maturity, so were these two 
bodies knit in close embrace: they were no longer two, nor such as to be called 
one, woman and one, man. They seemed neither, and yet both.42
We see that, at the very least, the original union is not welcomed by the victim, 
Hermaphroditus. Salmacis is represented as a violent and destructive parasite; she is a 
snake hindering the flight of an eagle, an ivy suffocating a tree, and a multi-limbed 
squid who kills its prey by ‘wrapping its tentacles around it on every side’.43 
Hermaphroditus, the descendant of Atlas, resists stubbornly, denies the nymph all 
pleasure, but finally gives in and submits himself to her embrace.44 The combination of 
Hermaphroditus’ and Salmacis’ bodies yields a new being, somewhere between man 
and woman, and not only causes the boy to lament his own transformation, but also 
inspires him to cry out a curse upon all other men who bathe in the stream.45
Ovid's concept of hermaphroditism is negative in this tale: all of the terms used 
to describe the act of becoming intersexed are decisively unfavourable. However, the 
terms are in relation to the loss of Hermaphroditus’ masculinity, rather than a reflection 
of a general objection to intersexuality. Whereas Ovid quite casually refers to Sithon, 
who ‘hovered between both sexes, now male, now female’,46 without any mention of 
remorse or deformity, the curse of Hermaphroditus is consistently described in terms of 
a horrendous loss of manliness. Hermaphroditus specifically becomes less than a man, 
and his voice is no longer masculine: ‘Ergo ubi se liquidas, quo vir descenderat, undas 
semimaremfecisse videt mottitaque in illis membra, manus tendens, sed iam non voce 
virilV 41 The stream ‘enervates with its enfeebling waters and renders soft and weak all 
men who bathe therein’.48 The term ‘hermaphrodite’, therefore, cannot be seen to carry
42 Ovid, p. 205.
43 Ovid, p. 205.
44 Ovid, p. 204.
45 Ovid, p. 205.
46 Nec loqour, ut quondam naturae iure Novato ambiguous fuerit modo vir, modo femina Sithon (p. 198).
47 Ovid, p. 205.
48 Ovid, p. 199.
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with it from its literary genesis any preconceptions of objective negativity, but, rather, 
negative connotations in relation to masculine imperfection, change, lack, deformity, 
weakness or privation.49
In Aristotle, we see the first systematic discussions of privation as a necessary 
component of becoming. In fact, Aristotle’s definition of privation is intimately 
connected with his definition of the principle of contrariety.50 Aristotle’s discussion of 
privation in the Physics leads him to conclude that it is itself a kind of form (193b 19-21, 
p. 330) and can be subsequently seen as one of the three fundamental aspects of the 
category of substance (201a4-9, pp. 342-343).
For Augustine, on the other hand, privation takes a far more substantial role. 
Although he never addresses the specific subject of gender, Augustine combines the 
Aristotelian principle of privation with the neo-Platonic principle of emanation to 
deduce that privation is a defection of a quality of a thing that has inherently more 
potential than it exhibits in existence. Because all created things are necessarily good, 
privation becomes the principle by which Evil is formed, as Evil is defined by the 
deliberate turning away from God to favour a lesser good (as in one’s self or material 
things).51 Considering Augustine’s ubiquitous influence on medieval Western 
philosophy, it comes as no surprise that most philosophers who follow him take up the 
general topic of privation at one point or another.
Boethius’ acceptance of the Augustinian definition of good is the entire premise 
of the Consolation o f Philosophy ; Anselm extends the concept to include the privation
49 Paul Vincent Spade, ‘Medieval Philosophy’, in The Oxford Illustrated History o f Western Philosophy, 
ed. by Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 55-106 (p. 60). Spade reminds us that 
privation is a fundamental principle by which the moral value of any thing may be assessed. Spade states 
that privation is the concept by which something is determined to be something less than it either 
metaphysically or physiologically ought to be. It cannot be underestimated how important the concept of 
privation was to the ancient and medieval thinkers. In an ancient system where all things are ultimately 
the Effects of a necessarily good Cause, and a medieval system in which that Cause is a necessarily good 
God, the concept of privation plays a decisive role in the ability of medieval Christian thinkers to deal 
with manifestations of the Good that are not so good: Evil, for instance.
50 Physics, 225b3-4 (p. 381).
51 See On Free Will, III. 1.1 for Augustine’s discussion of evil as a choice to turn away from the Good.
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S'}of good as the loss of the intrinsic human justice and beauty. Peter Abelard’s (1079- 
1142) relationship with privation was a very personal matter, as he was castrated by the 
uncle of his lover Heloise.53 Martin Irvine recognises that the removal of Abelard’s 
testicles gave his enemies the excuse to dismiss him on the most basic level; denying 
him even the very fundamental elements of identity.54
Irvine goes on to suggest that Abelard’s emasculation ‘is a sign of a deeper lack, 
a deficiency or erasure of virtus, which alone allows the true performance of 
masculinity’. Abelard is lamenting and being ridiculed not for what he is per se, but 
what he is in light of what he should be. Necessarily operating within a philosophical 
and social world in which the privation of male sex organs is inseparably linked to a 
scale of human perfection, he is forced to use his mind and his writing to, as Irvine says, 
‘perform through his books, a claim to this inner virtus, a fantasised phallus-substitute, a 
re-identification with symbolic power’: he uses his intellect and his writing to reclaim 
that of which he has been deprived. In this sense, Chaucer’s Pardoner might be seen by 
a contemporary audience to be suffering from a lack of positive masculinity when he is 
described as possibly being a ‘geldyng’. As such, any number of assumptions regarding 
his character could be made, ranging from the most pious (voluntary or ‘immaculate’ 
castration to serve God) to the most perverse (forced castration as punishment for any
52 Sin - evil as privation, privatio boni - strips the world of its beauty and order; when man commits a sin 
he ‘disrupts that part of the world’s order, that is, its beauty, revealed in him’ (Cur Deus Homo (Chicago: 
Open Court Publishing, 1939), pp. 208-10). See also Robert D. Crouse, ‘The Augustinian Background of 
St. Anselm's Concept of Justitia’, Canadian Journal o f Theology, 4 (1958), 112-13.
53 Oxford Illustrated History, p. 83.
54 Martin Irvine, ‘The Pen(is), Castration, and Identity: Abelard's Negotiations of Gender’, [Accessed 15 
August 2003], < http://www.georgetown.edu/labyrinth/conf/cs95/papers/irvine.html>. According to 
Irvine, Abelard has no identity in Roscelin's view: he is neither monk nor cleric or layman, and he has no 
name, not even Petrus, since a masculine proper name loses its signification once its subject changes 
gender: ‘But, to be sure, you are lying that you can be called “Petrus” from conventional usage. I'm 
certain that a noun (nomen) of masculine gender, if it falls away from its own gender, will refuse to 
signify its usual thing (rem). For proper nouns usually lose their signification when the things signified 
fall back from their own completion. A house is not called a house but an imperfect house when its walls 
and roof are removed. Therefore since the part that makes a man has been removed, you are to be called 
not “Petrus” but “imperfect Petrus”. It is relevant to this heap of human disgrace because in the seal by 
which you seal your stinking letters you form an image having two heads, one a man and the other a 
woman.. I have decided to say many true and obvious things against your attack, but since I am writing 
against an imperfect man, I will leave the work that I began incomplete’.
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one of a variety of sexual crimes).55 Either way, the nature of the Pardoner is 
ambiguous; the principle of privation as a precaution is, however, the overriding 
impetus in both explanations. When the text refers to the Pardoner either as a gelding or 
a mare, it is possible to read ‘gelding’ as the more abhorrent option, as it would imply 
an unnatural and unholy state of being due to its state of deviant privation.
Aquinas deals specifically with the privation of good in De Malo\ it is safe to 
say that every medieval thinker dealt with privation in some way or another. Although 
we do not have the time at present to give full attention to a discussion of Evil as a 
privation of good, we should at least understand that by the late medieval period, the 
principle of privation continues to play an important role in the evaluation of most 
aspects of philosophy and physiology. In the physiological examples of the medieval 
woman, eunuch and hermaphrodite, the case for a lower status rested entirely on a 
presumption of privation. The standard for that measurement was, of course, the 
supposed philosophical pre-eminence of the male body as a biologically complete 
human being.
The gender-based negativity associated with hermaphrodites seems to have been 
consistent with other discourses as well, specifically with medicine and philosophy. 
Much earlier than Ovid, Aristotle presents a fundamentally dualistic approach to the 
reproduction of the human species, and, by extension, the relative error that occurs in 
order to produce a hermaphrodite. Aristotle's works (especially History o f Animals, c. 
350 BC) ‘invoke pairs of opposing qualities’: male and female, form and being, effect 
and cause.56 In his description of the reproductive process, Aristotle describes the
55 Irvine lists at least one example of the former and several examples of the latter.
56 Joan Cadden, Meanings o f Sex Difference in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), p. 23.
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formation of a hermaphrodite in terms of this polarised view of reality and of the sexes;
57his work sets precedents for the hierarchical distinctions between male and female.
Sometime later, Galen (AD 130-200) considered and developed Aristotelian 
notions of reproduction by introducing the concept of the active female sperm. 
Departing from Aristotle's view of the womb as a passive receptacle, Galen's view 
provided women with a determining role in the sex of a child. Unfortunately, it also 
provided them with much of the blame for abnormalities, especially hermaphrodites.58 
Galen discusses the concepts of warm and cool as factors of gender determination; 
while certain imbalances between the heat of the sperm and the coolness of the womb 
could result in effeminate men or masculine women, the most catastrophic combination 
produces the hermaphrodite. Galen seems to anticipate medieval attitudes towards 
intersexuality; hermaphrodites are produced because of the lack of masculinity or the 
deterioration in the natural state of a man.
Cadden, Datson and Park all claim that Hippocratic and, to some extent, Galenic 
principles promote a non-judgemental view of hermaphrodites as an ‘event of perfectly
57 In relation to human reproduction, if the active, thick, ‘granular’ spermatic fluid meets with a woman's 
sickly and passive womb that is appropriately ‘somewhat rough and adherent,’ conception is likely. After 
conception, observing the placement of the foetus could be useful in determining its sex: ‘in the case of 
male children, the first movement usually occurs on the right-hand side of the womb [...] but if the child 
be a female then on the left-hand side’. By describing the process by which to distinguish male from 
female embryo, Aristotle comments less on hermaphroditism than on the fundamental establishment of a 
gender hierarchy. Anatomic sex is important to Aristotle: male babies exhibit more movement in the 
womb and take less time than females to ‘to come to perfection,’ as the female foetus ‘accomplishes the 
whole development of its parts more slowly than the male.’ Furthermore, male embryos give the pregnant 
woman an easier time during gestation and allow the expectant mother to ‘retain a comparatively healthy 
look,’ whereas female babies cause the mother to ‘look as a rule paler and suffer more pain.’ (History o f 
Animals, 582a30-584al3-15 (pp. 912-5)). Aristotle constantly allows for exceptions to his rules, but refers 
often to at least a distinct difference, if not a remarkable inadequacy, of the role of the woman in 
reproduction and of the generation of female babies in general. For further discussion, see Blamires’ 
Woman Defamed and Woman Defended, pp 38-45.
58 Cadden, p. 33.
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balanced male and female factors’.59 Even if the case is that a Hippocratically-based
understanding of non-judgmental intersexuality existed to any extent in Galen, the
authors admit that by ‘the later thirteenth century the simple dichotomies between
Aristotelian and Hippocratic models had become blurred and complicated by a welter of
distinctions and mutual accommodations’.60 The evidence seems to suggest that as with
Ovid, eventually it came to be understood that it is only because of an insufficiency of
masculinity that a hermaphrodite comes into being and it is seen as a regression from
normalcy in relationship to the anatomic dichotomy established by Aristotelian and neo-
Platonic hierarchical structures relating to ‘natural’ reproduction.
Although a convert away from the pitfalls of Manichean dualism, Augustine still
produced writings that served to reinforce the view of the hermaphrodite as an
abnormality. Chapter Eight of City o f God, entitled ‘Whether certain monstrous races of
men were produced as descendants of Adam or the sons of Noah’, clearly states:
The histories of the nations tell of certain monstrous races of men. [...] Others 
combine in themselves the nature of both sexes, having the right breast of a man 
and the left of a woman, and, when they mate, they take it in turns to beget and 
conceive.61
One might be willing to overlook this condemnation of an intersexed race, as in 
context (mentioned with examples of Cyclops and backwardly-footed peoples, dog­
headed men and neckless men whose eyes are in their shoulders) they can be dismissed 
by the modem critic as mythological references. However, Augustine does not limit his 
categorisation of monstrosities to purely fantastic creatures. He continues:
59 ‘The Hermaphrodite and the Order of Nature’, p. 119. To whatever extent Galen though of women as 
less perfect than men, he still did not attach the same rigid system of polarity of classification that had 
been institutionalised by Aristotle. See Meanings o f Sex Difference, especially page 17. Cadden also 
expresses the sentiment that although binarily based on contraries, the Hippocratic system did not entail 
any hierarchical structure. Opposites were thought to be balancing and of equal value, which promoted 
the ‘the medical concept of balance, like the general notion of moderation, presupposed the existence of 
polarities and sets of extremes between which a mean must be sought’. Galen would take this stance to 
indicate that many of Plato’s tenets were based on Hippocratic principles of moderation and mediation, 
Wesley Smith, The Hippocratic Tradition (New York: Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 86.
60 ‘The Hermaphrodite and the Order of Nature’, p. 121.
61 City o f God, XVI.8, p. 708.
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Again, though they are rare, it is difficult to find times when there have been no 
androgyny, also called hermaphrodites: persons who embody the characteristics 
of both sexes so completely that it is uncertain whether they should be called 
male or female. However, the prevailing habit of speech has named them 
according to the superior sex, that is, the male; for no one has ever used the term 
‘androgyness’ or ‘hermaphroditess’.62
Augustine’s comments are interesting on two levels. First, we must realise that 
the purpose of the passage is to attempt to defend these ‘monsters’ as descendants from 
Adam and, by extension, as intentional creations of God. In this attempt, Augustine is 
forced to admit defeat as he concludes the passage by declaring three possible answers 
(none of which being, of course, that God has made a mistake). Either the stories about 
the existence of these monsters are ‘completely worthless’ ; if such creatures exist they 
are not truly men; ‘or, if they are men, they are descended from Adam’.63 The second 
interesting point is that Augustine seems to rely on a convention of language, rather 
than a steadfast biological classification, in order to label the hermaphrodite as male. 
The admission that no one uses a third term to describe the sex of the hermaphrodite 
suggests that the refusal to allow the possibility of a unique sex for the androgynous 
person is a linguistic limitation rather than a scientific necessity or cultural aversion. 
However, we cannot ignore the brutality of the term ‘monstrous’ and the connotations 
of unnaturalness with which it must be associated. The term is used again by Augustine 
in On the Trinity, during which he clarifies the scriptural reference to the creation of 
man and woman:
“male and female created He them;” for some have feared to say, He made him 
male and female, lest something monstrous, as it were, should be understood, as 
those whom they call hermaphrodites, although even so both might be 
understood not falsely in the singular number, on account of that which is said, 
‘Two is one flesh”.64
For medieval philosophers and their ancestors, then, the hermaphrodite existed 
to remind the ‘normal’ person what ‘normal’ was supposed to be. Furthermore,
62 City o f God, XVI.8, p. 709.
63 City o f God, XVI.8, p. 710.
64 Augustine, On The Trinity, XII.8, p. 290.
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intersexed people existed as a direct result of the inability of their parents to reproduce 
correctly in accordance with the laws of nature, all of which indicated that being ‘male’ 
was better than being ‘female,’ and that being ‘in-between’ was worse than being either. 
In the cultural fragments of the Middle Ages, therefore, hermaphrodites are represented 
as deficiently masculine beings, only useful as rhetorical devices to explain the 
‘naturally’ binary oppositions of male and female, and the role each plays in the process 
of procreation.
Medical Concepts o f the Hermaphrodite
The medieval medical documentation of the intersexed echoes the philosophical
concern with the troublesome nature of the hermaphrodite. In much of the contemporary
medical evidence available, the production of a hermaphroditic child is seen as a
medical abnormality in much the same way as Galen presents it as an inadequacy. As a
surgical resolution to the abnormality, Guy de Chauliac instructs physicians to cut off
what the person does not want, as long as one does not cut off the part that ‘maketh
water.’65 Surgical solutions to a perceived medical problem, to some extent still
practiced today, requires that the subject conform to a binary model of sexuality to
which they may not subscribe.66 Aristotle's and Galen's respective arguments eventually
develop into the contemporarily common theory of the seven-celled uterus, which
describes the female organ as divided into seven compartments, each of which serve a
specific function in determining the sex of the foetus:
conceptus housed in one of the cubicles on the left, the cooler side, would, of 
course, be a girl, on the right, a boy. A foetus that developed in the middle cell 
would be a hermaphrodite.
65 The Cyrurgie o f Guy de Chauliac, ed. by Margaret S. Ogden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 
p. 529.
For information regarding the current state of ‘unwanted surgery’ on intersexed individuals, see the 
‘Intersex Society of North America’, <http://www.isna.org/about/index.html>.
67 Cadden, p. 198.
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Although the seven-celled theory may seem to begin to provide the 
hermaphrodite with a uniquely sexed identity, its identity is, in fact, only secondary to 
the importance of masculinity implicit in the fundamental points of the argument. In 
other words, because of the well-established hierarchy implicit in the superiority of the 
male's attributes and the deficiency of the female contributions, the hermaphrodite still 
exists as a deficient form of maleness. Based on this evidence, the classification of sex 
in medieval thought may have consisted mainly of two sexual normative categories, 
male and female. Any problematic issue relating to sex or gender, such as sodomy, 
bisexuality, homosexuality or hermaphroditism, most likely would have been dealt with 
in terms of being an abnormality of masculinity, which had long been understood to be 
the dominant and more perfect gender.
However convincing and well-established the model of the ‘hermaphrodite as 
deficient male’ is, there is evidence to suggest that, during the Middle Ages, there was 
another conception of gender that did not attempt to place hermaphrodites within the 
confines of masculinity and femininity. Cary Nederman and Jacqui Tme raise the 
argument ‘that hermaphrodites may at some time have been understood as a third sex, a
iTO
biologically distinct sort of human being’. Caroline Walker Bynum adds support to the 
argument by stating that medieval discussions regarding conception ‘seem to put male 
and female along a continuum and leave it totally unclear why there are not at least as 
many hermaphrodites (midpoints on the spectrum) as there are males and females 
(endpoints on the spectrum).69
68 Cary J. Nederman and Jacqui True, ‘The Third Sex: The Idea of the Hermaphrodite in Twelfth-Century 
Europe’, Journal o f the History o f Sexuality, 6 (1996), 497-517 (p. 499).
69 Caroline Walker Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body in 
Medieval Renaissance (New York: Zone, 1992), pp. 220-1.
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The Three-Sex Model
Looking again to some of the antecedents of medieval medical and literary 
thought, we find evidence to support such a claim that such a three-sex gender model 
may have existed. For instance, Ovid refers to the intersexed Hermaphroditus as ‘no 
longer two, but a single form, possessed of a dual nature, which could not be called 
male or female, but seemed to be at once both and neither’.70 By reading from a tri-sex 
perspective, we see that Hermaphroditus is being portrayed not as male or female, but as 
a different sex altogether. The use of the term form  becomes important, in that it implies 
a new unique existence in the Platonic evaluation of being. All material things exist in 
relation to a perfect, unknowable Form. To exist corporally is to be a physical (albeit 
necessarily imperfect) representation of a perfect Form.
Using this knowledge and Ovid's terminology, Hermaphroditus and Salmacis 
cease to exist respectively as representations of male and female forms, but as a separate 
and unique form: that of the intersexed individual. This perspective significantly 
changes the source of Hermaphroditus' lamentations from being that of the loss of 
masculinity to the loss of identity with a particularly sexed individual within a binary 
system of anatomic classification. Because the sexual system employed by the text does 
not allow for a third option, we are brought back to the issue of privation as the source 
of its characters’ anguish. The implication of weakness is still enshrined in a 
hierarchical concept of male superiority, but the general emphasis has shifted from the 
degeneration of Hermaphroditus' manliness to the loss of his ability to recognise the 
third Form, a failure to comprehend his material relationship to his own inherent 
intersexed potentiality, or a dramatic and unwanted change in fundamental being. The 
previously separate forms are represented as a new and unique being; Hermaphroditus is 
seen as lamenting the loss of his former uniquely sexed identity and not being
70 Ovid, p. 104.
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comfortable with his new uniquely sexed identity, rather than being upset solely
because he has ceased to be completely male. Hermaphroditus is not only lamenting the
privation of his potential male sexuality, but he is also worried about the change in his
gender, which is socially and philosophically invested in male-centred hierarchical
value systems. By extension, we can propose that since Hermaphroditus laments his
new and different sex, one that is neither male nor female, a third and unique sex must
therefore exist (at least according to Ovid); that sex must be that of the hermaphrodite.
Evidence of the possibility of the third sex can also be found in Aristotle. Again,
in History o f Animals, he refers to the intersexed as natural and unique forms of life:
With regard to sex, some animals are divided into male and female, but others 
are not so divided [...] In animals that live confined to one spot there is no 
duality of sex [...] among some insects and fishes, some cases are found wholly 
devoid of this duality of sex. For instance, the eel is neither male nor female, and 
can engender nothing.71
Aristotle, in his treatment of the sex of animals, clearly allows for the possibility 
of beings to exist outside of the binary constructions of male and female. It is a matter 
of fact to him that some animals are either completely sexless or at the very least neither 
male nor female. Although we cannot necessarily impose upon Aristotle an unqualified 
application of this non-duality to humans, he does allow for ‘certain exceptions’ to his 
otherwise unyielding rule of either absolute duality or absolute plurality.72
The Rykener Case
One such exception may be the case of John/Eleanor Rykener of 1395. In 
addition to the exhaustive interpretation of the document presented by Karras and Boyd, 
which presents Rykener ‘in modem terms [...] as a bisexual prostitute’,73 we also find 
evidence of the possibility of John/Eleanor being discussed as an historical
71 History o f Animals, 537b23-34 (p. 850); 538a 1-3 (p. 850).
72 History o f Animals, 537b, 28 (p. 850).
73Ruth Mazo Karras and David Lorenzo Boyd, ‘Ut cum muliere’, in Premodem Sexualities, ed. by Louise 
Fradenburg and Carla Freccero (London: Routledge, 1996), 99-116 (p. 101).
65
hermaphrodite. If we are able to escape the social and grammatical limitations of a 
binary system of sexuality, we begin to see John/Eleanor very differently indeed. Much 
of Karras and Boyd's own language recognises the problematic nature of classifying 
Rykener's sex and gender; they admit ‘Rykener does not seem to have been treated 
under either of these two categories [of prostitute or sodomite]’.74 By this we may infer 
that, because there is no evidence of Rykener being prosecuted for either the offence of 
sodomy or prostitution, there may have been other issues that complicated his case. 
According to Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass, the medieval woman could not 
be prosecuted for sodomy.75 As it was clear that the more controversial of the two vices
7 (\in question was understood to be sodomy, the apparent inability of the courts to 
prosecute Rykener for that specific crime suggests that something else -  perhaps his sex 
-  was in question.77
Evidence suggests that the issue in question, while perhaps having been 
understood in terms of homosexual activity, was, in fact, that of a hermaphrodite 
choosing to have sex with people, sometimes as a woman and sometimes as a man. 
‘Phillip, rector of Theydon Gamon, had sex with [Rykener] as a woman’78 while ‘as a 
man, [Rykener] had sex with a certain Joan [...] and also [in Beaconsfield] two foreign 
Franciscans had sex with him as with a woman.’79 Rykener admits that he cannot
74 ‘Ut cum muliere’, p. 101.
75 That is not to say that the medieval woman could not commit sodomy. Sodomy, a problematic term in 
itself, expanded its meaning to encompass all kinds of ‘abnormal’ sexual activity, including same-sex 
relations between women, usury as well as anal intercourse. See Joan Cadden, ‘Sciences/Silences: The 
Natures and Languages of “Sodomy” in Peter of Abano’s Problemata Commentary’, in Constructing 
Medieval Sexuality, ed. by Karma Lochrie, Peggy McCraken and James A. Schultz (Minneapolis and 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 40-57, and Karras and Boyd, above.
76 Karras and Boyd, p. 113. The footnote to this reference of vice reads: ‘Since the language is stronger 
than that used to refer to prostitution in the legal records, it probably refers to sodomy here’.
77 Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass. ‘Fetishising Gender: Constructing the Hermaphrodite in 
Renaissance Europe’, in Bodyguards: The Cultural Politics o f Gender Ambiguity, ed. by Epstein and 
Straub (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 80-112.
78 Jones and Stallybrass, p. 111.
79 Jones and Stallybrass, p. 112.
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remember how many times he has had sex as a man as opposed to how many times he
DA
has had sex as a woman: only that he got paid more by priests.
Clearly, there is evidence that Rykener can operate as man or woman in either
sexual capacity. Although it may be postulated that the male-sexed body can operate in
either sexual capacity, this does not explain the inability of the officials to prosecute for
sodomy (the ‘illegal and immoral’ male enactment of the female sexual capacity), or the
ambiguity of the engendering of Rykener by the language used in the document. This
linguistic intersexuality is commented on by Karras and Boyd:
[...] the document repeatedly treats Rykener as a woman. He commits the sex act 
'modo muliebri' (in a womanish manner) and men have sex with him 'ut cum 
muliere' (as with woman) or 'ut cum femina' (as with a female), while when he 
has sex with women, he does it 'ut vir' (as a man) or 'modo virili' (in a manly 
fashion) [...]. When he acts as a man, he is the subject [...], but when he acts like 
a woman, he is its object.81
Rykener, then, becomes either man or woman - agent or passive recipient - of 
sexual intercourse, which in the medieval mind, according to Pierre J. Payer, is not only 
a horrible sin akin to masturbation, but definitive evidence of hermaphroditism in the 
works of Peter of Poitier and William of Auvergne.82 Furthermore, ‘the language in the
01
confession itself suggests that Rykener might have been seen as woman’. Although 
Rykener is biologically observed as a man, ‘he is linguistically gendered female in the 
Latin document’.84 Boyd's and Karras' own observations about the interchangeability of 
Rykener's gender support a claim of hermaphroditism in that they are willing to claim 
that the original language regarding his sexuality is not ambiguous - it is specifically, 
alternatively, male and female. Rykener's dilemma may not have been, then, that he was 
performing any illegal act of sodomy, only that he was beyond evaluation by the legal 
authorities.
80 Jones and Stallybrass, p. 112.
81 Jones and Stallybrass, p. 109.
82 Pierre J. Payer, ‘Sex and Confession in the Thirteenth Century’, in Sex in the Middle Ages: A Book o f 
Essays, ed. by Joyce E. Salisbury (London: Garland Publishing, 1991), pp. 126-144 (p. 132).
83 Karras and Boyd, p. 101.
84 Karras and Boyd, p. 110.
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There is evidence to suggest that Rykener’s case was not an isolated one and, in 
fact, there may be other cases of hermaphroditism that have not been recognised in 
medieval culture. Whereas Rykener may represent an actual empirical medical case, 
Chaucer's Pardoner, who has been described ‘as a eunuch, a hermaphrodite, or a 
homosexual’, may illustrate the problematic nature of representing hermaphrodites in 
fourteenth century literature.85 Until recently, the concept of hermaphroditism is only 
given a brief mention of possibility in relationship to the amount of the academic 
attention that has centred on the pardoner's role as a eunuch or a homosexual, due 
mostly, I imagine, to a modem preoccupation with a binary model of sexual 
classification.86
The Pardoner
Of the evidence presented, among the most accessible is that of the animal imagery used 
to portray the ‘Pardoner's abnormality’ ,87 The most obvious mention of the sex-dilemma 
is in the General Prologue, wherein the Host declares of the Pardoner: ‘I trowe he were 
a geldyng or mare’ (1.691). This statement immediately throws the gender and the sex of 
the Pardoner into question; it is not certain whether the subject is a surgically altered,
oo
'sexless and impotent’ male horse or a biologically functional female horse. Rowland 
argues that this reference to the Pardoner's sex is one of several other animal allusions, 
specifically those that refer to the hare and the goat. Both references would place the
85 Mathew Kuefler, ‘Castration and Eunuchism in the Middle Ages’, in Handbook o f Medieval Sexuality, 
ed. by Vem L. Bullough and James A. Brundage (London: Garland Publishing, 1996), pp. 279-306 (p. 
290).
86 The most obvious recent exception to this is Robert Sturges’ Chaucer’s Pardoner and Gender Theory: 
Bodies o f Discourse (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999). Prior to Sturges’ book and Rowland’s discussions 
(below), most arguments regarding the possibility of an intersexed Pardoner were dismissed (see Jeffrey 
Myers’ ‘Chaucer’s Pardoner as a Female Eunuch, Studia Neophilologica, 72 (2000), 54-62; Steven 
Kruger’s ‘Claiming the Pardoner: Toward a Gay Reading of Chaucer’s Pardoner’s Tale’, in Critical 
Essays on Geoffrey Chaucer (New York: G.K. Hall, 1988), pp. 150-72; and Carolyn Dinshaw’s ‘Eunuch 
Hermeneutics’ in Chaucer to Spenser: A Critical Reader, ed. by Derek Pearsall (Oxford; Blackwell, 
1999), pp. 65-106.
87 Rowland, ‘Animal Imagery’, p. 58.
88 Beryl Rowland, Blind Beasts: Chaucer's Animal World (Chatham: W. & J. Mackay & Co., 1971), p. 
99.
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Pardoner as a hermaphrodite rather than a eunuch or a homosexual, as hares and goats 
have long-standing and well-established associations with lechery and hermaphroditism 
in the Middle Ages.89 The Pardoner is also described as dove, (vi.397) which is 
commonly associated with the image of the hermaphroditic goat.90 The specific use of 
the dove could be seen to invoke a reference to the Holy Spirit, something suggested 
analogically not by the Pardoner's relationship to the Summoner and the Physician in a 
triad, but perhaps a reminder of the Platonic necessity of mediation between extremes.91 
Representing the Pardoner as a part of a necessarily triangular relationship is consistent 
with an interpretation of hermaphroditism as a unique and separate possibility of a third 
gender. It could be argued that, as with the Holy Trinity and the three pilgrims, each 
member of the triad exists in relation to the other while maintaining an individual 
identity. Because the concept of hermaphroditism is impossible to understand without 
the relative concepts of male and female, we need all three concepts in order to gain a 
complete understanding of the possibilities of gender.
The physical description and the allusions to the sexual activities of the Pardoner 
support the idea that he may be envisioned not only as a hermaphrodite, but also as 
existing outside of the normal constraints of a two-sexed model of gender. At the same 
time the description suffers from a language and culture which can only interpret him as 
far as he relates to the conventional functions of ‘male’ or ‘female’. For instance, while
89 Rowland, ‘Animal Imagery’ (p. 57-8): ‘Chaucer describes the Pardoner as having “glarynge eyen [...] 
as a hare’ (1.684), and ‘voys [...] as smal as a g o o f (1.688). These brief comparisons are striking and 
specific. The eyes of the hare are large, prominent, placed on the sides of the head, and they have slightly 
elliptical pupils. They project beyond the surrounding surface and their protrusion appears to vary with 
the will of the animal. One of the most persistent beliefs about the hare is that it is a hermaphrodite or 
bisexual. This error appears in works of various periods and is said to have survived until the end of the 
eighteenth century. Aristotle does not record it, but the superstition appears in both Pliny and Aelian, and 
in the Gwentian code of north-east Wales, supposed to be of the eleventh century, the hare is said to be 
incapable of legal evaluation because it is male one month and female another. Twiti states that “at one 
tyme he is male, at other female,” and in common with the writer of The Master o f Game, he applies 
masculine and feminine pronouns indiscriminately [...]. in the fourteenth-century Welsh poem 
“Ysgyfamog”, the hare is termed “gwr-wreic”: a hermaphrodite. The goat is also regarded as a 
hermaphrodite and both animals have a reputation for extreme lasciviousness’.
90 Rowland, Blind Beasts, p. 19.
91 Jane Chance, “ Disfigured is thy Face’: Chaucer’s Pardoner and the Protean Shape-Shifter Fals- 
Semblant (A Response to Britton Harwood)’, Philological Quarterly, 67 (1988), 423-437 (p. 423).
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he has long, uncut ‘heer as yelow as wex’, (1.675) and ‘no herd had he, ne nevere sholde 
have / As smothe it was as it were late shave’ (1.689). He is also described as having, 
perhaps figuratively, a bulging ‘male’ (a purse, pouch or wallet), (1.694) and carries 
with him, as Vance comments, ‘his ‘holy bulles’, like parchment entrails, tubular scrolls 
from which dangle leaden pendants, the bullae themselves as much a coarse double-
Q9entendre in medieval Latin as in Modem English’. It is important to note that the 
Pardoner shows ‘alle and some’ of his bulles, (vi.334) perhaps a reference to a system 
of self-imposed partial disclosure of the Pardoner's sexuality. By showing the pilgrims 
what would be sufficient proof of his masculinity and by implying that there may be 
other interesting things to see regarding his gender, the Pardoner appears to hide from 
them what may be further proof of concealed femininity. In a rare moment of self- 
empowerment, Chaucer’s Pardoner even refers directly to works of Avicenna by whom 
a hermaphrodite is condemned to choose between one or the other of the sexes he does 
not truly represent, (vi.889), and makes several references to fertility and water-making 
which are, again, issues of hermaphroditism raised by contemporary medical and 
philosophical discourses (vi.355-9, 368-70, 374-6).
His non-productive sexual exploits are gender-balanced by Chaucer’s reference 
to ‘a joly wenche in every toun’ (vi.453), and by the male flirtation he seems to engage 
in with the Host when he asks him to ‘kiss the relikes’ (vi.944) he keeps in his ‘male’ 
(vi.920). Much like Rykener, Chaucer’s Pardoner seems to be able and willing to 
alternate between sexual intercourse as a man and as a woman. If we look at Fals- 
Semblant, Chaucer’s probable inspiration for the Pardoner, we see more evidence of 
the character’s ability to choose one sex or the other, and, therefore, to exist outside of 
them both. At one stage during Fals-Semblant’s confession to Love, he claims:
92 Eugene Vance, ‘Chaucer's Pardoner: Relics, Discourse, and Frames of Propriety’, New Literary 
History, 20 (1989), 723-745 (p. 737).
93 Carolyn Dinshaw, Chaucer's Sexual Poetics (Madison, MI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), p. 
173.
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Now I am Robert, now Robin, now Cordelier, now Jacobin. And in order to 
follow my companion, Land Constrained Abstinence, who comforts me and 
goes along with me, I take on many another disguise, just as it strikes her 
pleasure, to fulfil her desire. At one time I wear a woman’s robe; now I am a 
girl, now a lady. At another time I become a religious: now I am a devotee, now 
a prioress, nun, or abbess; now a novice, now a professed nun.94
Here, the text’s images for the ubiquity of deceit in society employ a trope of 
gender ambiguity that may have some sexual resonances. At the very least, de Meun’s 
Faux Semblant blurs the rigidity of the masculine/feminine divide. It could be argued 
that Faux Semblant, *[...] like the Pardoner [...] has an essentially uncertain gender - 
sometimes he’s a man, sometimes a woman’.95
Everything about the Pardoner seems to lie somewhere in between expected 
realms of duality and normalcy: even the Pardoner's sponsor, the Hospital of St. Mary 
Rouncivale at Charing Cross, is considered by some to have been outside of an 
established relationship of two geographical and political extremes, as its ownership and 
the rites to its funds were disputed between France and England for decades.96 Again, 
we see that many aspects of the Pardoner relate him as being in a state of neither here- 
nor-there, of simultaneously having and lacking. As the criteria would suggest that he
Q*7should, he ‘affects to be both [sexes]’, and produces the appropriate degree of 
confusion to those who attempt to define him within polarised categories of gender. It is 
perhaps this confusion and subsequent repulsion that makes it appropriate that the Host 
threaten the Pardoner with castration one minute and kiss him the next (vi.202).
Conclusion
Chaucer's Pardoner personifies the uncertain state of the medieval concept of 
hermaphroditism. He exists as nothing absolutely certain and definable: not as gelding
94 Charles Dahlberg, trans., The Romance o f the Rose by Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 197.
95 Dinshaw, p. 175.
96 David K. Maxfield, ‘St. Mary Rouncivale, Charing Cross: The Hospital of Chaucer's Pardoner’, The 
Chaucer Review, 28 (1993), 148-163 (p. 155).
97 Nederman and True, p. 507.
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or mare, eunuch or hermaphrodite, man or woman, true spiritual guide or true pilgrim. 
He is, in fact, all and none of them at once. He represents an entity entirely separate 
from the above diametrically opposed modes of classification, but at the same time, one 
that can only be experienced and referred to in terms of genders that are exclusively 
binary. The fact that Rykener and the Pardoner can at least be considered to be 
hermaphrodites raises important issues concerning the possibility of other cases wherein 
the subject may not be representing itself, but the object's best attempt to place the 
implacable within a familiar discourse of understanding. The medieval hermaphrodite 
becomes a sexual enigma because of their reliance upon and resistance to a system of 
engendering which simultaneously denies and recognises the triangular nature of the 
spectrum of human sexuality. Hermaphrodites reiterate the need for modem observers 
to reconsider the assumption of duality in reference to medieval culture and literary 
productions.
98 One of the other reasons for the Pardoner's association with Rouncivale is that it may have already had 
a wide reputation for being the hospital of choice for fake pardoners (see Maxfield, above). This claim not 
only explains why the Pardoner admits to having false relics despite a badge and a guarantee from the 
Pope (probably also fake), but also serves to expel him from the ranks of the truly religious. His 
hypocrisy, however, also denies him classification as a true pilgrim, as he is only really there to take the 
other pilgrims’ money.
Virginius as a Poor Platonic Practitioner 
Philosophical and Surgical Implications in The Physician’s Tale
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And this is what the physician has to do, and in this the art of medicine consists: for 
medicine may be regarded generally as the knowledge of the loves and desires of the 
body, and how to satisfy them or not; and the best physician is he who is able to 
separate fair love from foul, or to convert one into the other; and he who knows how to 
eradicate and how to implant love, whichever is required, and can reconcile the most 
hostile elements in the constitution and make them loving friends, is a skilful
practitioner.
Symposium 186c5
74
It can appear that no one likes The Physician’s Tale: the scope of its reluctant 
criticism ranges from indifferent to indignant, with relatively few scholars even 
attempting to make sense of Chaucer’s problematic Doctor of Physic. There have been, 
more recently, developing indications of some critics’ willingness to take the tale more 
seriously, but on the whole the tale has received a lukewarm critical reception at best.1 
As a member of the Physician’s many critically unfriendly audiences, Sheila Delany has 
called it ‘one of Chaucer’s least interesting and least successful efforts’, with ‘flat 
characters, a rather incompetent narrative flawed by irrelevent digressions, a plot 
exceedingly implausable’.2 R. Howard Bloch remarks that ‘the characters of The 
Physician’s Tale act so inexplicably and even illogically that not even the weight of 
psychologistic Chaucerian criticism can recuperate their intent’.3 Lee Ramsey said in 
1971, ‘The moral tale which Chaucer assigned to his Physician has not elicited a great 
deal of critical comment, and what comment there has been is generally 
unfavorable.. .In fact, the only thing on which all commentators agree would seem to be 
that it is not a particularly good tale’.4 Fifteen years later, Brian Lee comments that 
more than a few critics have stated that ‘The Physician's Tale is not one of [Chaucer’s] 
most successful achievements’.5 For some readers and for quite some time, it would 
seem, The Physician ’s Tale has provided more critical questions than answers. Almost 
every critical approach to the tale yields a similar introduction; this chapter is as yet no 
different. However, in light of Linda Lomperis’ recent evaluation of the text that seems, 
at least in part, to reply to Sheila Delany’s claims about the negative ‘depoliticization’
1 See Helen Cooper, Oxford Guides to Chaucer: The Canterbury Tales (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989).
2 Sheila Delany, ‘Politics and the Paralysis of Poetic Imagination in the Physician’s Tale’, Studies in the 
Age o f Chaucer, 3 (1971), 47-75, (p. 47).
3 R. Howard Bloch, ‘Chaucer’s Maiden Head: The Physician’s Tale and the Poetics of Virginity’, 
Representations, 28 (1989), 113-134, (p. 113).
4 Lee C. Ramsey, “The Sentence of it sooth is”: Chaucer’s Physician’s Tale’, The Chaucer Review, 6 
(1971), 185-197, (p. 185).
5 Brian S. Lee, ‘The Position and Purpose of the Physician’s Tale’, The Chaucer Review, 22 (1987), 141 - 
160, (p. 141).
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of the tale, we might be able to come to a better understanding of the complexity and 
sophistication that the much-maligned tale has to offer.6
The approach of this thesis to such an understanding will be based on four 
methodological premises. First, this chapter intends to explore the premise that the 
concept of surgery -  physical and metaphorical -  dominates both the portrait and the 
tale, and to draw on both the theoretical and the practical sides of a medieval medical 
practitioner in its interpretation of the tale. Secondly, parts of the argument presented in 
this chapter hinge on the assumption that Chaucer’s declaration of the Physician as a 
‘parfait pracktisour’ is ironic. Thirdly, this chapter argues a deliberate metaphorical 
connection between the human body and contemporary socio-political structures.
Lastly, this section will presume a subtle relationship between the teller and the tale, an 
exploration of which can enlighten heretofore unrecognised or underestimated value in 
the tale itself.7
The Physician’s Portrait and Tale
The General Prologue portrait and The Physician’s Tale together address the 
two fundamental aspects and discrepancies inherent in the medieval medical 
community. Firstly, the portrait tells us at some length of the physician’s knowledge of 
theoretical medicine, while also crediting him with surgical skill. This reflects the fact 
that there were contemporary sociological and vocational differences between medieval 
physicians and surgeons. Secondly, The Physician’s Tale itself can be seen as a
6 By her own admission, Lomperis disagrees with the ‘fundamental assumption’ of Delany’s work. See 
‘Unruly Bodies and Ruling Practices: Chaucer’s Physician’s Tale as Socially Symbolic Act’, in Feminist 
Approaches to the Body in Medieval Literature, ed. by Linda Lomperis and Sarah Stanbury (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), pp. 21-37 (p.37), n.27.
7 For a discussion about possible sources for The Physician’s Tale, see Kenneth Bleeth, 'The Physician’s 
Tale and Remembered Texts’, Studies in the Age o f Chaucer, 28 (2006), pp. 221-4. For an argument that 
regards the tale as one with an intellectual message, see Andrew Welsh, ‘Story and Wisdom in the 
Physician’s Tale and the Manciple’s Tale’, in Manuscript, Narrative, Lexicon: Essays on Literary and 
Cultural Transmission in Honour o f Whitney F. Bolton, ed. by Robert Boenig and Kathleen Davis, 
(London: Associated University Press, 2000).
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demonstration of theoretical and practical skills as through the tale, Virginius is 
presented with, diagnoses and treats the affliction upon Virginia of Apius’ lechery.
This chapter hopes to be able to draw out the inherent contrarieties elicited by 
the connections between the teller and the tale, as well as to examine The Physician ’s 
Tale itself in light of the Platonic definition of a good practitioner. By doing so, we can, 
to some degree, examine the neo-Platonic hierarchical categories of contrariety that may 
be at work in the text: categories which would not only inform the argument concerning 
what Delany calls the fictional character’s seemingly illogical conceptualisation and the 
tale’s inherent worth as a literary and social exercise, but also serve to further an 
ongoing argument regarding the gentle underlying current of neo-Platonism that
o
meanders throughout the Tales as a whole. Furthermore, by approaching the tale with a 
Platonic reading (as opposed to assuming that the tale, its teller or its author employ any 
necessarily neo-Platonic inspiration), it is possible to address questions raised by 
Emerson Brown Jr. when he asks, ‘What is Chaucer Doing with the Physician and his 
Tale’?9
The portrait of the Physician in the General Prologue stresses the doctor’s 
learning. This itself prepares the reader for an intellectual tale, and not just one of drama 
and pathos. However, some of the more relevant observations regarding his character 
are found not in what a medieval physician is, but what he certainly is not. Medieval 
physicians are not surgical practitioners. Until the eighteenth century, the medical 
approach to healing was largely philosophical and based on time-honoured (and 
classically-based) expectations rather than current empirical observations.10 This is in 
large part because of the medieval concept of auctoritas, as identified and examined by
8 Delany, p. 47.
9 Emerson Brown, Jr., ‘What is Chaucer Doing with the Physician and his Tale?’ Philological Quarterly, 
60 (1981), pp. 129-149.
10 Michel Foucault, The Birth o f the Clinic (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), p. xiii.
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Minnis.11 The entire sociological construct of the physician was built upon a
knowledge-base of ‘authorites’ and theoretical solutions; Michael McVaugh goes so far
as to say that ‘discoveries and innovations -  experimenta -  appear sometimes to have
struck the medieval physician almost as awkwardness, inconvenient intrusions that had
to be fitted into an already rationally finished, completed system’.12 The doctor, as
opposed to the surgeon, is someone who spends most of his professional training
learning from books, rather than from any hands-on experience. Piers Mitchell states
that the distinction between doctor and surgeon was clear:
Physicus/fisicien designated a doctor with a high level of theoretical knowledge 
of natural science and medicine, together with the study of the liberal arts at 
university.
[.. .]the cyurgicus was a surgeon, a term which only became common in the 
thirteenth century... Surgeons are widely thought to have been less well 
educated than physici and were looked down on by some physicians, who saw 
surgery as a manual trade.13
the General Prologue alerts the reader to such a authority-centric state of 
‘medical rationality’ as it begins to declare the Doctor’s credentials: he is well-grounded 
in astrology, nosology, philosophy, chemistry, politics and economics (1.413-445). The 
only knowledge ommitted from his repetoire is that of religion (1.438), an omission to 
which some critics attribute several kinds of significance and plausibility, ranging from 
artistic choice to a superstition that doctors tended towards atheism.14 Although Michael 
Murphy’s critical views regarding the physician’s lack of religious learning are not 
necessarily widely supported, the fact remains that the Physician’s credentials are 
entirely confined to theoretical training. The medieval physician’s educational 
dependence upon theory and reason, as opposed to the necessarily practical demands of
11 A.J. Minnis, Medieval Theory o f Authorship (London: Scholar Press, 1984).
12 Michael McVaugh, ‘Treatment of Hernia in the Later Middle Ages: Surgical Correction and Social 
Construction’, in Medicine from the Black Death to the French Disease, ed. by French, Roger and others 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 131-155 (p. 131).
13 Piers D. Mitchell, Medicine in the Crusades: Warfare, Wounds and the Medieval Surgeon (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 12.
14 Michael Murphy, ‘The Physician and his Tale’, Reader Friendly Version o f the General Prologue and 
Sixteen Tales, <http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/webcore/murphy/canterbury/13physi.pdf> [accessed 
28 January 2003] (footnote 2).
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his profession, gives rise to the first demonstration of the inherent contrariety present in 
Chaucer’s physician: theory versus practice, knowledge versus action, intellect versus 
the body.
The Physician embodies this fundamental opposition. He is both a surgeon and a
doctor; a theory-based academic whose profession demands that he demonstrates
practical skills. The text may even be raising similar alarms as those expressed by Roger
Bacon in his treatise entitled ‘On the Errors of Physicians’, in which he laments that
‘The generality of Physicians give themselves up to disputes about numberless
problems and useless arguments, and give no time to experience as they ought’.15
Implicitly, its conclusion may also be acknowledging John of Ardeme’s concerns that:
Auicen, forsoj), seij>, ‘experience ouercomej) reson’; and galien in pantegni sei{), 
‘No man *ow for to trust in reson al-oon but 3it it be proued of experience.’ And 
he seith in ano{>er place, ‘Experience without reson is feble, and so is reson 
withoute experience fest vnto hym.16
Theoretical knowledge for a medieval physician would have necessarily included
knowledge of medical and non-medical information. The General Prologue covers all
the medical knowledge thoroughly:
He knew the cause of everich maladye,
Were it of hoot, or coold, or moyste, or drye,
And where they engendred, and of what humour.
He was a verray, parfit praktisour:
The cause yknowe, and of his harm the roote,
Anon he yaf the sike man his boote. (1.419)
This physician knows his stuff, medically speaking, and many medical theories were, if 
not contemporarily Platonic, certainly Platonic in origin.
15 A.G. Little and E Withington, eds, Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, vol. 9 (Oxford, 1928), pp. 
150-179.
16 John of Ardeme, Treatises o f Fistula in Ano: Hemorrhoids and Clysters (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, 
Trubner & Co., 1910), p. 3.
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Neo-Platonic Influences on Medieval Medicine
It may be unsurprising that the medieval world of medicine is one of the most 
fruitful places to look for neo-Platonic theoretical influences. The belief that the human 
body corresponded directly with the fundamentally hierarchical and binary structure of
17the universe was one of the truly ubiquitous theories of the Western Middle Ages.
When applied to the body of man and to medicine, this system of classification and
i o
opposition manifests itself as the theory of humoral medicine. Rowe says:
The most common conception of man’s microcosmic identity with the four 
elements is found in the physiological psychology of the humors. Just as there 
are four elements comprised of pairs of contrary qualities, so in man there are 
four humors dependent upon the four bodily fluids, which were made of the 
same pairs of qualities, with each humor producing a disposition at least 
poetically like its corresponding element. 9
Even in the broadest terms, a medieval practitioner’s life is characterised by an intimate 
knowledge of contrarieties and the management of their balance within the human body. 
Theories which were Platonic in origin had become part of general cultural beliefs. 
These beliefs often maintain, however, patterns of thought that we can continue to call 
Platonic or neo-Platonic, such as the deep belief in the importance of contrariety in the 
construction of reality. There are some very obvious references throughout The 
Canterbury Tales that suggest that both the narrator and the audience of the Tales might 
be familiar with these theories. The Knight, for instance, when describing the unusual 
severity of Arcite‘s love-sickness, states:
17 D.W. Rowe elaborates on the development of the idea and the application of the theory in other aspects 
of medieval culture that eventually correspond to the human body. O Love, O Charite! Contraries 
Harmonized in Chaucer’s Troilus (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Press, 1976), pp. 9-12.
18 For further discussions on the ubiquity and longevity of the humoral theory through history, see Anne 
Digby, Making a Medical Living (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Luis Garcia-Ballester, 
Galen and Galenism, ed. by Jon Arrizabalaga and others (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2002); C.H. 
Talbot, Medicine in Medieval England (London: Oldboume Book Company, 1967); Carole Rawcliffe, 
Medicine and Society in Later Medieval England (London: Sandpiper Books, 1999) and, of course, 
Walter Clyde Curry, Chaucer and the Mediaeval Sciences (London: Allen & Unwin, 1960).
19 Rowe, p. 12.
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Nat oonly lik the loveris maladye 
Of Heroes, but rather lyk manye,
Engendred of humour malencolik 
Biforen, in his celle fantastik. (1.1373)
Arcite’s affliction is greater than any run-of-the-mill love sickness: it also
manifests symptoms of the madness representative of an unnatural amount of the
melancholic humor in the brain. In The Nun's Priest's Tale, this same knowledge and
reliance on humoral diagnosis constitutes Pertelote’s explanation not just for
Chauntecleer’s nightmares, but of many other types of disturbing dreams as well:
Certes this dreem, which ye han met to-nyght,
Cometh of the greet superfluytee 
Of youre rede colera, pardee,
Which causeth folk to dreden in hir dremes 
Of arwes, and of fyr with rede lemes,
Of rede beestes, that they wol hem byte,
Of contek, and of whelpes, grete and lyte;
Right as the humour of malencolie 
Causeth ful many a man in sleep to crie 
For feere of blake beres, or boles blake,
Or elles blake develes wole hem take.
Of othere humours koude I telle also
That werken many a man sleep full wo. (vn.2926)
Pertelote further instructs him to purge himself of the humors through herbal 
remedies in order to rid himself of his haunting dreams (vil.2946-2950). The Knight's 
Tale also invokes the Platonic concept of ‘the faire cheyne of love’ as the harmonising 
force that binds together the elements of fire, water, air and earth (1.2991-2992). There 
are several humoral descriptions of Pilgrims as well. The Reeve is described as ‘a 
sclendre colerik man’ (1.589) and, as Laurel Braswell-Means points out, elements of 
contemporary medical diagnosis in the description of the Summoner are a good 
indication of the text’s debt to humoral theories that can reasonably be seen to be 
Platonic in origin. There is a strong suggestion that the text is aware (and expects its 
audience to be aware) of humoral theories and their relationship with physical health 
and outward appearances:
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In summary, this diagnosis would have depended upon three primary theories. 
The first concerns the Platonic and Aristotelian distinction of four primary 
elements.20
In several ways, then, the text demonstrates a wide-spread contemporary
knowledge and expectation of knowledge that the balance and temperance between the
contrary elemental forces in the human body is essential to personal health, just as it is
to universal harmony. As an essential principle of metaphysical contrariety is inherent
in this physiological theory, it is not surprising that a medieval physician’s tale would
deal at some level with the physical oppositions found in his profession. However, this
particular physician’s story pushes this basic theory of contraieties further, by moving
from conservative and predictable depictions of accepted medical physiological
principles found in the Prologue and some other tales, to a debate over the oppositional
conflicts inherent in the medical profession itself.
A contemporary audience however was not likely to have been convinced by
such a medicine-centred account of intellectual qualifications. Doctors, much like the
text’s example, are expected to be learned and full of information about medicine and
also its philosophical and even political links. Rawcliffe states that the requirement that
physicians ‘should cultivate a wide range of scholarly pursuits went back to classical
times. [...] The aim was to produce graduates who were both “philosophers and
technicians”, able to utilise their knowledge of the natural world as a means of
conserving and restoring health’.21 By way of gaining this range of knowledge,
candidates for the Doctorate of Medicine [at Oxford] who had yet to obtain their 
first degree were expected, from 1312 onwards, to attend lectures for eight 
years, a requirement cut to six in the case of substantially accredited individuals. 
Statutes drawn up in the 1270s for the faculty of medicine at Cambridge had 
already imposed a far longer period of study for the degree of Bachelor of 
Medicine upon those without previous qualifications.22
20 Laurel Braswell-Means, ‘A New Look at an Old Patient: Chaucer’s Summoner and Medieval 
Physignomia’, The Chaucer Review, 25 (1991), 266-276.
21 Rawcliffe, p. 106.
22 Rawcliffe, p. 107.
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Whereas Rawcliffe’s evidence demonstrates the requirements for the education 
and, later, delineates the implicit educational rationale for the physician to be educated 
in the arts, Talbot demonstrates how such training is ultimately made manifest in 
medical training:
It is not surprising, therefore, that the methods employed to the study of arts, 
theology and law, should be applied to the study of medicine. These had always 
been verbal commentary; each word was defined, its place set in the sentence, its 
meaning amplified, and the whole sense tested by argument. [...] Instead, 
therefore, of medical students observing sick cases and finding out for 
themselves what diseases were, how they developed, how they reacted to forms 
of treatment and so on, they learned their medical texts like a catechism, always 
implicitly believing, hardly ever questioning, and rarely criticizing. Medical 
education was thus a matter of book-learning, a theoretical and speculative 
process, not necessarily associated with practise.23
The method of medical study is, again, fundamentally theoretical. Physicians are 
expected to be thinkers more than doers, as is reflected by later disdain by surgeons for 
their highly-revered counterparts. In fact, the narrator’s Physician follows the prescribed 
guidelines in that:
Whoever wishes to become proficient in the art of medicine ought to be capable 
of prolonged study, so that by constant reading of different books his perception 
and judgement reach that point where learning becomes easy[...]. Before 
studying medicine he should be well instructed in all subjects[...]. First of all he 
should be taught grammar, dialectic, astronomy, arithmetic, geometry and music 
[...] and be taught philosophy along with medicine.24
Further to establishing the exemplary qualifications of the Physician, the 
narrator demonstrates his doctor’s comprehensive knowledge of ‘astronomy’. Laurel 
Braswell adds to the understanding that a late-medieval physician should be
23 Talbot, pp. 65-66. The entirety of Talbot’s chapter five, ‘Medical Education’ is an invaluable resource 
for understanding the length, breadth and shortcomings of the curriculum and method of late-medieval 
medical education. See also Danielle Jacquart, ‘Medical Scholasticism’, in Western Medical Thought 
from Antiquity to the Middle Ages, ed. by Mirko Grmek (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1988), pp. 197-240. Philosophy (or at least, at this point in the argument, the way in which it is learned) is 
a determining factor in regulating the relationship between doctor and patient and, ultimately, the relative 
ability of a physician to diagnose accurately the ailment and subsequent best course of treatment for his 
patient. Whereas it is enough at the moment to note the general consensus that medieval physicians were 
highly and broadly educated in all manners of contemporary education, we will return to the unique 
dynamic implications of their educational bias at a later point in this chapter. For a deeper discussion of 
the possible Islamic orgins of the medieval method and presentation of education, see George Makdisi, 
‘The Scholastic Method in Medieval Education: An Inquiry into its Origins in Law and Theology’, 
Speculum, 49 (1974), 640-661.
Talbot, p. 135.
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knowledgeable in all areas of astrology by reminding us that many medieval writers
25presupposed the requisite that physicians should be competent in astrology.
Astrology plays an important role in medical practice. Walter Clyde Curry 
emphasises this point by discussing in great detail the ways in which astrology affects 
the prognosis of a perceived malady as well as the cure prescribed for an ailment.
A medieval doctor ‘must understand that the four humours of the body fluctuate 
in volume and power according to the waxing and the waning of the 
moon[.. .]moreover, that humours have dominion variously in respective hours of the 
day’ .27 This becomes particularly relevant to the Tales ’ doctor as he is described as able 
to keep ‘his patient a full great deal / In houres by his magic natural’. The Doctor of 
Physic is thereby established as a representative authority on all dimensions of the 
educational expectations placed on doctors at this time.
At this point, we have been able to establish the Doctor’s theoretical credentials. 
However, the Prologue also claims that he is a perfect practioner, and the distinction 
between theory and practice is significant. ‘During the late Middle Ages, doctors were 
believed to be a repository of medical knowledge, thus their profession was seen as 
learned. The surgeon, on the other hand, was considered to be an artisan, thus his 
profession was seen as a craft’.
25 Laurel Braswell, ‘The Moon and Medicine in Chaucer’s Time’, Studies in the Age o f Chaucer, 8 
(1986), 146-156 (p. 146). Chaucer’s doctor is, of course, ‘grounded in astronomye’ (1.414). As Benson 
notes, however, the fourteenth-century concept of astronomy is more closely aligned with the modem 
practice of astrology. For a thorough explanation of the different approaches to the medieval concept of 
‘astronomye’, see The Riverside Chaucer, p. 816, n.414. See Talbot, Braswell or Rawcliffe for the 
particulars of such education.
6 See also Talbot, pp. 129-133.
2 7 Curry, Chaucer and the Medieval Sciences, p. 14. For a brief discussion of the Galenic principles of 
humoral opposition at work in the Middle Ages, see Benson’s notes in The Riverside Chaucer, p. 8 lb- 
817, n.420,424. For further discussion of humoral sciences, see Rawcliffe, pp. 29-81, Talbot, p. 127 or 
Mirko Grmek, ‘The Concept of Disease’, in 'Western Medical Thought, ed. by Grmek, pp. 247-254.
28 Curry, p. 11.
29 Bryon Grigsby, ‘The Social Position of the Surgeon in London, 1350-1450’, Essays in Medieval 
Studies, 13 (1996), pp. 71-80 (p.71).
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Medieval Surgeons and Doctors
Chaucer’s doctor is unusual in being said to know of surgery as well as 
medicine. The medieval surgeon, seen as a lay craftsman who learns by apprenticeship, 
is the very opposite side of the medical coin to the physician. The two professions 
provided two very different services to their relative clients, and therefore had different 
vocational training, social expectations and reputations. Even the most broad inspection 
into the world of medieval medicine reveals that, in the words of Marie-Christine 
Pouchelle:
generally, physicians treated problems inside the body, and surgeons dealt with 
wounds, fractures, dislocations, urinary problems, amputations, skin diseases, 
and syphilis. They also bled patients when directed by physicians.31
There was a very practical difference between physicians and surgeons:
physicians usually treated patients with topical or otherwise foreign remedies (herbs,
elixirs, broths) by focusing on non-manipulative correction, whilst surgeons
investigated and treated people physically by manipulating, restricting, removing or
replacing parts of the body itself. Carole Rawcliffe states emphatically:
This division of labour was not merely a matter of convenience or even 
snobbery: the Church itself had insisted that senior clergy should have nothing 
to do with surgery, thus implicitly widening the gulf between theory and 
practice.. .At the University of Paris all graduates in medicine were required to 
swear a formal oath, from 1350 onwards, that they would never attempt any kind 
of ‘manual surgery’ whatsoever.32
Both Grigsby and Rawcliffe seem to disagree with C.H. Talbot, who states that 
‘If there was a separation of surgery from medicine, it would appear to have taken its 
rise first among the Romans, for Galen admits that in his day there was a cleavage 
between physicians and surgeons. This tradition passed, through knowledge of Galen’s
30 Although there is some evidence that parts of the professions had come to overlap by the end of the 
fourteenth or beginning of the fifteenth centuries, most sources indicate that the professions were 
considered distinct from one another. For more information, see: Charles Hugh Talbot, Medicine and 
Medieval England (London: Oldboume, 1967), pp. 79-80, 100, 109, and 113.
31 Marie-Christine Pouchelle, The Body and Surgery in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), p. 67.
32 Rawcliffe, p. 112.
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works, to the Arabs... The separation of surgery from medicine [.. .was due] to the 
influence of such texts as this which exhalted the “noble physician” to heights where 
any kind of manual operation was unthinkable’. In fact, Talbot’s very point is that the 
separation between the two fields was fundamentally a matter of ‘convenience and 
snobbery’, as it had begun because of a preoccupation of monasteries and abbeys with 
keeping their surgically-trained monks and abbots at home rather than out in the 
townships, and that the division of labour had little or no legal or ecclesiastical 
precedence. ‘The famous phrase, Ecclesia abhorret a sanguine, which has been quoted 
by every writer on medicine for the past two hundred years as the reason for the 
separation of surgery from medicine [...] cannot be found in the Decretals of the Popes 
nor in any of the medieval commentaries on canon law. It is a literary ghost’.34 Clearly, 
there is some disagreement as to the initial cause of the split between physician and 
surgeon; no one, however, can deny that the realistic difference between the two 
professions existed. Doctors and surgeons were, for the most part, two very different 
professions with two very different professional methods.
The fact that the the idea that the medieval Church associated surgey with 
prohibitions against spilling blood appears to be a myth does not detract from the use by 
Chaucer of both medical and surgical procedures as symbols for political and moral 
evils. The rest of this chapter will present the arguments that support this claim.
The Links Between Physical and Moral Well-Being
The Canterbury Tales as a whole shows much interest in the analogy between 
literal and moral healing. In the Tale ofMalibee, Melibee is seeking advice from the 
community on how to heal his daughter. Among the first to offer their suggestions are 
the surgeons, who announce:
33 Talbot, p. 54.
34 Talbot, pp. 50-55.
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But certes, as to the warisshynge of youre doghter, al be it so that she perilously 
be wounded, we shullen do so ententif bisynesse fro day to nyght that with the 
grace of God she shal be hool and sound as soone as is possible, (vn.1015)
This comment by itself is rather meaningless. However, the next section clearly
delineates the perceived difference between contemporary surgeons and doctors:
Almoost right in the same wise the phisiciens answerden, save that they seyden a 
fewe wordes moore: that right as maladies been cured by hir contraries, right so 
shuld men warisshe werre by vengeaunce. (VII.1015)
This analogy might seem, again, more familiar to Chaucer’s audience than it 
does to modem readers. It uses the ideal of ‘contrarieties’ that, in essence, goes back to 
classical philosophy. Arguably, a link between the Physician’s Portrait and Tale is the 
analogy between surgeon and executioner, both resolving an otherwise corrupt situation 
through the knife. According to Marie-Christine Pouchelle, surgeons and executioners 
shared the same degree of public detestation. Surgeons were generally thought of as 
being ‘proud and pompous, but at the same time quite unreasonable and completely 
ignorant [...] they are ill-humoured, cruel men, and they demand and carry off fat 
payments’.35 Furthermore, Pouchelle states that ‘contemporaries judge the efficiency of 
the surgeon by the pain his operations cause, so that the cruelty is fathered on him, to 
such an extent that the surgeon who refuses to be considered as an executioner or public 
tormentor would become a laughing-stock among “ordinary educated people”.36 The 
medical surgeon, then, shares an unlikely cultural association with other professions 
such as butchers, barbers, dentists, and public exectioners. In fact, Pouchelle tells us that 
these professions were so closely related that in some cases, surgeons directed 
executions in French courts, and were given criminals to execute and, later, to dissect .37
The fact that surgeons could be closely associated in medieval cultural 
assumptions with executioners plays an important role in solidifying the idea of the 
double nature of Chaucer’s Doctor’s profession: as surgeon as well as physician. The
35 Pouchelle, p. 15.
36 Pouchelle, p. 76.
37 Pouchelle, p. 77.
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knight Virginius acts as executioner to his daughter. At the same time, he performs the 
physical act of surgery by removing her head, thus relieving her of the threat to her 
moral health. In a final plea to her doctor, her father, young Virginia asks desperately, 
‘Goode fader shal I dye?/Is ther no grace, is ther no remedye?’ (vi.235). These words 
clearly are meant to evoke a degree of sympathy for the young woman, and could also 
be intended to evoke from the audience a medieval Christian understanding of grace, 
despite the pre-Christian pagan setting of the tale itself. ‘Remedye’ can, of course, mean 
‘cure’ as well as ‘solution’. Virginia’s words also serve to reinforce the established 
cultural connection between knight, surgeon, executioner and the narrator’s doctor.
The Physician’s Tale
Once such a connection has been made, it is easier to discuss the text’s doctor 
(and medieval medicine in general) in an oppositional relation to neo-Platonism. For 
instance, the primary neo-Platonic and medical question of mover and moved, cause and 
effect, is brought into question by the knight’s inability to diagnose and to locate 
correctly the cause of his daughter’s moral ailments. This error is fatal and fundamental 
on at least two levels. For a surgeon, the ability to diagnose maladies correctly is 
essential to success and reputation. For a medieval philosopher, the fundamental life 
project is to ascertain the primary cause of being, and to formulate an idea of process by 
which that knowledge is gained and the extent to which we are able to know that 
primary cause. As we have already learned, the knight, acting as a metaphorical doctor, 
fails in his duty to assess the true nature of his daughter’s moral dilemma. This 
ineptitude is accentuated when, after Virginia‘s execution, the villagers arrive on the 
scene to deliver the correct diagnosis:
88
But right anon a thousand peple in threaste 
To save the knyght, for routhe and for pitee,
For knowen was the false iniquitee.
The peple anon has suspect in this thyng,
By manere of the cherles chalangyng,
That it was by the assent of Apius,
They wisten wel that he was lecherus. (vi.260)
Readers may be intrigued by the fact that a thousand people saw through the judge’s 
plan, knew of his treachery, and were better able than the knight to ascertain the correct 
diagnosis of the situation. In other words, the knight is unable to recognise a symptom 
of lecherousness that everyone else ‘wisten well’.38
The metaphorical knightly surgeon completely misinterprets the data from the 
patient. Regardless of the fact that everyone else in the village ‘had suspect in this 
thyng’ (vi.263), Virginius could not realise as they did ‘that he was lecherus’ (VI.266). 
Virginia’s final plea for an alternative solution recalls the previously established 
relationship between Christ and the Physician, as she pleads for a less intrusive cure to 
her infection: ‘Is ther no grace, is ther no remedye?’ (vi.236) The word grace suggests 
not only paternal mercy but the grace of Christ, a Physician, to administer an external 
remedy than invite Virginius to exhibit his surgical skills. Virginius’ surgical solution, 
that his daughter is ‘To dyen with a swerd or with a knyf (vi.217), wording which 
establishes the father as acting both as knight and surgeon, as he declares a utensil of
38 The idea of seeing sexual passion as a disease might not have been as novel to a fourteenth-century 
audience as to a modem one. The metaphor of love as an illness is common in courtly poetry, and notably 
treated, with humour, by the chacacter Reason in the Romance o f the Rose (4377-84). Medieval medical 
writers also treated it as a serious topic. One contemporary example is Gerald of Sola’s Determinatio de 
Amore Hereos. This treats the disease in not only medical but learned philosophical terms, as Mary 
Frances Wack’s study of the work argues, showing that ‘masters and students [of medicine] studied, 
expounded and debated the lover’s malady’. It is also interesting to note that Chaucer’s Physician would 
not be alone in his association of physical illness with sexual activity. The chronicler Walsingham 
associates the dangers of contagion, esp. the plague, with sexual misconduct. He reports that the citizens 
of London in 1382 took stricter measures against sexual sins, partly because they felt the clergy let too 
many people off lightly for cash (like the General Prologue's Summoner and Friar) but also because, he 
says, they feared God would strike the city with disease ‘on the day that God took his revenge’. Close to 
that entry in his chronicle, Walsingham also reports on a possibly anticlerical London Physician who 
warned people could only escape an onslaught of plague prophesied for Ascension Day by staying 
indoors, eating breakfast (against orthodox Christian precepts, before Mass), and reciting the Lord's 
Prayer five times, which led many people not to attend Ascension Day mass. See David Presst, trans., The 
‘Chronica Maiora’ o f Thomas Walsingham, 1376-1422 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2005), pp. 182- 
3.
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each profession to be the tool to be used for the impending operation. At the moment 
that his decision is made, Virginius fails to maintain the professional distance 
recommended by physicians such as Ardeme, and, as did Ardeme, ‘cannot remain 
uncorrupted throughout this interaction, but is drawn into a fusion of the crossing over 
of what is touching and what is being touched’.39 As he is about to perform his work, 
Virginius comments that her suffering causes him to suffer also (VI.215) and, even more 
strikingly, that her death will serve as the ‘endere of my ly f (vi.218). The text presents 
Virginius in a classically medical dilemma: where the lines between patient and doctor 
become blurred to the point that it is impossible at times to determine where one body 
of suffering ends and another begins. It can be argued, and will be argued here, that the 
miscalculations and misunderstandings by the knight are to be read as inadequacies by 
Chaucer’s Physician-narrator.
As the narrator dramatically introduces the idea that Virginius’ surgical solution 
will result in the death of his daughter, the reader begins to see the dissolution of the 
forms invested in the characters’ creation. The learned Physician, the noble Knight and 
the virtuous Virgin are all subject to change and to death and, as such, are beginning to 
lose the immortal nature of their forms. The medieval concept of death, according to 
Jeremy Citrome, is heavily invested in a Platonic notion of forms and that idea that the 
primeval aversion to the fragmented body under threat of ‘castration, mutilation, 
dismemberment, dislocation, evisceration, devouring, bursting open of the body’ 
dominates and defines a concept of masculine invulnerability.40
Knights, it seems, would be required to be familiar with surgical matters related 
to their battles and to be able to render assistance if necessary.41 This point is again 
demonstrated by the common appearance in contemporary medical publications of the
39 Jeremy J. Citrome, ‘Bodies that Splatter: Surgery, Chivalry and the Body in John Ardeme’, Exemplaria 
13(2001), 137-172 (p. 145).
40 Citrome, p. 141.
41 Grigsby, p. 72.
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‘Wound Man’: a medieval anatomical tool used by field surgeons (knights) to help with 
the identification and respective treatments of all possible battle injuries.42 However 
tenuous this connection is, the concrete establishment of Virginius as a ‘surgeon’ is not 
necessary to further the argument. Whatever his primary profession and secondary 
experience, Virginius can be read to perform a kind of metaphorical surgery in the tale.
Virginius is enlisted as a surgeon by the text from the moment that he is 
presented with a moral dilemma. Unable to respond to Claudius’ deceitful declaration of 
Virginia’s ownership, Virginius submits to the judgement that his daughter is to be 
given to Apius, ‘in lecherie to lyven’ (vi.206). At this moment, Virginius is presented 
with a moral decision for which he believes a surgical solution to be the only cure. 
Afflicted by the consequences of Apius’ lechery, Virginia’s physical and spiritual 
integrity is at risk. Of course, Apius’ unrighteous lust is not a disease that she has 
fostered or even invited, but has attacked her without provocation or apparent reason. It 
is important to make the clear distinction that Virginia herself is not infected, but that 
she is being affected by the lust in another. This assessment, or diagnosis of the nature 
and the locality of the affliction is crucial to its treatment. It is, of course, exactly where 
Virginius’ skills as a surgeon let him and his daughter down.43 Instead of addressing the 
actual disease, or indeed identifying its true location in Apius, Virginius decides to 
attempt an extreme cure of the secondary threat to his daughter’s reputation. From a 
purely Galenic point of view, the failures of Virginius as a surgeon begin with his 
inability to recognise the person who is truly ill. Secondarily, he fails in that he is unable 
to comprehend the nature of the disease as lying outside the body of the patient, and
42 There are many online depictions of the Wound Man. Some of the better ones from different periods 
can be found at www.st-mike.org/medicine/woundman.html.
43 Worthiness or wickedness plays little part in the medieval concept of the application of disease by God 
to mankind. If the recipient of an illness is not lacking spiritually, then suffering can be a physical test 
eventually to achieve a spiritual reward, as was the biblical precedent set by Job. In these cases of the 
righteous being tested by God, it is not important that the suffering person necessarily heals herself, but 
that she endures the afflictions set upon her without losing faith in die goodness of God. For further 
discussion on the role of Fortune in the affliction of the innocent, see Gerhard Joseph, ‘The Gifts of 
Nature, Fortune, and Grace in the Physician’s, Pardoner’s and Parson’s Tales’, The Chaucer Review, 9, 
(1975), 237-245.
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therefore beyond the expertise of any medical practitioner.44 However, from a Christian 
medieval point of view, the afflictions of the body and those of the soul are very much 
interdependent.
Aristotle first made the connection between diseases of the body and those of the 
soul, when he hypothesised that humans possess ‘an unobservable somatic substrate that 
was needed to explain the psychic functions found in the interface between body and 
soul’.45 Rawcliffe writes that, in the devastating age of the plague, this connection 
evolves from a simple correlation of a physical illness with spiritual deficiency to a 
wide-spread metaphorical association of Christ as the physician of man’s soul.46 Any 
good physician or surgeon would be able to recognise the symptoms of a spiritual 
disease and apply the correct spritual remedy, ‘ranging from the harsh extremes of 
penance and self-denial (which ranked as the spritual equivalent of major surgery) to 
prophylactic measures for avoiding the infection in the first place’ 47 It is hardly 
reasonable for us to expect our knight-surgeon to be any good at the diagnosis of 
causation, however. Given that the narrator is a physician and not a surgeon, the reader 
can expect exactly what is eventually delivered: Virginius, rather than saving a life, is 
instrumental in taking one instead.
Virginius, acting as surgeon, is given the unenviable task of trying to determine 
a physical cure for a serious spiritual condition. Both the affliction and the cure have 
moral and social ramifications; the text uses the oppositional characterisations of 
Virginia and Apius to argue against the neo-Platonic theories of moral and social 
diagnosis based on physical attributes of the body. One of the primary tools in the 
Augustinian neo-Platonist’s arsenal for diagnosing issues of moral depravity and
44 For a discussion on the limitations of Galenic theories regarding the soul, see Garcfa-Ballester, 
especially section III.
45 Mario Vegetti, ‘Between Knowledge and Practice: Hellenistic Medicine’, in Western Medical Thought 
from Antiquity to the Middle A ges\ ed. by Mirko D. Grmek, pp. 72-104.
46 Rawcliffe, pp. 19-21.
47 Rawcliffe, p. 21.
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political structure is the inspection of the physical condition. For instance, certain parts 
of the body are associated with different aspects of society. These qualifications are 
based on the hierarchical establishment prescribed by Christianised neo-Platonism, and
4 0
set out famously in the pages of John of Salisbury’s Policraticus.
The Body Politic
Socially, every part of the body associates itself with different levels of divine 
insight, power and available knowledge. Apius, for instance, as a judge, is represented 
as the eyes, ears and tongue of a contemporary sociopolitical body. He is unable to use 
any of these parts effectively. The inability of each character to utilise the powers that 
are meant to be inherent in their social position challenges the basic structure of the 
political hierarchy itself. Likewise, a complete reversal of the power dynamic prescribed 
by this rigid structure implies that the hierarchy itself may not be as inflexible as the 
audience would tend to believe. As we delve deeper into the association of the surgeon 
with the physical body, the parts of the body can be seen to be used by the text to 
challenge the social structure that they are meant to represent. In such an interpretation, 
each relevant body part is, in turn, addressed by the text.
Apius, as a judge, allows his eyes to be satisfied by insisting that he physically 
sees (and be seen to see) Virginius so that the knight may make some public pretence at 
a defence: ‘Of this, in his absence, / 1 may nat yeve diffynytyf sentence’(VI. 171). Apius 
demands, as his corelative in the neo-Platontic social structure might suggest, that he 
employs his eyes in his judgement, leaving only to utilise his ears and tongue in order to 
fulfil his civic duty and metaphorical representation.49 To this point, the text supports 
the social associations implied in the heirarchy established by Plato’s Republic, 
furthered by Aristotle’s insistence on categorical classification and confirmed in the
48 John of Salisbury, Policraticus, ed. and trans. by Cary J. Nederman (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990).
49 See v. 11 of the Policraticus for this specific metaphor.
93
twelth century by the Policraticus. However, as Apius’ other senses are ignored or
misused, we see that the text also supports John of Salisbury’s warnings, that there is
‘nothing more miserable than judges ignorant of the science of law and devoid of a
good will, which their love of presents and compensation proves beyond all doubt; the
power by which they have exercised in the service of greediness, ostentation, or their
own flesh and blood, and they are absolved from the necessity of a sacred oath to the
laws’.50 The previously sympathetic corroboration of the structure of the Policraticus
quickly fades as the rest of Apius’ social functions fail to deliver their promises of
justice, insight or knowledge. Although the reader is told that Virginius’ case will be
heard fairly (vi.173), the judge’s ears are, in fact, largely unused in the process of
considering his decision. Apius refuses to hear Virginius, thus eliminating the use of
one of the organs associated with his social responsibilities:
But hastily, er he his tale tolde,
And wolde have preeved it as sholde a knyght,
And eek by witnessyng of many a wight,
That al was fals that seyde his adversarie,
This cursed juge wolde no thynge tarie,
Ne heere a word moore of Virginius. (vi.192)
Apius‘ ears fail to fulfil their social duty by failing to hear Virginius’ pleas. As
such, Apius’ ability to perform morally in the prescribed political structure dimishes
further. The text shows Apius’ immoral tongue pronouncing an unjust judgement:
But yaf his juggement, and seyde thus:
‘I deeme anon this cherl his servant have;
Thou shalt no lenger in thyn hous hir save.
Go bryng hire forth, and put hire in oure warde 
The cherl shal have his thral, this I awarde.’ (vi.197)
Lastly, Apius’ eyes are lamented by Virginius just before the execution of his 
daughter: ‘Allas, that evere Apius the say’ (vi.227)! As we can see, each of the body 
parts meant to be represented by the judge are represented in this case as corrupt, unjust 
examples of what are meant to be the higher functions of the body politic.
50 Policraticus, p. 93.
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This analogy between body and social system continues with the other major 
characters as well, as the text works its way through the hierarchical system of social 
association by challenging the representative body parts in the characters. Virginius, 
represented in the social structure by his hands, is virtually stripped of any other bodily 
part. His eyes are ineffective; he is not able to see the treachery before it is planned or to 
stop it once he is called to court. The only real mention that Virginius’ eyes are given is 
their futility to witness his accuser (VI. 191). His tongue is likewise useless, as he is not 
given the chance to defend himself and his ears can only be assaulted by the treacherous 
judgement pronounced by Apius. His head -  or mind -  fails to identify the real nature of 
the issue and his heart is stricken with pity (V I.211). All that Virginius has at his 
disposal, by social right and by way of literary device, are the hands of a soldier. Those 
hands, of course, contribute to the ultimate tragedy of the tale by delivering the fatal and 
unwise decapitation of Virginia. Like the judge, the knight represents the ruling power 
in the social hiearchy. Here the minds of both men are infected with a failure to make 
their will, reason and action rightly.
By the authority of medieval convention, exemplified by the Policraticus, 
Virginia is a member of a degenerate, ‘inferior sex’, and, as such, has no real place at all 
in the hierarchical social stucture.51 Although Lomperis and Delany provide significant 
evidence for a non-biblical source of the tale, one of the few stories in the Policraticus 
that relates a specific reference to a woman bears some interesting similarities to the 
situation surrounding Virginia. The text mentions the story of Judith: blessed by a 
superior beauty by God, Judith is faced with the unholy desires of an evil judge. Just as 
Virginia’s beauty is said to be so powerful that it beguiles Apius, Judith appears
51 Policraticus, p. 90. The women and effeminate men of the book are infamously maligned, often 
referred to as ‘shameless’ (p. 31), ‘the weaker sex’ (p. 171), the ‘inferior sex’, or people who are justly 
subject to lower standards of education and are disposed to higher degrees of vanity (p. 184). In one of the 
few instances that the text depicts a female ruler, she is chastised for being foolish enough to allow a 
stranger into her court. The ‘frivolity’ of Dido typifies ‘the end of the rulership of women and the 
effeminate because, although it may have a foundation in virtue, it could by no means devise a course 
towards subsequent propriety’ (p. 131).
‘incomparably elegant to everyone’s eyes’.52 Holofemes, like Apius, specifically has his 
heart changed by the woman’s beauty, and had made plans to own her since he first saw 
her.53 But whereas Judith’s ‘pious deception’ earns her the opportunity to ‘[smite] twice 
upon his neck with all her might, and she took away his head from him’ (Judith 13.8), 
Virginia’s beauty only earns her the opportunity to have her head taken off by her 
father. Judith takes the head of Holofemes to show to the elders of her city and the 
people all rejoice (Judith 13.15-17); Virginius takes the head of his daughter to Apius’ 
court, wherein the people msh in to save the knight from Apius’ rage. The links may 
seem tenuous, but the social ramifications of the association of Judith/Virginia with the 
physical head of the body are significant. Even more interesting are the implications of 
the decapitation and the situation of the female character’s position as either the 
executor or the executed; the association, the decapitation and the difference of the 
female character from active agent of justice to passive recipient of injustice deserve 
critical attention.
The female association with the head is an interesting challenge that the text 
makes to the social infrastructure, in that it serves to initiate a general upheaval of the 
neo-Platonic social order. Any strict application of the socio-political metaphor cannot 
work, as any presumption of power obtained by placing Virginia as the head of a 
political body is eliminated by her decapitation. Whereas the political value of the text 
has been dismissed by Delany and recentred to the body by Lomperis, neither critic 
develops the implications of the association of the political aspects of the body parts 
addressed. This omission becomes important in view of the fact that most of the 
criticism regarding Virginia and the beheading focuses solely on the virginal nature of
52 Policraticus, p. 208.
53 Bible, King James. ‘Judith’, from the Holy Bible, King James version (Apocrypha)
Electronic Text Center, University of Virginia Library, [accessed 12 August 2003],
<http://etext.lib. virginia.edu/etcbin/toccere w2?id=KjvJudi.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/en 
glish/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=13&division=divl>. All other references to the story of Judith 
will be from this edition and cited parenthetically.
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the victim, rather than the social or political significance of her dismemberment. That is 
not to say that her virginity is unimportant, or that the criticism that addresses the 
implications of virginity in the tale is at all misplaced or unwarranted. There is, 
however, another aspect of Virginia’s beheading that has yet to be explored.
Judith’s story centres on God’s ability to make the faithful overcome the wicked, 
regardless of any inherent difference in social class, strength or intellectual ability 
(notice that it took two swings of the blade to cut of the head off Holofemes). If we look 
at The Physician's Tale in reference to Judith’s, we see that the disregard for social 
classification is once again being inserted into the socio-political metaphor. Despite her 
unfortunate end, Virginia’s role as the head of the story -  and the fact that her head is 
severed from its physiological body -  serves to shake up the remaining parts of the 
political body as well.
In the Physician’s narrative, it is clear that the woman is returned to a victimised 
state, thus negating any potential message of feminist power. This interpretation of the 
events does not allow for the possibility that Virginia’s death serves to advance any 
politically feminine agenda. However, by refocusing the tale on the body of a passive, 
innocent victim, Virginia’s unjust decapitation allows the peasantry to re-install the 
political motif of righteous revolution implicit in what is the most likely source for 
Chaucer’s text.54
However unjustly the tale deals with women, by symbolically removing the head 
of the socio-political structure, and later literally removing the judge who wields power 
within in, the tale implies a challenge to the model of traditional political order set out 
in the Policraticus. As is the case in the source materials cited by Lomperis and Delany, 
the tale alludes to violent political upheaval. However, unlike these source materials, 
Chaucer’s ‘peple’ do not revolt crudely or mindlessly: they revolt with surgical
54 See Delany and Lomperis for detailed descriptions of the probable sources of the tale, each of which 
has overt political themes.
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precision and righteous equity.55 Instead of acting like a mob of enraged idiots, their 
position on the neo-Platonic hierarchy of society is given value. Although representing 
the lowest extremity of the symbolic body politic, the villagers are the only characters 
who are can recognise the truth regarding Apius and his churl. They, of course, know of 
his plan and of his lechery: their pursuit and punishment of Apius and Claudius is the 
only judgement, the only ‘remedye’, that is both just and compassionate. The text 
promotes their standing above all other members of society and, by doing so, arguably 
challenges the strictly hierarchical structure which is meant to define their social roles.56
The text confronts the established political order and suggests that the lines 
which are meant to delineate the differences between social standing (and relative 
inherent worth) may not be as clear-cut or as static as some critics might wish us to 
believe. Is Chaucer’s text, at least momentarily, advocating widespread revolution and 
social reform? Probably not -  or at least if it is, the evidence is not necessarily explicit. 
By addressing the neo-Platonic hierarchy of social value, the text is at least questioning 
the social views derived from neo-Platonism in general. They may also put into question 
the philosophical foundations upon which contemporary medicine is based. In other 
words, whereas the tale may not be a call to arms for another peasants’ revolt, it may in 
some degree serve as a sympathetic expression of solidarity against the rigid 
sociological and philosophical premises that disallow any inherent worth in the 
peasantry.
55 It is worth noting that the medieval meaning of the word ‘peple’ fluctuated greatly, from the most 
common use (the general public), to other uses that may have implied a lower social status. The MED 
lists at least one of these latter uses as ‘the lower classes, the masses, the populace’ (as used explicitly in 
The Knight’s Tale, 1.2350), and also states that it is often confused with other usages, including ‘those 
present at a feast, church service, etc.; an assemblage’ (as used by Chaucer in The Pardoner’s Tale 
(vi.961), and ‘subjects of a king or lord’ (as in The Clerk’s Tale, IV. 112). Although the explanatory notes 
to the tale suggest the more common usage of the word here, it is not unreasonable to explore a similar 
‘confusion’ in this case.
56 See also Lynn Staley Johnson, ‘The Prince and His People: A Study of the Two Covenants in the 
Clerk’s Tale’, The Chaucer Review, 10 (1975), 17-29; or David Wallace, ‘Chaucer's Body Politic: Social 
and Narrative Self-Regulation’, Exemplaria, 2 (1990), 221-40.
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Conclusion
Successful Platonic medicine is the ability to manipulate love and to create 
harmony from discontinuity. The Physician’s Tale demonstrates a distinct inability 
safely to ‘separate fair love from foul’, or to ‘eradicate’ love without killing the patient. 
The Physician’s Tale is filled with demonstrations of misdiagnosis and poorly 
considered treatments. Does this imply the fictional narrator’s awareness of these 
problems? His characters pay the ultimate price for his lack of skill in reconciliation. 
Even the other characters of the Tales are adversely affected by the Physician’s story.
As Brian Lee says, the Host ‘turns from [The Physician’s Tale] quickly, joking at the 
expense of the Physician. But when he says that he almost ‘caught a cardynacle’ 
(vi.313), he speaks more wisely than he knows’.57 Although Lee continues by arguing 
for the inability of the Physician to service the spiritual needs of the Host, one can also 
argue that the reaction of the Host to the tale is indicative of the Physician’s Platonic 
failure to able to heal, either through theory or through practice. The elusive theoretical 
morality of his tale is befuddling. The tale itself causes more practical harm than good. 
Instead of moving the storytelling along merrily, the host praises the Physician warmly, 
‘myn owene maister deere, [...] I pray to God so save thy gentil cors’ (vi.301-304), then 
proclaims, ‘But wel I woot thou doost myn herte to erme’ (vi.312), and drives him to 
admit that ‘Or but I here anon a myrie tale, / Myn herte is lost for pitee of this mayde’ 
(VI.316). The Physician’s Tale ends in disharmony not only for its characters, but for its 
audience. Given the unsettled nature of modem criticism for the tale, it would appear 
that this disquiet continues, and that the Physician and his tale continue to vex his 
audience.
57 ‘The Position and Purpose of the Physician's Tale\  p. 157.
Manly Beasts and Beastly Men
Considerations of the Medieval Body/Soul Relationship in Some of The 
Canterbury Tales
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Now God did not make the soul after the body, although we are speaking of them in this 
order; for having brought them together he would never have allowed that the elder 
should be ruled by the younger; but this is a random manner of speaking which we 
have, because somehow we ourselves too are very much under the dominion of chance. 
Whereas he made the soul in origin and excellence prior to and older than the body, to 
be the ruler and mistress, of whom the body was to be the subject. And he made her out 
of the following elements and on this wise: Out of the indivisible and unchangeable, and 
also out of that which is divisible and has to do with material bodies, he compounded a 
third and intermediate kind of essence, partaking of the nature of the same and of the 
other, and this compound he placed accordingly in a mean between the indivisible, and
the divisible and material.
Timaeus 34bl0-35a6
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When modem Chaucerians come to talk about ‘the body’, they usually do so in 
reference to one of two things: either the body and its relationship to the body of Christ, 
or the female body and its evaluation in relationship to that of the male body. Although 
both lines of criticism are worthwhile and add a significant amount of greater 
understanding to the texts, neither of them addresses a fundamental relationship that the 
body enjoys in terms of its existence and the question of immortality: the relationship 
that body has with its soul. Notwithstanding works that address the issue of the 
body/soul relationship as an aside to supplement a more central argument, recent 
scholarship regarding aspects of the association between the two elements of human 
nature in Chaucer’s can be seen to be limited to Astell’s discussions in Chaucer and the 
Universe o f Learning, Reame’s comments in 1980 regarding the Cecilia legend, and 
Yvette Marie Marchand’s ‘Towards a Psychosomatic View of Human Nature’, in which 
the premises of Platonic theory are established as the governing principles behind the 
discussion of the body/soul relationship in Chaucer’s Legend o f Good Women) Before 
that, Kellogg’s ‘An Augustinian Interpretation of Chaucer’s Pardoner’ (Speculum,
1951) is arguably the next place to find any real attention paid to the special issues 
raised by such a relationship in Chaucer’s work; it is itself almost a half-century after 
John Livingston Lowe’s ‘The Second Nun’s Prologue, Alanus and Macrobius’ {Modem 
Philology, 1917). The nature of the soul and its relationship to the human body was one 
of the most often discussed problems for philosophers, whether of the Middle Ages or 
of Antiquity. Chaucer, of course, knew intimately, and used as a source for some texts, 
notably Troilus, Boethius’ essentially Platonic examination of the relationship of the 
human’s spiritual essence to the material world and the sphere of the emotions. The
1 Yvette Marie Marchand, ‘Towards a Psychosomatic View of Human Nature: Chaucer, Spencer,
Burton’, in The Body and the Soul in Medieval Literature, ed. by Piero Boitani and Anna Torti 
(Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1999), pp. 123-44.
2 John Livingston Lowe, ‘The Second Nun’s Prologue, Alanus and Macrobius’, Modem Philology, 15 
(1917), pp. 193-202.
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neo-Platonic concept of a spherical cosmology and the difference between this
‘wrecched world’ and a higher plane of existence is reiterated by Chaucer in some of
the final lines of Troilus:
And whan that he was slayn in this manere,
His lighte goost ful blissfully is went 
Up to the holughnesse of th eighthe spere,
In convers letyng everich element;
And ther he saugh with ful avysement 
The erratic sterres, herkenyng armonye 
With sownes fill of hevenyssh melodie.
And down from thennes faste he gan avyse 
This litel spot of erthe that with the se 
Embraced is, and fully gan despise 
This wrecched world, and held al vanite 
To respect of the pleyn felicite 
That is in hevene above, (v.1807)
After the era of Boethius, and in the face of philosophical challenges both from 
Aristotleian works on the anima and Arabic interpretations, Western Christian 
philosophy explored the difficult question of what the soul was. A notable text in this is 
Aquinas’ De unitate intellectus. Chaucer himself lived in a society where concern for 
the soul, especially in such matters as confession, prayers for the dead, and anxiety 
about the fate of souls in purgatory, constantly surrounded members of society in their 
daily personal and communal life. Furthermore, the Pardoner illustrates contemporary 
concern over clerics who put money above the fate of the souls of their fellow- 
Christians.
However, to some extent, the scholarship discussing this subject of souls and 
how it may manifest itself through the Tales seems inordinately sparse. This next 
chapter attempts to address that imbalance with an investigation into the nature of that 
relationship and the problems that the text experiences when trying to resolve the issues 
inherent to the discussion.
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The neo-Platonic Tradition o f Contrariety and the Body/Soul Relationship
For the ancient neo-Platonists, nothing embodied the principle of contrariety more 
poignantly -  or more problematically -  than the relationship between the human body 
and the human soul. The problem of the body/soul relationship is discussed in Plato’s 
theories, identified and analysed by Aristotle, re-addressed by Plotinus and discussed at 
length by nearly every thinker thereafter. The following chapter attempts to address the 
medieval concept of the soul as a particularly troublesome entity in contemporary 
philosophy and literature. I hope to show how the arguments raised by Aristotle in 
reaction to Plato’s concept of the soul as an ‘immortal creature’ who ‘receives an 
earthly frame’, rather than getting refined or developed, only ever really get expanded 
upon and complicated by later thinkers.3 Furthermore, I would suggest that, by the time 
Chaucer writes The Canterbury Tales, the problematic issues surrounding the soul are 
fundamentally no closer to being resolved than they were in Plato’s own time. Matters 
of the soul, its problematic contrary relationship to the body and the search for the neo- 
Platonically precious intermediate between the two play a key role in the characters and 
actions of The Canterbury Tales.
The fact that the narrator and characters of The Canterbury Tales are at least on 
some level concerned with the nature of their souls almost goes without saying. 
Although attention should be paid to Benson’s proposition that most of Chaucer’s 
pilgrims seem to be on more of a holiday than a spiritual voyage, the Tales grounds 
itself to some degree on the conceit of a physical and spiritual journey.4 Perhaps it 
should come as no surprise, then, that the soul is referenced directly 83 times throughout 
the tales; so much so that at times, they seem insignificant aspects of the necessary
3 Phaedrus 246b9-c7, in The Dialogues o f Plato, trans. by B. Jowett, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1953), IE, pp. 107-190 (p. 153). All further references to Phaedrus will be from this source.
4 Larry D. Benson, Pilgrimages, (June 2000)
<http://icg.fas.harvard.edu/~chaucer/special/varia/pilgrimage/index > [accessed 19 November 2002].
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framework or scenery. However, this chapter will explore the possibility that the 
frequency of reference to the soul is not simply coincidental to the pilgrimage 
framework of the text. Rather, the text deals with the issue of souls on at least two 
levels. Firstly, if only superficially, it deals with the popular medieval concern for the 
state of the soul in a religious context. Secondly, and perhaps more elusively, the text 
addresses sophisticated issues regarding the particularly complex nature of the human 
soul: its relative privilege or privation of inherent divinity; its physicality or its 
incorporeality; and its frustrating relation to time, space and to the body with which it is 
associated.
This chapter will also explore how useful to an interpretation of body and soul in 
Chaucer is the neo-Platonic notion that between any two contraries there must be an 
intermediate substance that can negotiate in both realms of polarity. In the case of the 
body and soul dilemma, this negotiation of opposites becomes essential to our 
understanding of the way in which human beings are presented in relation to their 
intrinsic humanity and to their potential divinity. In short, we shall see how some of 
Chaucer’s texts struggle, in much the same way as the medieval philosophical mind 
struggles, to mediate the tensions between body and soul and to come to terms with the 
conflicting medieval philosophical and theological arguments surrounding the issue.
The conclusion of The Second Nun’s Tale, if there is one, seems to indicate that as an 
intermediate being between the poles of God (pure reason, pure soul, pure limitlessness) 
and Beast (pure appetite, pure flesh, pure physicality) mankind can, in accordance to 
neo-Platonic doctrine, exist anywhere on a flexible scale of humanity which 
demonstrates either a privation or an abundance of emanated divinity.
On one level, it may seem tempting to disregard overt references to the soul in 
the narrative, as the text deals with salvation, if only coincidentally by way of the nature 
of the pilgrimage. One might, after all, expect to find references to the nature of the soul
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and its salvation in a series of tales concerning a group of travellers who are either 
working in some aspect of the Church or in the group in order to fulfil a physical 
journey representative of their soul’s progress toward eternal reward. The frame of a 
pilgrimage and the presence of religious figures and tales does not necessarily mean that 
the text is primarily concerned with salvation. However, with such a group, on such a 
journey, one might be inclined to expect that the issues regarding the value of the soul 
might crop up from time to time as recurring subjects of the collective tales. It remains 
to be seen, however, what the narrator’s and characters’ respective depictions of the 
nature of the soul are and whether those representations corroborate or challenge 
contemporary philosophical arguments in the field.
The Medieval Concept o f the Soul
One of the more basic principles when considering the medieval concept of the 
nature of the soul is what Augustine (d. 430) would call ‘Divine Illumination’. The 
concept of Divine Illumination, which originates with Plotinus and is adapted thereafter 
by the Church Fathers (most notably Augustine), states that the essence or being of all 
things emanate from one divine source and that all things exist in an ever-decreasing 
order of perfection based on their relative intellectual and spiritual proximity to God. 
Even without further refinement, this theory intrinsically lends itself to a hierarchical 
classification of value and purpose, whereby things closer to the source of Being (God) 
are more perfect and more complete than those farther away from His supreme 
divinity.5 The soul, of course, is no exception. According to the general fourteenth- 
century conception of the soul -  and therefore, at this state of the development of 
thought, according primarily to the Christianised versions of Platonism, Aristotelianism 
and neo-Platonism of Augustine -  souls fundamentally exist in three parts of ascending 
potentiality: the vegetative, the sensitive and the intellectual. In agreement with neo-
5 See On the Trinity XII. 15.24, and for Augustine’s discussions of this principle.
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Platonic doctrine, the intellectual soul exists in a higher state of illumination than the 
sensitive soul, and it, in turn, is placed above the vegetative soul. Each soul’s 
potentiality is determined and valued by the highest division of soul that it possesses. 
Plants, for example, are not privy to reason, just as Man is not expected to act purely in 
reaction to a physical sensation. Furthermore, each type of soul is divided into its 
fundamental functions and powers. An oak tree, for example, is limited in its mobility 
by the powers retained by the highest soul it possesses: the vegetative soul.6
The Vegetative Soul
As the vegetative soul is the least capable of the souls, it is limited to four
primary powers: those of the attraction of matter (through heat and dryness), reduction
of the attracted matter into digestible substances (through coolness and dryness), the
digestion and distribution of reduced matter (warmth and dampness), and the expulsion
of the unusable reduced matter (cold and wet). The powers, themselves combinations of
the four basic physical attributes of existence, are to form, in combination, what James
McEvoy describes as the threefold ‘fundamental functions of all living things’:
nutrition, growth and reproduction. Grosseteste (d. 1253) promotes the idea of the
vegetative soul, which he develops from Avicenna.
In time, such a notion becomes accepted doctrine rather than simple proposition.
In his On Being and Essence, Aquinas (d. 1274) states:
And the more valuable the form, the more its powers are found to exceed the 
elementary particles of matter, as vegetable life has operations metals do not 
have, and sense-life has operations vegetable life does not have.8
Later, referring to the vegetative soul as the ‘nutritive soul’, Aquinas sets out to 
determine whether the different souls within man are essentially different: ‘Therefore if
6 See especially the last eight books of Augustine’s On the Trinity for his matured view of the human soul 
as a indication for a tripartite Godhead; and Summa Theologica I.Q78-83 for Aquinas’ discussion of the 
three types of soul and their functions.
7 James McEvoy, The Philosophy o f Robert Grosseteste (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 292.
8 Summa Theologica, XI, p. 47.
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a man receives life from one (the vegetative soul), animal life from another (the sense-
soul) and human life from another (the rational soul), man would not be just one
thing[...] And you cannot say that [separate souls] are held together through the body’s
unity, because it is the soul that holds the body together, not the other way round’.9
Without digressing into any discussion of whether Thomist philosophy dictates the
‘oneness’ of man, it is clear that there is a distinction between the types of soul available
for the composition of a living thing. And whereas Duns Scotus only remarks briefly on
the division of souls, it is obvious by his recognition of ‘all the parts of the soul’ and the
differentiation between an act of will and a natural inclination that he recognises the
accepted compartmentalisation of the soul.10
A natural desire in this sense is not an elicited act but merely an inclination of 
nature towards something, then it is clear that the existence of such a natural 
desire can be proved only if we prove first that the nature in question is able to 
have such a thing. To argue the other way round, therefore, is begging the 
question. 11
Scotus does not spend a lot of time talking about the different types of souls. Rather, he 
seems to accept the partitioning and ordering of the souls as a matter of fact. His 
comments concerning the subject are limited, perhaps because of the fact that there was 
no reason for him to question what had been long accepted as fact.
The Tales, too, seem not to question the existence of a ‘vegetative’ or ‘nutritive’ 
soul. As when reading Scotus, however, readers are forced to dig more deeply in 
Chaucer’s work in order to identify the references, as the notion of a purely subsistent 
soul was an assumption of fact in Chaucer’s period rather than a matter of contention.
So that when the Knight speaks of ‘the ook, that hath so long a norisshynge / From tyme 
that it first begynneth to sprynge, / And hath so long a l if  (VII.3017); or the ‘tree / That 
blosmeth er that fruyt ywoxen bee’ (IV. 1461), to which the Merchant refers, the
9 Summa Theologica, XI, p. 61.
10 John Duns Scotus, ‘The Spirituality and Immortality of the Soul’, in Philosophical Writings, trans. by 
Allan Wolter (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1962), p. 150.
11 Scotus, ‘The Spirituality and Immortality of the Soul’, p. 158.
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characters seem to take for granted that the driving force behind such nutritive acts is a 
base vegetative soul. That soul, though simple enough in purpose, is definitive of all 
things. The vegetative soul controls the growth of the trees as well as determining the 
downward path of the tears that fall from the eyes of Saint Urban in The Second Nun’s 
Tale (X.190). In each case objects of experience are following the directions of the most 
basic type of soul. Each act is without volition, but ruled by primordial necessity. For 
just as the sea in The Franklin’s Tale desires to be warmed by the sun, all existent 
things have natural inclinations that are determined by their vegetative soul (v.1049). 
The text acknowledges the existence of the ‘partitioned’ soul and its relative top-down 
classification; it remains to be seen whether it endorses the static nature of that 
classification, or whether it represents the soul and its relationship to matter as 
something less fixed.
The Sensitive Soul
According to Grosseteste, the sensitive soul has within its definition an 
altogether different set of internal classifications that the text must address. External 
senses, of which sight is the most privileged, are functions and combinations of the
i *y_
elements. The internal senses, anchored to the sensus communis, provide the ability to 
‘co-ordinate individual senses and combin[e] them into a unity of apperception’.13 Just 
as all perception is based in the sensus communis, desire is based in the appetitive 
capacity, which is broken into the powers of concupiscentia specialis and irascibilis. 
These powers are described as the ‘positive and negative affective reactions to the 
objects of sense-experience’, and are coupled in all animals by a relevant power of
12 See ‘Sighte Merveillous’ (below) on the hierarchical classification of senses.
13 McEvoy, p. 297.
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discretion between those sensations that are of benefit and those that are of potential 
danger.14
Other thirteenth-century thinkers considered and expanded on the neo-Platonised 
Arabic and classical views summarised and refined by Grosseteste. In most cases, the 
categories of distinction are either multiplied in order to express more refined criteria of 
difference, or simplified in order to express underlying unity. For instance, according to 
Aquinas, the souls of animated beings are further distinguishable from the forms of 
inanimate objects in that they combine natural appetites (the propensity of man to fall to 
the ground when tripped) with sensuality (the cognitive faculty of living a thing to seek 
ways to avoid the potentially painful consequences of being tripped in the first place).15 
Aquinas takes the definition of appetitive souls and refines the hierarchy within their 
definition. In other words, although all beings have appetites, as Grosseteste would 
assert, cognitive beings also have volition, or expressions of sensual appetites governed 
by rational discretion.16
Beasts and Men
Common to both classical and Christian models of the human being, it is a lack of 
rational discretion that separates beast from man. This distinction is the source of lament 
when Palamon speaks of the beast, unencumbered by the will of God, which ‘may al his 
lust fulfille’ (1.1317). Chaucer’s text is utilising the common understanding that the 
sensitive soul has within its powers the rudimentary ability to interpret sensory data and 
motivate the animal in question to act accordingly, with no need for the intervention of 
judgement or reason. A beast, in its purely sensual capacity, acts upon only what it 
wants to do, as it is incapable of determining in any way what it should do. If we follow
14 McEvoy, p. 299.
15 The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. by Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 144.
16 Kretzmann and Stamp, p. 144.
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the development of the consideration of the soul to the more immediate forerunners to 
Chaucer, we will see that the ideas concerning the nature of the soul change very little. 
Not only does Aquinas agree that the sensitive soul surpasses the vegetative soul, but he 
carries distinctions within the animal world in the delineation of animals based on the
17capacity of their respective sensitive souls. The Tales appear to accept this
classification as they often give us lists of animals in the Biblically-declared ascending
order. For instance, in The Knight’s Tale:
For every labour somtyme moot han reste,
Or elles longe may he nat endure;
This is to seyn, no lyves creature,
Be it fyssh, or bryd, or beest or man. (1.1862)
Again, we see that by recounting the established hierarchy of sensitive things, 
everyone, including Chaucer’s Knight, demonstrates an understanding of the 
fundamental notions of the soul’s constituent elements. The text is, of course, following 
the order laid out by the Bible and followed in all bestiaries of its time. The narrator is 
not an inventor of a hierarchical classification of animal evaluation. At least since 
Aristotle, a ‘scientific’ general classification of the inherent worth of animals has been 
established. Aristotle’s classification was relatively simple: all non-human animals 
belong to two categories, each of which category is then further subdivided. 
Subcategories are then also divided, and so on. According to the History o f Animals, 
animals are divided first by those with blood and those without. Among blooded 
animals, we find quadrupeds, birds and fish. Blooded quadrupeds are then distinguished 
between viviparous (those that give birth to live young) and oviparous (those that lay 
eggs). Blooded viviparous quadrupeds are then classified by such scientific criteria as 
hoof division, the possession of horns, the presence of a mane and genital size, shape 
and placement. Animals without blood -  molluscs, crabs and insects -  are also defined 
and organised by similarly seemingly arbitrary criteria: number of feet, method of
17 Summa Theologica, especia lly  XI, pp . 5-83 and 119-19L
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movement, and relative hardness of shell are but a few. Although these categories may 
seem to be subjective and for the most part innocuous, Aristotle not only laid the 
foundations for all zoological classification to come, but also paved the logical way in 
which medieval thinkers evaluated their place in the cosmic order. Beryl Rowland 
mentions that ‘the Egyptian Book of the Dead, the Bible, travellers’ tales, the works of 
Herodotus, Aristotle, Pliny, Plutarch and others’.18 All had considerable influence on 
the way in which Chaucer’s contemporaries viewed animals, and that Isidore of 
Seville’s Etymologies added much to the delineation of animals based on ‘supposed 
characteristics of each’.19 If we remember that in the Aristotelian world-view ‘inner 
characteristics were exemplified by the outward physical form’ and that ‘both by virtue 
of [the animal’s] position in the Chain of Being and its appearance’, then we cannot 
ignore the fact that certain animals were ‘better’ than others based on their relevant 
spiritual proximity to God, or that humans, in general, are better than animals.20 By 
acknowledging the traditional chain of being within sensitive animals, the narrator is at 
once describing the order in which they exist in commonality -  that they all have the 
capacity for rudimentary faculties -  and reiterating the fact that man alone stands at the 
top of the list of material beings because of the fact that his soul contains the highest 
degree of potentiality: the ability to aspire to seek out the world of the rational soul.
Processes o f Perception and Understanding
According to Grosseteste, the rational soul of man has a tripartition of ‘speculative
91virtues’: intelligentia, wisdom and the vision of God. The full potential of the soul -  
the unfiltered reception of illuminated knowledge of God -  is accessible by man only in 
abnormal circumstances of extreme spiritual clarity. Such an experience is solely within
18 Beryl Rowland, Blind Beasts (Kent, OH and Chatham: The Kent State University Press, 1971), p. 4.
19 Rowland, Blind Beasts, p. 4.
20 Rowland, Blind Beasts, p. 19.
21 McEvoy, p. 301.
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the capacity of the intelligentia, which can grasp knowledge without sense perception. 
Intellectus is that ability in humans to gain knowledge by physical sensation through the 
medium of a phantasm. Phantasms act as the medium between the immaterial and the 
corporeal in that they theoretically allow the immaterial object to impress (in some 
theories literally) information received through the senses on the physical brain. 
Categories lend themselves to an almost endless series of subcategories and further 
classification, and these rigid classifications are imbedded in literature by the time 
Chaucer begins to write The Canterbury Tales. The opening section of The Book o f the 
Duchess, for example, illustrates Chaucer’s interest in and familiartity with a model of 
perception that sees ‘fantasye’, the undefined phantasmata from sight of the physical 
world, becoming ‘ymagynacioun’—the image-making faculty within the human mind. 
As yet in the text the narrator and his audience have not achieved adequate 
understanding, in the ratio, of what the subject-matter is that disturbs and puzzles his 
mind.
As if pre-thinkers had not already painstakingly and uncompromisingly labelled 
enough parts of the soul, the trend continues. These divisions and subdivisions are well- 
established by the time the Tales begin. For example: whereas the intellectus serves to 
communicate and motivate movement of physical species to the body, the intelligentia 
moves the intellect and provides judgement to balance apparent discrepancies reported 
by the senses. The Tales show some discussion of this subtle difference in The 
Franklin’s Tale, where most characters of the narrative are at one time or another 
deficient in their judgement concerning information transmitted through the senses.22 
Moreover, the Intellectual Soul provides man with the potential to know God directly in 
this life, as it is only the non-physical mind that has access to a complete knowledge of 
the Prime Mover. That the intellectual soul exists and that it is the determinate
22 This is discussed in the chapter entitled ‘Sighte Merveillous’, below.
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difference between man and beast is never in question. This assertion is in direct
contrast to Aristotle, for whom, as Olson states:
[...] what makes man human is his capacity for speech-for speaking together to 
identify species’ interest. Thus, while bees and birds and other collective 
creatures find out what they should do corporately by listening to instinct, men 
find out what they should do by talking together in assemblies until they 
recognise what the common interest is. (Politics 1.2; III. 1; IV. 14.)23
Olson misinterprets the fundamental distinction being made by Aristotle in this
section of the Politics. In fact, Aristotle states plainly that although the ability to speak
is reserved for man alone, the power of the voice is retained by all animals for the
mutual indication of pleasure and pain.24 Furthermore, Aristotle says:
And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of 
just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this 
sense makes a family and a state.25
Grosseteste confirms the fundamental difference between beast and man as the
rational capacity rather than a physical capability by stating that ‘the natural differentiae
of the various kinds of being can be used to specify the human powers of understanding
constituting in their sum the total intellectual life of man’. At one point, Aquinas adds:
Now, it sometimes happens that what has one perfection may attain to a further 
perfection as well, as is clear in man, who has a sensitive nature and, further, an
9 7intellective one.
Aquinas expresses the dominance of man based on the relative potential of his 
soul. However, Aquinas will go on to echo Aristotle’s sentiment that intellect is above 
sense28 and that ‘the human animal, unlike all the others, is called not sensory but rather 
rational substance because sensation is less than [rationality], which is proper to a
23 Paul A. Olson, ‘The Parlement ofFoules: Aristotle’s Politics and the Foundations of Human Society’, 
Studies in the Age o f Chaucer, 2 (1980), 53-69 (p. 55).
24 Aristotle, Politics, in The Complete Works o f Aristotle, trans. by B. Jowett, ed. by Jonathan Barnes, 2 
vols (Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1984), II, pp . 1986-2129 (p. 1988).
25 Politics, 1253al5-18 (p.1988).
26 McEvoy, p. 301.
27 Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, in Medieval Sourcebook: Thomas Aquinas: On Being and 
Essence, trans. by Robert T. Miller, 1997, < http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/aquinas-esse.html>, 
[Accessed 01 September 2003].
28 Summa Theologica, pp. 119-211.
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human being’.29 Scotus, in an attempt to establish the immortality of man, puts forth this
argument for the unique rational soul of the human animal:
This much is clear, if any argument proves the resurrection, it must be one based 
on something that is proper to man and does not belong to other perishable 
things. But such a thing would not be matter, nor even incorruptible matter. 
Neither is it some form that can be destroyed. For even if such a form exist in 
man and indeed, one even more excellent than any brute form, still this would 
not provide an adequate argument for the resurrection of man as a whole. Hence, 
the argument must be based upon that form which is specific to man or upon 
some operation which man enjoys by reason of this form. [...] Furthermore, all 
philosophers commonly assign ‘rational’ as the difference that properly defines 
man, meaning by ‘rational’ that the intellective soul is an essential part of man.30
In an unusual moment of philosophical accord, everyone seems to be in 
agreement that the one most basic difference between man and all other sentient beings 
is his capacity for reason. However strong the currents of conformity are on the matter 
of Man’s dominance over the terrestrial chain of being, evidence suggests that the text 
disputes the prescribed order of being. In fact, once again, we see that the text 
challenges the accepted hierarchies and classifications it inherits from neo-Platonic 
precedents.
Soul and Body: The Second Nun’s Tale
It could be argued that, in context of The Knight's Tale, the text falls back into line 
quickly. Palamon continues his lament by remarking that unlike beasts, rational man is 
forced to repress his sensitive desires (1.1317) and carries on suffering after death 
because of the higher nature of his soul (1.1320), thus reinstating the unique ability of 
Man’s soul to conquer his appetite and to exist beyond physical death. However, 
evidence suggests that another challenge to the nature and value of souls exists. As 
Sherry Reames points out in her discussion of the St. Cecilia legend, the normal process 
of medieval conversion is altered by the narrator in The Second Nun’s Tale from one of
29 Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, p. 137.
30 Scotus, p. 138.
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an intelligent choice to one bordering on coercion. Although Reames uses this 
observation to point out the ‘disappearance of the Augustinian ideal’ of a conversion 
theory based on the internal and intelligent choice of the converted to participate in the 
grace of God, the same evidence can be used to advocate a challenge to the Order of 
Being as described above. Reames reminds us that Chaucer’s version of Passio S. 
Caeciliae dismantles the Augustinian ideal of a truly intellectual enlightenment. If the 
reader is to accept her argument, the text offers an adaptation of conversion that 
bypasses Augustine’s ‘active, informed role in the process’ of conversion in order to 
favour one in which the converted character is ‘railroaded’ into making the choice to 
submit to the grace of God. A distinct lack of rational choice takes the characters away 
from the intellectual ideal, so that early Christian converts and, by extension, all 
humans, are ‘incapable of responding in knowledge and love to the divine initiative’. 
These converts are not making decisions based on the information acquired by their 
intellects; they are, in fact, ‘chosen, singled out by God, and suddenly set on a new path 
-  whatever the inclinations of His own heart and mind’.34
Although Reames is making the claim that the relationship between the 
converted soul and God is no longer one of intellectual choice to the philosophers of 
Chaucer’s century, the basic premises of the argument can be applied to our ongoing 
argument as well. In other words, whereas Reames concentrates on the challenge that 
the text makes to the Augustinian ideal of conversion, the foundations of the argument 
can just as easily be applied and alternatively emphasised to show how the text 
challenges the inherent distinctions perceived between Man and Beast based on the 
relative intellectual capacities of their souls. By removing the intellect from the process 
of conversion, the text eliminates the primary criterion by which we distinguish the soul
31 Sherry Reames, ‘The Cecilia Legend as Chaucer Inherited It and Retold It’, Speculum, 55 (1980), 38- 
57.
32 Reames, p. 42.
33 Reames, p. 54.
34 Reames, p. 51.
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of Man from that of Beast. As Reames demonstrates, the tale’s potential converts are 
not interested in the knowledge associated with the intellectual conversions of 
Augustine, but are, in fact, bullied into conversion and overwhelmed by physical 
sensation rather than by intellectual epiphany. Valerian, for instance, demands to see the 
angel guarding his bride’s virginity: ‘If I shal trusten thee, / Lat me that aungel se and 
hym biholde’ (VIII.163). After himself being overwhelmed with the vision of an angel in 
white robes (viii.201), Valerian returns to convince Tiburce to follow a similar path to 
conversion. His description of the process focuses entirely on the sensation aspects of 
the visiting angel:
Valerian seyde: ‘Two corones han we,
Snow white and rose reed, that shenen cleere,
Which that thyne eyen han no myght to see;
And as thou smellest hem thurgh my preyere. (vm.253)
Valerian is concentrating not on what he has learned from Urban and from the 
angel (as far as the text is concerned, nothing is learned at all), but rather on how the 
angel affected his senses. By doing so, he is removing the decision to become baptised 
from the realm of the human’s rational soul and placing it within the animalistic 
territory of the sensitive soul. The text has eliminated the unique intelligentia of the 
human soul which would be able to participate in the grace of God without sensation 
and concentrated on the sensus communis, available to all animals. Valerian is not 
acting according to the full potential of his classification as a rational being: the text 
seems to suggest that in fact, his decisions are nothing more than appetitive reactions. In 
other words, Valerian’s actions and subsequent communications are entirely based on 
sensational stimuli rather than an intellectual process defined by Grosseteste and 
strongly advocated by Augustine. Of course, we must acknowledge that Tiburce’s 
conversion is more reminiscent of the Augustinian model in that we are given the details 
of his spiritual education. However, the brevity of the lessons - four lines, ‘bisily’ 
preached - seems to emphasise again that the intellectual soul of man is not being
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completely satisfied (vm.342). Even Cecile’s explanation of the tri-part soul of Man and 
the Holy Trinity seems rushed to the point that the inclusion of intellect appears to be an 
afterthought (viii.339). We cannot ignore even the most subtle of challenges to the 
assumed order; the discreet manipulation of the Chain of Being weakens the rigidity of 
the order and, at the same time allows the narrative to reconsider the inherent 
relationship of each creature with its respective soul. As far as Chaucer’s pilgrims are 
concerned, the most important relationship in that Chain to be discussed is that between 
the body and the soul.
Having established that the soul is generally considered by Chaucer’s 
contemporaries to be of a multifaceted nature, with nested hierarchies dominating the 
internal structure as well as the overall composition of the soul, it is necessary that we 
explore the unique relationship that man has with his soul. Again, this is an aspect of 
philosophy that, by Chaucer’s time, seems almost to have been taken for granted as a 
matter of fact. In short, the relationship that man’s soul -  or at least his intellective soul 
-  shares with his body is one of administration and limitation. In other words, it is clear 
in the philosophical texts as well as in the Tales that the Soul not only serves to 
facilitate the physical potential of the human body, but to inform it of God’s existence 
and love. The body is a limitation of the soul that, only when released, is able to sustain 
its potential of direct knowledge of God. Grosseteste speaks of the soul as ‘both mover 
and form[.. .]present everywhere in the body without being located in an organ, but it 
acts directly only through affecting the luminous spirits, the intermediary between spirit 
and matter favoured by all neo-Platonists’. Aquinas supposed that:
35 McEvoy, p. 267.
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Similarly, above this perfection of having a form such that three dimensions can 
be designated in it, there can be joined another perfection, as life or some similar 
thing. This term body, therefore, can signify a certain thing that has a form such 
that from the form there follows in the thing designatability in three dimensions 
and nothing more, such that, in other words, from this form no further perfection 
follows, but if some other thing is superadded, it is beyond the signification of 
body thus understood. And understood in this way, body will be an integral and 
material part of the animal, because in this way the soul will be beyond what is 
signified by the term body, and it will supervene on the body such that from 
these two, namely the soul and the body, the animal is constituted as from_ 36parts.
However, Aquinas pushes the stipulation of the essence of man as his soul one 
step further. By reducing man’s soul from three ‘co-operating substantial forms’ to the 
essential element of what it is to be a human being (rationality), Aquinas found his own 
way of defining the necessary distinction between body and soul and, by extension, the 
immortality of the human soul. This, of course, establishes the opportunity for souls 
to exist after the physical death of the body that they were informing. Aquinas goes on 
to postulate that the human soul, by nature of its essential incorruptibility, indeed has 
the inherent capacity for immortality.
Scotus is not so easily convinced. In fact, by the time Scotus arrives at the 
question, the limitations of the previous arguments have left him without intellectual 
reason to believe that the soul exists after death. That is not to say that he does not 
believe that it does: only that he is unable to formulate a satisfactory logical reason as to 
why it MUST be so. In other words, while his predecessors were content to devise 
logical arguments that demonstrated the necessary existence of man’s eternal nature, 
Scotus could not reach such a conclusion. As Scotus replies to the arguments he has 
inherited, he states:
36 On Being and Essence, in Medieval Sourcebook: Thomas Aquinas: On Being and Essence, trans. by 
Robert T. Miller, 1997, < http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/aquinas-esse.html>, [Accessed 01 
September 2003].
37 Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, p. 131.
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Frequently, what they gave was nothing more than rather persuasive probable 
arguments or what was commonly held by earlier philosophers... And this reply 
would suffice for all the testimonies [from the philosophers] cited above; even if 
they clearly asserted the proposed conclusion, they still do not establish it.38
He goes on to evaluate all of the previous arguments for the resurrection, as well as to
propose several new ones, each failing his own stringent tests of logical scrutiny. His
conclusion is far from optimistic:
To put it briefly, then, we can maintain that natural reason cannot prove that the 
resurrection is necessary, neither by way of a priori reasons such as those based 
on the intrinsic principle in man, nor by a posteriori arguments, for instance, by 
reason of some operation or perfection fitting to man. Hence we hold the 
resurrection to be certain on the basis of faith alone.39
Although Scotus cannot adequately prove by his own laws of reason that the 
soul of man exists eternally, he is persuaded to believe so by Scripture and by the 
testimony of the Church thinkers such as Augustine. Perhaps due to the ancient 
precedents of this, the idea that faith supersedes reason is a well-established aspect of 
late medieval theology, one that seems to transcend any need for logical explanation, 
Scotus is quite happy to carry on believing in the immortality of the human soul, 
without being able to prove it. Almost as a last resort, Scotus appeals to the Bible, 
‘Where Christ tells us: “Do not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill the 
soul”.’40
The Soul and Freedom from the Body
Chaucer’s texts can also be seen to subscribe to the belief that the soul is capable of 
existing without a physical body. Even Chaucer’s presentation of evil characters can 
remind his readers, in its wording, of this belief. The Summoner’s Limiter claims that 
his ‘spirit hath his fostryng in the Bible’ (ill. 1845) and that his soul is nourished despite 
the meagre sustenance he receives. This simple quotation, though put into the mouth of
38 Scotus, p. 149.
39 Scotus, p. 159.
40 Scotus, p. 159.
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a greedy hypocrite, reiterates the specific sentiment expressed by Scotus: that the 
scriptures are enough to feed the faith, and that the soul will survive on such 
nourishment regardless of the physical condition of the body. The wife of the merchant 
in the Shipman's Tale swears ‘by that God that yaf me soule and ly f (V ll.l 15), again in 
ironically irreligious context, but nonetheless reminding readers of the inseparable 
connection between Life and the Soul (but not necessarily the body) made by Augustine 
in Chapter 9 of his On the Immortality o f the Soul.41 Although there are numerous 
references that indicate a faith-based belief in the eternal existence of the soul, the exact 
nature of the relationship between body and soul as portrayed by the text has come 
under recent scrutiny.
As Ann Astell highlights in Chaucer and the Universe o f Learning, there are 
several interpretations of the relationship between body and soul that are depicted in the 
tales. Whereas the ‘Second Nun and her protagonist [represent that] the body is the 
soul’s prison from which it is to be released’, Astell claims that the Man of Law ’s 
Custance’s sea voyages ‘associate the body as the soul’s companion and shelter and 
emphasise the soul’s dependence upon and near-inseparability from the body’.42 This 
controversial argument addresses the pattern of challenging established beliefs in 
several aspects. Firstly, Galenic medical precedent (following the Aristotelian 
hylomorphic model) would allow that the soul is a tangible, treatable entity. A 
‘diseased’ soul could be treated medically to some degree, just as the actions of a 
healthy soul could be affected by herbs, music and drugs such as alcohol. This is not to 
say that all levels of the soul could be addressed physically, but that at least to some 
extent, the physical world had access to what was, medically speaking, another 
combination of humours. It is absolutely imperative to note, however, that although the
41 Augustine, On the Immortality o f the Soul, in Readings in Medieval Philosophy, ed. by Andrew S. 
Schroedinger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 264-74, p. 270.
42 Ann Astell, Chaucer and the Universe o f Learning (London and Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1996), pp. 140-1.
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contemporary Galenic model allowed for ‘directly physical’ access to the soul, medieval
Galenism approached treatment of the soul as an indirect science, acting on ‘the organs
or organs which acted as its instruments’.43
Philosophical precedent, however, demands that the body is, indeed, a hindrance
to the true potential of the soul, that the soul fared much better after being released from
the body and that, furthermore, it would have been considered impossible for the soul to
be considered to be reliant on any physical thing. The Knight's Tale is a notable
example of fourteenth-century poetry attempting to work with philosophical ideas that
combine Christian and pre-Christian worldviews. It is partly dependant on its sources,
of course, but it includes some of Chaucer’s most memorable images of the relationship
of soul and body. Arcite’s death invokes several images regarding this relationship.
Firstly, as he lays dying, Arcite calls Palamon and Emelye to his bedside, and declares:
To yow, my lady, that I love moost,
But I biquethe the servyce of my goost 
To yow aboven every creature,
Syn that my lyf may no lenger dure. (1.2767)
Then, when Arcite’s body leaves his soul, a clear distinction is made as the relationship
between the body and the soul is severed:
Oonly the intellect, withouten moore,
That dwelled in his herte syk and soore,
Gan faillen whan the herte felte deeth.
[.. .]His spirit chaunged hous and wente ther,
As I cam nevere, I kan nat tellen wher. (1.2803, 2809)44
The Knight's Tale demonstrates, if only briefly, that Chaucer is aware of the
developing medieval concept of the soul and its relation to the physical body.
Philosophically speaking, the rules of engagement between body and soul seem clear:
although the soul perfects and informs the body, the reverse simply is not possible.
43 For an extensive discussion of the development of the medical concept of the soul, see Angel Gonzalez 
De Pablo’s ‘The Medicine of the Soul’, History o f Psychiatry, 5 (1994), 483-516.
44 It is worth noting too that Troilus’s soul’s flight to a celestial realm is borrowed from Boccaccio’s 
Teseida. See The Riverside Chaucer, p. 840.
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Jeremy Citrome makes this relationship even more poignant by reminding us that the
medieval mind saw a correlation between spiritual illness and physical maladies. He
also states that ‘the Augustinian conceit of Christ as Physician is a familiar feature of
the medieval religious polemic’.45 Simply put, the line of causation is top-down only,
and the reverse would not have been considered, as such a consideration would
ultimately imply that man could somehow affect God. Contemporary belief, in general,
states that every living thing is endowed with two ‘distinct principles, one to explain
composition, and the other to explain life’.46 Whereas any specific soul depends on a
corresponding material body for initial formation, nothing material -  including the body
-  ever acts upon the soul itself. Scotus states without reservation that any claim that the
soul would rely upon the body for its well-being is categorically untrue, as the soul:
communicates to the compound and maintains it in the harmony of qualities and 
proportions necessary for the vegetative, sensitive and intellective life. When for 
one reason or another this equilibrium of dispositions in the compound is 
broken, and the soul, no longer finding the indispensable conditions for its 
permanence in the body, withdraws from it [...] the form of the compound still 
remains.47
Furthermore, Aquinas states clearly that the soul ‘has its existence raised above 
the body and does not depend on it’.48 In fact, Aquinas states unequivocally that the 
human soul is united with a body ‘because it is imperfect and exists potentially in the 
genus of intellectual substances, not having the fullness of knowledge in its own nature, 
but acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily senses’ 49 That Astell uses 
Aquinas’ model of the soul as being ‘moved’ by the body is recognition of a significant 
challenge to the chain of causation. By definition, the body cannot act upon the soul, as 
the body clearly exists below the soul in the established hierarchy of being. Although 
there seem to be some unanswered questions regarding the soul, the unilateral causal
45 Jeremy J. Citrome, ‘Medicine as Metaphor in the Middle English Cleanness’, The Chaucer Review, 35
(2001), 260-280 (p. 262).
46 Efrem Bettoni, Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles o f his Philosophy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1978), p. 69.
47 Bettoni, p. 70.
48 Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae de Anima, IC, in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, p. 136.
49 Summa Theologica 1 .Q76.
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nature of its relationship to the body seems philosophically without question. That is, of 
course, until we examine the special circumstances by which the intellective soul exists 
independent of the physical restraints of materiality: the very specific case of the angel.
Somewhere in Between: The Medieval Problem o f Angels
Angels and demons represent the fundamental dilemma of the Chain of Being. 
They are, in a way, the Yeti of medieval thought -  they make sense in theory as a point 
of mediation between the extremes of mortal Man and immortal God, but they are 
frustratingly elusive to demonstrate or to explain. The origins, composition and 
subsequent limitations (if there are, indeed, any limitations) of Angels become essential 
to the debate over the same aspects of the human soul. Once again, the debate seems 
unresolved, either in medicine, philosophy or in the Tales. Dyan Elliot tells us that the 
fundamental argument regarding the actual nature of Angels emanates from the 
Augustinian desire to reserve ‘the privilege of absolute incorporeality for God alone’.50 
Whereas ‘there is little doubt that both angels and demons had bodies in the first three 
centuries of the Christian era’, the matter gets considerably more muddled by the 
twelfth century, by which time there is no real consensus regarding the existence of 
angelic bodies in any form.51 Elliot reminds us that even after the scholasticism of 
Bonaventure (d. 1274), which allows for incorporeal bodies to realign elements to form 
a temporary body that is neither permanent nor completely transient -  angelic power 
holds the elements together as long as necessary before the elements are returned to 
their original state.52
Grosseteste, writing around the same time, also spends a great deal of time 
discussing angels and their inherent peculiarities. He describes them as ‘purely
50 Dyan Elliot, Fallen Bodies (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), p. 129. See also 
Summa Theologica 1 .Q31; and 1 .Q50.
51 Elliot, p. 128.
52 Elliot, p. 133.
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unembodied and intellectual substances, the energies of whose intelligence are
inflexibly fixed upon the Trinity’.53 One of these purely intelligent beings ‘must act on
the body it assumes in the same immaterial way as does the human spirit: its will affects
the subtlest and least material energy of the body, light or bodily spirit, which in turn
moves the nerves and muscles’.54 By the time Aquinas approaches the question, he feels
compelled to refute propositions that purely incorporeal creatures can exist:
There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what is principally intended by 
God in creatures is good, and this consists in assimilation to God Himself. And 
the perfect assimilation of an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect 
imitates the cause according to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as 
heat makes heat. Now, God produces the creature by His intellect and will 
(Question [14], Article [8]; Question [19], Article [4]). Hence the perfection of 
the universe requires that there should be intellectual creatures. Now intelligence 
cannot be the action of a body, nor of any corporeal faculty; for every body is 
limited to “here” and “now”. Hence the perfection of the universe requires the 
existence of an incorporeal creature.55
Having established a necessary need for the existence of angels, Aquinas goes 
on to ascribe to them a place between God and corporeal creatures. Angels exist in form 
only, without matter and without locality, temporal displacement or mobility as all of 
these categories of being require finite being. In other words, purely intellectual beings 
cannot be limited to matters of time or space, as those are the predicates of matter, of 
which intellect has none. Therefore, angels exist without the necessity of matter and 
therefore without the constraints of location or time. Thomism demands that Angels -  
and demons, for that matter -  exist as creatures of pure intellect and without bodies.
Scotus, on the other hand, takes a different view on the nature of angels. Firstly, 
he contends that they are finite. Scotus argues that any ‘finite form is limited first in 
itself before it is limited in respect to matter... The finite character of the angelic 
essence, then, is something that is prior to the nature of its existence’.56 Scotus’ only
53 McEvoy, p. 60.
54 McEvoy, p. 57.
55 Summa Theologica 1 .Q50.
56 Scotus, ‘The Existence of God’, in Duns Scotus: The Philosophical Texts, ed. by Allan Wolter 
(London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1962), p. 7.
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real comments on angels seem to be that there must be some kind of finite element to
their existence; otherwise their individualisation would be impossible. He does not seem
to question that they exist or that they exist as part of a hierarchy that places them
between man and God.
In his article examining the use of mirrors in Dante’s work, Gilson states:
It was after all the sixth-century Christian Platonist, Pseudo-Dionysius the 
Aeropagite, who did more than any other thinker to organize the cosmos into a 
cascade of illuminations by presenting the angelic hierarchies as mirrors which 
received and transmitted divine light. 7
He is, of course, referring to the Dionysian treatise entitled The Celestial 
Hierarchies, in which the Pseudo-Dionysius establishes the nine orders of angels which
co
demonstrate the emanation and mediation from God to Man. Gilson also states that 
‘Dionysian ideas on angelic mediation had become commonplace by the late thirteenth 
century’, so it would appear prudent to assert that the role of angel as a reflector to 
God’s intellect would be available both to Chaucer and to his audience.59 Furthermore, 
this unique role as intermediate and vessel of the light of the intellect of God to man 
seems to be the notion which Chaucer’s text takes up as its idea of the angel. And 
although several of the tales present the classic images of demons and angels, each 
presents an aspect of the inconclusive arguments for and against angelic embodiment.
From the beginning of The Second Nun’s Tale, the text is fairly orthodox 
regarding the philosophical certainties of the incorporeality of angels established by 
Aquinas.60 In line with Thomist doctrine, we are introduced to the problematic lover of 
Cecile that represents the current state of indecision in reference to the physicality of 
angels. Whereas Cecile’s angel lover is incorporeal to the point that he may not be seen
57 Simon A. Gilson, ‘Light Reflection, Mirror Metaphors and Optical Framing in Dante’s Comedy: 
Precedents and Transformations’, Neophilologus, 83 (1999), 241-52 (p. 245).
58 For a discussion of the physical implications of that mediation, see Matthew Fox and Rupert Sheldrake, 
The Physics o f Angels (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1996), 29-76.
59 Gilson, p. 245.
60 Of course, Chaucer is weaving together material from several sources. See Sherry L. Reames’ study of 
the sources in Sources and Analogues o f the Canterbury Tales, ed. by Robert M. Correale and Mary 
Hamel, 2 vols (Cambridge: Brewer, 2002), vol. 1, pp. 491-527.
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except by the faithful, he clearly occupies physical space and can make contact with the
physical world through the manipulation of the senses (viii.218). The angel’s garlands
are physically brought ‘fro paradys’ and produce strong sensational reactions even in
the senses of the as-of-yet unsaved:
And [Tiburce] syede, “I wondre, this tyme of the yeer,
Whennes that soote savour cometh so 
Of rose and lilies that I smelle heer.
For though I hadde hem in myne handes two,
The savour myghte in me no depper go.
The sweete smel that in myn herte I fynde 
Hath chaunged me al in another kynde. (viii.246)
The power of the roses and lilies are being sensed through the nose and through the 
heart. It is noteworthy that as of yet, the garlands are not addressing the mind. Once 
again, two aspects of the human soul are being acknowledged while a third and most 
distinctive partition is being ignored. Chaucer is close to one of his sources here, yet the 
wording of his stanza is significant in terms of the model of perception and the 
relationship of sensation to understanding. He adds the image of the smell going deeper 
into the human consciousness and the allusion to the ‘herte’ receiving the impression of 
the physical sensation of smell.61
By occupying time and space, the Second Nun’s angel not only has an aspect of 
corporeality, but is also able to bring gifts and to manipulate human senses. He is not 
the completely disembodied entity asserted by some pre-Thomist doctrines. By the late 
thirteenth century, angels had, to some extent, been established as ‘austere entities, 
comprised of pure intellect and will’. The angel presented in The Second Nun's Tale, 
and its sources for this saint’s life however, is philosophically problematic because of its 
refusal to adhere rigidly to any of the possible arguments for angelic embodiment or 
disembodiment, choosing rather to be found somewhere in the middle of the two. As 
such, he follows the observations of angels made by Aquinas when he states that they
61 Compare the passage in 11.95-100, in Reames’ edition and translation of In festo Sancte Cecilie virginis 
et martyris, in Correale and Hamel, pp. 52-21.
62 Elliot, p. 134.
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can occupy time and space, and can affect the sensations of bodies through internal and 
external stimulation.63
Furthermore, we see once again that the angel is not appealing to the intellect of 
Tiburce but, rather, to his senses: Chaucer mentions the sweetness of the smell twice 
(vm.247-8, 256). The conditions of his conversion are to this point entirely sensitive; 
another reminder that the text chooses to emphasise the corporeal rather than the 
intellectual aspects of the human body/soul relationship. This is not the only challenge 
that the text makes to the presupposed exceptional nature of mankind’s rationality. If we 
reconsider the lament of Palamon mentioned above, we see that the passage is 
particularly interesting in that it comes at the conclusion of Palamon’s appeal to the 
‘cruel goddes’ who seem to take no more notice of mankind than they do of sheep in the 
fold (1.1303-8). The lament is based primarily on the fact that mankind is meant to have 
a degree of priority in relation to the beasts, but, just like the irrational animals they are 
meant to have dominion over, ‘slayn is man right as another beest, / And dwelleth eek in 
prison and arreest / And hath siknesse and greet adversitee’ (1.1309). Again, we see that 
the lament is based on the very neo-Platonic notion of privation; Palamon is feeling as if 
he is not enjoying all of the potential divinity to which he is entitled as a human.
The Rational Soul
The text seems to be raising doubts as to whether the fundamental distinction 
between man and beast, the existence of a rational soul, is either existent or practically 
relevant. What good is a rational soul, especially in the context of Palamon and Arcite, 
when the evidence he observes cynically suggests that, at best, mankind is treated no 
better than livestock? To make matters worse, the human being is burdened his entire 
life with the rational desire to follow the will of God and thereby to curb his animalistic 
hungers, only to be rewarded after death with possibly more pain and suffering (1.1315-
63 Summa Theologica, I.Q52,1.Q53,1.Ql 10 and i.Ql 1.
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23). What good is the just life that filled with ‘greet pyne y s \ when beasts and beastly 
men (‘a serpent or a th e f) spend their lives in freedom and relative unaccountability 
(1.1324-5)? Of course, it could be well argued here that the human in question is not 
acting out of reason, but out of the ‘lovesickness’ with which he has been afflicted. In 
that limited sense, Palamon is not acting as a reasonable man, but, rather, as someone 
who is being controlled by his appetitive soul. The same could, in fact, be said of 
anyone who acts contrary to reason. However, one could argue that the fact that 
mankind in general is meant to be uniquely able to use reason to direct his ‘lower’ soul, 
reiterates the argument that his supposed superiority over the beasts is in jeopardy.
The text can be seen not only to be challenging some of the essential distinctions 
made between rational men and irrational beasts, but also to be raising concerns as to 
the overall practical benefit of indulging the rational and tempering the unreasonable. 
By blurring those assumed boundaries that are meant to lay between man and beast, 
Chaucer’s text the tale addresses both the internal and the external hierarchies that are 
dependant upon those assumptions. If the rational soul is of no real benefit to mankind, 
or if the rational human is ultimately of no greater inherent worth than irrational beast, 
than we must begin to wonder whether the compartmentalised soul is really as 
segregated as we were meant to believe, or, indeed, whether the ‘great chain of being’ 
(in regard to the application of different levels of soul-potentiality) applies as rigidly as 
it has been proposed that it should.
Such challenges add dimensions to the discussion of what is at work when the 
Nun’s Priest describes Chantecleer’s reaction to seeing a fox crouched in the tall grass: 
‘for natureelly a beest desireth flee / fro his contrarie, if he may it see, / Though he 
never erst hadde seyn it with his ye’ (vm.3279). Undoubtedly, this passage refers to the 
sensitive soul of the cock that would require it to flee from perceived danger. However, 
with this brief passage, we also begin to get a hint of how the text is challenging the
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rigidity of medieval soul type classifications. A direct reference to the bestiary 
‘Phisiologus’ (vn.4461) reminds us of the common practice of using animals to 
illustrate specific human characteristics, comparing humans with animals to highlight 
characteristics associated with baser creatures. Such comparisons are usually just useful 
illustrations, but they also serve to highlight the possibility that people were at some 
level able to conceptualise a reasonable ‘beast’ or, by contrast, a ‘beastly’ human. After 
all, the fox goes on to comment on the angelic sounds of the cock’s song, prays for the 
soul of Chantecleer’s departed father (vii.3295), and even goes as far to say ‘That ther 
nas no man in no regioun / That hym in song or wisedom myghte passe’ (VII.3310). On 
a purely philosophical level, this further blurs the distinction between the appropriate 
souls of animals and man, as only the intellect (which is unique to humanity) is able to 
survive after death. The argument is furthered by Pelen’s article ‘The Escape of 
Chaucer’s Chauntecleer’, in which he not only argues for the correlation made 
previously by Levy and Adams between the Priest’s cock and the fall of humanity, but 
also points out that the tale deals ironically with the human being’s salvation as well.64 
Although Pelen’s conclusion has more to do with semiotics than with souls, the 
reasoning still stands that the general order of Being is, at least on some level, being 
challenged by the text. By blurring the different definitions of potentiality assumed to 
exist between man and beast, the use of the conceits of the beast fable provides an 
avenue to contest the entire structure of cataloguing. At the very least, this can be seen 
as a demonstration that the rigid classifications of the neo-Platonists between the 
sensitive and the rational soul are susceptible to scrutiny.
The relationship between the souls of the characters in the Tales has become as 
important as the souls of those within the framework of the pilgrimage to Canterbury. 
As many of the tales’ respective narrators are presented in an imperfect state of spiritual
64 Marc M. Pelen, ‘The Escape of Chaucer’s Chauntecleer: A Brief Revaluation’, The Chaucer Review,
36 (2002), 329-335 (p. 332).
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development, so too are the subjects of their tales depicted somewhere between the 
possible extremes. The Soul, in general, may or may not be as segregated or as 
departmentalised as some scholars of the late fourteenth century, a century that was 
heavily indoctrinated with Platonic, neo-Platonic and Aristotelian concepts of 
corporeality, contrariety, continuity, evaluation and hierarchy, would ask modem critics 
to believe. In fact, evidence shows that the potential supremacy of the human soul 
because of its unique capacity for reason (as determined by the philosophical legacy at 
work behind the texts) may also be a matter still under scrutiny. It would seem 
presumptuous to imagine that Chaucer’s text offers any real alternatives to systematic 
categorisation of the Soul and its relationship to the body; what the chapter claims to do, 
as much perhaps as Chaucer’s text could claim to do, is to provide an opportunity at 
least to consider the issue in another way. Neither this chapter nor the Tales are able to 
provide an ultimate and unwavering solution to the problem of humans’ relationship to 
their souls - with any luck, the best either can hope to do is to illustrate that the matter is 
still very much open to debate. In reference to the state and nature of the human soul, it 
would seem that Chaucer proves himself to be, as Shoaf predicted he would become, ‘a 
poet of uncertainties and a master craftsman of multiplicities’.65 However, the dilemma 
of the matter of Soul leads to another crisis in medieval secular thought that is heavily 
influenced by the philosophical tenets that have filtered their way from antiquity to the 
medieval mind. If the unique and potentially pure rationality of the human being is 
indeed in question, what is the epistemological alternative? We are, of course, left to 
only our senses and, as the next chapter demonstrates, all of the inherent uncertainties 
that they entail.
65 R.A. Shoaf, ‘Notes Towards Chaucer’s Poetics of Translation’, Studies in the Age o f Chaucer, 1 
(1979), 55-66 (p. 55).
Chapter Five
‘Sighte Merveillous’ or Sleight of Hand?
The Fallibility of Sight and Medieval Problems of Empirical Knowledge 
The Franklin's Tale
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The sight in my opinion is the source of the greatest benefit to us, for had we never seen 
the stars, and the sun, and the heaven, none of the words which we have spoken about 
the universe would ever have been uttered. But now the sight of day and night, and the 
months and the revolutions of the years, have created number, and have given us a 
conception of time, and the power of enquiring about the nature of the universe; and 
from this source we have derived philosophy, than which no greater good ever was or
will be given by the gods to mortal man.
Timaeus 47al-b2
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Chaucer’s work abounds in references to arguments regarding the senses in 
general and several which express some regard for contemporary optical theory. Even 
as we thumb through The Canterbury Tales, we cannot help but be struck by the visual 
nature of the work. Of course, the descriptions of the characters and their tales are a 
necessary element of the storytelling itself, but the incorporation of sensory and optical 
motifs in the tales raises the interest of any reader who is familiar with the problems the 
eyes cause for philosophical texts. Even apart from the colourful visual descriptions of 
the pilgrims in the Prologue, Chaucer’s text soon invites readers to recall and to engage 
with medieval theories of vision. The Knight’s Palamon is the first to lament as his heart 
is pierced through the sight of Emelye -  only momentarily before Arcite is likewise 
afflicted by the sight of the princess as she passes the prison window. In what is 
generally seen as the most blatantly philosophical of the Tales, the impetus of the 
conflict is generated through the medium of sight, though the bulk of philosophically- 
orientated criticism tends to focus (not unjustly) on the Boethian qualities and a 
discussion of free will versus fate.
Likewise, the lewd comedy of the Miller’s Tale focuses on the absence of sight 
or recognition, as do the slightly more disturbing elements of the Reeve’s Tale. Of 
course, the Merchant’s Tale deals directly with the loss of sight, the importance of sight 
in obtaining the truth, and, to some extent, may even deal with the medieval 
understanding of the connection between sight and the sexual organs. In Chaucer’s 
other writings, of course, references to sight and its connection to great philosophical 
issues are common. The dream poems speak of visions of a different sort, but even 
those are connected physiologically and metaphysically to the process of sight. To the 
medieval mind, and certainly from the texts themselves, the faculty of sight is the key to 
understanding -  or, as is the case with so many of the works, the m^understanding of 
the truth. The prominence of the eyes and the consistent correlation between their
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functionality physically, psychologically and spiritually, especially in The Canterbury 
Tales, raises issues that can only really be discussed thoroughly in a discourse that 
includes the philosophical antecedents that the stories employ. This discussion has not 
received much critical attention; the premise that the function of the mechanics and 
epistemological utility of sight is discussed in detail in The Franklin's Tale serves as the 
basis for the following chapter.
The Franklin's Tale is not a tale at all; it is a literary legerdemain. As an 
epistemological exercise, it embodies the very principles of misdirection and deceit 
against which it warns. All too often, readers are so engulfed in the ‘sighte merveillous’ 
of the courtly project of the tale that they may fail to recognise a significant alternative 
reading of the text: one that addresses the fundamental principles behind our sensory 
interaction with ‘truth’ and the reliability of the information so obtained. The following 
chapter will attempt to attend to those sleight-handed issues of epistemology and 
authority by exploring the relationship between the main characters of the tale and 
relative constituent parts of the process of sense perception they may be understood to 
represent. Specifically, I will argue that the tale can serve as an exploration of the 
medieval state of optical theoretical debate, as well as to acknowledge the debt the text 
acknowledges that the late fourteenth century owes to neo-Platonic theories of the 
optical process and its significance in relation to a posteriori knowledge. Finally, I 
intend to discuss those theological, philosophical and medical precedents in regard to 
the characters and situations portrayed by the Franklin in his tale. I hope to be able to 
demonstrate that the physical and metaphysical processes of sensation are intrinsically 
invested in the principles of contrariety presented in the ongoing argument of the thesis. 
Furthermore, I want to show that these theoretical and physical aspects of sensation are 
significant and contested factors in the late medieval epistemological argument; the 
Tales speak to this debate through The Franklin's Tale by demonstrating the unresolved
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possibilities between the theories opposing each other and themselves at both ends of 
the spectrum of optical theory in Dorigen, Arveragus, Aurelius and the Clerk of 
Orleans.
Appearance and Truth in The Franklin's Tale
This is a tale that addresses the principles of empirical knowledge: it is a tale centred on 
the representation -  or the misrepresentation -  of truth. Joseph Dane argues that the 
issue of ‘trouthe’ plays an important, if not primary role in uncovering the work’s more 
elusive meanings.1 In fact, Dane goes as far as to suggest that the different meanings 
that the word can encompass (personal loyalty, linguistic truth and factuality) define the 
central conflict in the tale. In Arveragus’ ultimately ironic statement that ‘Trouthe is 
the hyeste thyng that man may kepe’ (v. 1479), there is an implication that the storyline 
is centred on misrepresenting the truth, misunderstanding the truth, or denying and 
concealing the truth altogether. Given a medieval understanding of the limitations of the 
senses in regard to knowledge, it can be argued that the text may be addressing 
Augustinian, if not directly neo-Platonic, theories of epistemology.
The specific roles of truth and knowledge in a medieval context and in the tale 
are a starting point for this argument. Notwithstanding Dane’s views about the different 
levels of truth we encounter in the tale, it may suffice to suggest that truth, or the 
absence of it, dominates every aspect of the tale: its teller, his introduction and 
numerous aspects of the plot of the story itself indicate that truth, not courtly love or
1 Joseph A. Dane, ‘Double Truth in Chaucer’s Franklin’s Tale’, Studia Neophilologica, 63 (1991), 161-7
(p. 162).
2 Dane, p. 164.
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marriage, is the meat of the argument presented by the text. Even before the story
begins, we are introduced to it by a series of gentle untruths. The Franklin has already
stated how nice it is to be able to converse with the Squire:
In feith, squier, thow hast thee wel yquit 
And gentilly. I preise wel thy wit,
Quod the ffankeleyn, considerynge thy yowthe,
So feelyngly thou spekest, sire, I allow the!
As to my doom, ther is noon that is heere 
Of eloquence that shal be thy peere,
If that thou lyve; God yeve thee good chaunce,
And in vertu sende thee continuance!
For of thy speche I have greet deyntee. (v.673)
Although he freely admits to being impressed by the eloquence and fluidity of 
the Squire’s words, the Franklin is, in effect, showing that he is still the Squire’s 
superior by reminding him that the level achieved by the young man is admirable, 
‘considering his youth’. The Franklin is, then, placing himself at least socially level, if 
not above, the Squire by the former’s ability to recognise the eloquence and by his 
desire that his son take after such skills of conversation:
3 There are, of course, many possible meanings of the word ‘truth’ in contemporary medieval literature; 
meanings which seem to have evolved over time and which lend themselves to an uncertainty of 
significance to both a medieval and a modem audience. The MED articulates the difficulty in pinning 
down which sense is meant in any given instance when it states ‘the word treuth and the concepts it 
expresses defy rigid categorisation. Frequently a specific gloss entails or implies yet another; it would be 
misleading to suggest that the assignment of a quotation to a sense excludes other glosses’ (p. 895). In 
The Franklin’s Tale, Chaucer uses several of these meanings, ranging from being used as part of an oath 
V. 1231, to several declarations of a promise (V.759, 910, 998), to assertions of fidelity (v.758,984). 
Chaucer can be seen to be working with the ironic ambiguity of the word, perhaps not only as a 
contemporary concept, but also in awareness of the historical development of the use of the word over 
time. In other words, if we are to accept (as the MED seems to suggest) that the meaning of the word 
fluctuates in the language between several concepts ranging from the more established meanings 
regarding moral and practical obligations (fidelity, a promise, an undertaking) to the developing concepts 
dealing with epistemological concerns (actuality, reality, correspondence to the ultimate or fundamental 
nature of things), then we might also be willing to accept that Chaucer had a significant degree of 
flexibility in how he employed the word in the tale . This section of the thesis bases much of its argument 
on the premise that Chaucer used such an awareness of the fluidity of senses of ‘treuth’ to his advantage, 
and approaches the tale with the later concepts foremost in its arguments.
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I have a sone, and by the trinitee,
I hadde levere than twenty pounnd worth lond,
Though it right now were fallen in myn hond,
He were a man of swich discrecioun 
As that ye been! fy on possessioun,
But if a man be vertuous withal!
I have my sone snybbed, and yet shal,
For he to vertu listeth nat entende;
But for to pleye at dees, and to despende 
And lese al that he hath, is his usage.
And he hath levere talken with a page 
Than to comune with any gentil wight 
Where he myghte leme gentillesse aright, (v.682)
The Franklin wishes at once to acknowledge the Squire’s eloquence while
establishing himself as a source of authority on the matter of gentillesse. By already
cementing the Franklin as ‘a worthy vavasour’ (1.360), the narrator has completed the
Franklin’s introduction as a man of indulgence, wealth and society.
However, the Franklin immediately dismisses his own qualifications, in an act
which can be interpreted as one of literary conceit, humility or irony. In any case, the
means by which to achieve the end result is that of subtle deception. The Franklin, like
many of the storytellers, belittles his abilities to do the story justice:
Which I shal seyn with good wyl as I kan.
But, sires, by cause I am a burel man,
At my bigynnyng first I yow biseche,
Have me excused of my rude speche.
I lemed nevere rethorik, certeyn;
Thyng that I speke, it moot be bare and pleyn.
I sleep nevere on the mount of pemaso,
Ne lemed Marcus Tullius Scithero [Cicero].
Colours ne knowe I none, withouten drede,
But swiche colours as growen in the mede,
Or elles swiche as men dye or peynte.
Colours of rethoryk been to me queynte;
My spririt feeleth noght of swich mateere.
But if yow list, my tale shul ye heere. (V.715)
The Franklin has, in fact, set himself up to be unlearned and untrained in the art of 
rhetoric: he is deaf to the muses and ignorant of the art defined by Cicero.
The opening of the tale introduces a plot in which appearances will be in 
constant conflict with truth. In other words, what appears to be the case may not always
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be what is, and we are thus presented with our first tastes of neo-Platonic contrariety in
the tale: that between reality and experience:
Of his free wyl he swoor hire as a knyght 
That nevere in al his lyf he, day ne nyght,
Ne sholde upon hym take no maistrie 
Agayn hir wyl, ne kithe hire jalousie,
But hire obeye, and folwe hir wyl in al,
As any lovere to his lady shal,
Save that the name of soveraynetee,
That wolde he have for shame of his degree, (v.745)
Initially, this marriage agreement seems ideal, in that it proposes that neither husband 
nor wife suffer from the usual constraints of medieval marriage: in exchange for her 
fidelity, he promises never to exercise his authority over her. However, the contract is 
based fundamentally on appearances, as Arveragus makes it clear that, for the sake of 
his honour, it must appear that he is master in public. This is the first instance in which 
the way things appear is misaligned to how they really are. Although the two lovers 
have agreed to a contract in which both seem happy to oblige, it must appear to 
everyone else that the husband is master over the wife. Deception enters the tale from 
the beginning, and is thereby poised to underline each of the tale’s main events and 
characters.
The next major event to be seen differently in light of the issue of truth is the 
moment when Aurelius declares his love for Dorigen. Aurelius, who is described as ‘a 
man of worshipe and honour’ (v.962), immediately is shown to be deceitful and 
manipulative. Aurelius, by the very nature of his courtly interest in Dorigen, is proven 
to be of necessarily questionable character, as he is presented not only as the instigator 
of an adulterous proposal, but as an opportunistic companion as well. Hidden amongst 
the language of courtly romance, the text is presenting another dishonest situation. In 
this case, the truth in question is Aurelius’ intention to seduce Dorigen: an intention of 
which she herself claims not to have been aware:
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Is this youre wyl, quod she, and sey ye thus?
Nevere erst, quod she, ne wiste I what ye mente.
But now, Aurelie, I knowe your entente,
By thilke God that yaf me soule and lyf,
Ne shal I nevere been untrewe wyf
In word ne werk, as fer as I have wit;
I wol been his to whom that I am knyt.
Taak this for fynal answere as of me. (v.980)
Dorigen appears genuinely surprised and offended by Aurelius’ deception; her 
reaction is enough to indicate to the audience that the potential suitor was, in fact, 
operating under false pretences. However, Dorigen may very well be playing her courtly 
role in rejecting the advances of an obvious suitor, thus continuing the courtly game and 
keeping her honour intact. Either way, we are shown another aspect of the plot that has 
as its foundation the misrepresentation or the ignorance of fact. Appearing to be a 
comfort and a confidant, Aurelius has swooped in at the first opportunity to take 
advantage of Dorigen’s grief and Arveragus’ absence.
Aurelius’ flirtations with truth continue as he attempts to hold Dorigen to her 
promise, again, by means of deception. Whereas Dorigen’s promise is to love Aurelius 
if he ‘remoeve alle the rokkes, stoon by stoon’ (v.993), Aurelius conspires to work 
around the demand by appealing to the god Phoebus. Phoebus, as the manifestation of 
Apollo as the sun, becomes important on two levels. Firstly, it is important to note that 
Apollo is the Greek god of musical and poetic inspiration. As such, he represents the 
muses whose sacred mountain, Parnassus, is referred to by the Franklin in the prologue 
to his tale (v.721). This further strengthens the argument that the Franklin himself is 
invested in deceit, as the self-referential nature of the use of Phoebus is an alteration that 
the text has made from Boccaccio’s original plot, wherein the supplicant asks that a 
summer garden blossom in the middle of winter.4 Apollo is also the god of divination 
and prophecy, both of which are centred on the discovery of future or hidden truths. 
Lastly, as will be discussed later in this chapter, Phoebus represents Light which, in
4 This is an important difference in that the original tale asks that the feat be completed actually, whereas 
Chaucer’s version demands that the miracle only seem to be actualised.
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medieval terms, is essential to the understanding of the process of vision and 
appearance.
However, it is not only Aurelius’ invocation of Apollo which is interesting in 
terms of deception; the appeal itself is of note. Although Dorigen asks that the rocks be 
removed, it is clear that Aurelius never plans to fulfil the request. In one sense, he is 
reluctant to read correctly the meaning of Dorigen’s promise (that removing all of the 
rocks would be impossible; therefore, becoming her lover is similarly unattainable). 
Fortunately, he is perfectly willing to accept the spirit of the agreement when he plans to 
make it only appear that the rocks have been removed. His request to Apollo is not that 
he should remove the rocks, but that he should make it seem that the rocks have been 
taken from the shore. Literally, he would not be fulfilling his part of the agreement, as 
Dorigen states clearly that the rocks are to be moved, not hidden. Aurelius, then, has a 
clear intent of deceit in regard to obtaining Dorigen’s love, and it is a further pursuit of 
this deception that at last grants him the right to claim his prize.
Truth, in one way or another, already appears to be a theme in the tale. However, 
we must also be able to recognise that all of the ‘truths’ discussed are relative to their 
perception by the characters through the medium of sight. If the concept of truth is 
important to the tale, the general theories of sensation and the specific epistemological 
value of vision must somehow be related to its discovery.
Sight in The Franklin’s Tale
Although many senses are addressed, none gets more attention than that of sight and for 
good reason: eyes, to the medieval natural scientist, are the keys to knowledge. 
Everything relating to sight (light, illusion, colour, etc) demands special attention in 
fourteenth century epistemological studies owing in great part to the positive and 
negative attention it had received by its Aristotelian and neo-Platonic investigators. For 
example, Plato tells us blatantly in the Theaetetus that sense-perception is not
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knowledge when he asks whether: ‘Thus, then, the assertion that knowledge and 
perception are one, involves a manifest impossibility’ .5 Plato, who asserts that ‘truth is 
given in reflection, in the judgement, not in bare sensation’, insists that sense-perception 
is too focused on unstable entities to allow for any real knowledge.6 In fact, knowledge 
(as opposed to opinion) only occurs when the mind is dealing directly with stable and 
unchanging forms and not, as sensation does, with the ever-changing realm of the 
material world.
This opinion is ratified by Augustine, who ‘follows the Platonist tradition in 
asserting that knowledge is not derived from sense-perception or experience’.7 In fact, 
Augustine claims that the mind alone is incapable of real knowledge as well. Divine 
illumination is needed in order to make accurate judgements about our experience in the 
world. God, who is the light of the mind, is the power that allows the rational mind to
o
achieve its inherent cognitive potential. Alan D. Fitzgerald’s invaluable reference, 
Augustine through the Ages, refers to De Genesi ad litteram {On the Literal 
Interpretation o f Genesis), during which Augustine states that ‘the senses then act as 
messengers to the soul, so that it can form within itself the object that is called to its 
attention from the outside world’.9 Carol Harrison’s contribution to the article seems to 
indicate that most of Augustine’s time spent dealing with the issues regarding sensation 
encourages an understanding of the transitional nature of sensation in knowledge; 
sensations form an ‘image of the object sensed [...] without a moment’s delay in the 
spirit of the one who sees’.10 For Augustine, the pre-eminent authority on all things 
medieval, sensation is a very neo-Platonic activity; it is merely a medium through which
5 Plato, Theaetetus (164b8-9), trans. by B. Jowett, in The Dialogues o f Plato, 4 vols (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1968), III, pp. 191-320 (p. 262).
6 A History o f Philosophy, ed. by Frederick SJ Copleston, 9 vols. (London: Bums and Oates, 1966), I, p. 
145.
7 From Aristotle to Augustine (Routledge History o f Philosophy Vol. 2), ed. by David Furley (London: 
Routledge, 1999), p. 395.
8 From Aristotle to Augustine, p. 395.
9 Allan D. Fitzgerald, et al., eds, Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopaedia (Cambridge: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing, 1999), p. 766.
10 Fitzgerald, p. 766-7.
142
imperfect physical manifestations of reality are presented to the intellect for 
interpretation. Interestingly, Harrison also clarifies the distinction made by Augustine 
between physical sensation and those perceived by the Spiritual Senses. By ‘Spiritual 
Senses’, Harrison is referring to the ‘complete anthropology of the inner man’ 
established by Augustine throughout his commentaries on the Gospels and in the City of 
God. Ultimately,
‘Augustine identifies three sorts of vision. The first, corporeal vision (visio 
corporalis), is concerned with the bodily eyes and sense perception [...]; the 
second, spiritual vision (visio spiritualis), with the inward perception, in terms 
of images stored in the mind or memory, of what has been sensed externally; the 
third, intellectual vision (visio intellectualis), is concerned purely with what the 
mind knows and sees interiorly, unmediated by external sense perception and 
without corporeal images’.11
The final vision, the intellectual vision, is the only vision capable of ‘seeing’ 
God, because of his necessarily indeterminate -  and therefore invisible -  nature. Despite 
his neo-Platonic account for multiple, non-physiological visionary capacities, Harrison 
insists that Augustine’s account of mediated physical sensation closely mirrors the 
principles found in Aristotle, the Stoics and the neo-Platonists.12
On the other hand, Aristotle tells us plainly that, ‘seeing, regarded as a supply 
for the primary wants of life, and in its direct effects, is the superior sense’.13 In this 
brief statement, Aristotle not only proclaims an ability of sensation to supply directly 
the ‘wants of life’, but establishes sight as the most appropriate of the five senses to 
accomplish this ambitious epistemological task. Furthermore, Aristotle claims that 
sight, ‘most of all the senses make us know and brings to light many differences 
between things’.14 Lindberg and Steneck say:
11 Fitzgerald, p. 767-8.
12 Fitzgerald, p. 766.
13Aristotle, On the Sense and the Sensible (437a4-5), trans. by J.I. Beare, in The Complete Works o f 
Aristotle, 2 vols (Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1984), I, 693-713 (p.694).
14 Metaphysics, 980a26-27 (p. 1552).
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the sense of sight is first in the order of knowing. This was the conclusion 
reached, so far as we are able to judge, by every medieval and renaissance 
philosopher who considered the matter. Albertus Magnus and Duns Scotus 
defended it; so also did Thomas Aquinas, Perre d’Ailly, Zabarella, and many 
others.15
From Aristotle onwards, the sense of sight dominates medieval thought as the 
primary way in which the human animal interacts with, and gains some degree of 
knowledge of, reality. Christian tradition also places sight at the top of the sensual 
hierarchy. Norman Klassen says ‘the imagery of vision and light dominates the 
Christian scriptures from the first verses of Genesis to the last of the Apocalypse’.16 The 
sense of sight enjoys a consistently primary role in the development of knowledge 
theories through Pseudo-Dionysius, Boethius, Bonaventure, Witelo, Aquinas, and Julian 
of Norwich among others.17
As far as Augustine is concerned, epistemological emanation can be seen as the 
most flexible of terms that has to accommodate the transition from ancient neo­
platonism to Christian neo-Platonism. For although Augustine rejects unintelligent or 
accidental emanation as a rule, he tends to agree with neo-Platonists, who see ‘ideas as 
thoughts of God and place them in Nous, or the divine mind, which emanate from the 
One as the first proceeding hypostasis’.18 In general, Augustine adapted the neo- 
Platonic theory of emanation to state that ‘the light which comes from God to the 
human mind enables the mind to see the characteristics of changelessness and necessity 
in the eternal truths’.19 In other words, by incorporating neo-Platonic principles and 
adapting them to Christian ideological constraints, Augustine at once both reinforces the 
influence of neo-Platonism of medieval thought and re-establishes emanate light and
15 David C. Lindberg and Nicholas H. Steneck, ‘The Sense of Vision and the Origins of Modem Science’, 
in Science, Medicine and Society in the Renaissance, ed. by Allen G. Debus (London: Heinemann 
Educational Books, 1972), 29-46.
16 Norman Klassen, Chaucer on Love, Knowledge and Sight (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 1995), p.
6 .
17 Klassen describes the development and perpetuation of the primacy of sight as he establishes the 
literary tradition of conflict between love and intellect, and the role that sight plays in that conforming to 
and confusing that inherent juxtaposition. On this literary development, see pp. 2-38 especially.
18 Copleston, History o f Philosophy, II, p. 60.
19 Copleston, History o f Philosophy, II, p. 61.
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Divine Illumination as the foundational metaphors for knowledge. References to light 
and sight have implications in medieval literature; the investigation of optics is 
inextricably related to contemporary theories of epistemology. It is not Augustine’s 
optical theories which are important, but, rather the implications of his work and the 
metaphors he employs in regard to light and sight which profoundly affect both the 
development of optical theory and the application of those developments in the social 
discourses which were to become the framework of The Franklin’s Tale.
It is not surprising, then, to find sight as a reoccurring theme in The Franklin ’s 
Tale when the tale is dealing with matters regarding the perception of truth. It is unclear, 
however, how that interaction worked and to what degree an understanding of reality 
was limited by the use of sight.
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The Franklin’s Tale and Contemporary Theories about Vision and Knowledge
There are two fundamental components of medieval theories of vision: how sight works 
and what, if anything, it means in relation to reality.20 The tale presents the 
contemporary stalemate between the opposing schools within these two aspects of 
theories of vision: the practical matters of optics and philosophical issues of 
epistemology. Written in a time when the debates over how the eye works and what 
vision can say about reality had yet to be resolved, the tale offers the reader an insight 
into the current state of indecision in the two disciplines. Epistemologically, the tale 
parallels contemporary philosophical discourses, which themselves are based on neo- 
Platonic systems (the current incarnation of which shares basic tenets with 
Aristotelianism as well). As a whole, these systems promote sight as the primary source 
of any knowledge attainable through physical sensation and rely heavily on 
metaphorical inferences to sight as the foundation of its epistemological system.
Plato’s discussion of vision is centred in, but not limited to, the Timaeus. The 
claim that Plato takes the extramissionists’21 point of view is usually taken from the 
following passage:
20 Although it may seem reductive, I use capital letters here to denote philosophical absolutes, rather than 
practical relatives. In other words, ‘reality’ refers to that which actually is, whatever that may be.
1 ‘Extramissionists’ and ‘intromissionist’ are terms coined to differentiate between the two schools of 
thought regarding the process of vision. As the names suggest, an ‘extramissionist’ would believe that the 
primary functions of the eye occur because of an outward radiation of a medium from the eye to the 
external subject of vision. On the other hand, an ‘intromissionist’ would claim that the eye is a passive 
organ, acted upon by an external causation.
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And of the organs they first contrived the eyes to give light, and the principle 
according to which they were inserted was as follows: So much of fire as would 
not bum, but gave a gentle light, they formed into a substance akin to the light of 
every-day life; and the pure fire which is within us and related thereto they made 
to flow through the eyes in a stream smooth and dense, compressing the whole 
eye, and especially the centre part, so that it kept out everything of a coarser 
nature, and allowed to pass only this pure element. When the light of day 
surrounds the stream of vision, then like falls upon like, and they coalesce, and 
one body is formed by natural affinity in the line of vision, wherever the light 
that falls from within meets with an external object. And the whole stream of 
vision, being similarly affected in virtue of similarity, diffuses the motions of 
what it touches or what touches it over the whole body, until they reach the soul, 
causing that perception which we call sight.22
Plato’s views seem clear enough: a ‘gentle light’ issues forth from the eye and
mixes with its like, daylight. This mixture of ‘eye-light’ and daylight form ‘one body’
‘which serves as a material intermediary between the visible object and the eye’.23
Emanations from the visible object must encounter this mixture of ‘ocular emanation’
and daylight for the motion of the visible object to be detected as sensation by the soul.
Plato goes on to say that particles of colour may be of varying size, and therefore may
lie outside the range of perceptibility:
Colours are flames which emanate from all bodies, having particles 
corresponding to the sense of sight. Some of the particles are less and some 
larger, and some are equal to the parts of the sight. The equal particles appear 
transparent; the larger contract and the lesser dilate the sight. White is produced 
by the dilation, black by the contraction, of the particles of sight. There is also a 
swifter motion of another sort of fire which forces a way through the passages of 
the eyes, and elicits from them a union of fire and water which we call tears. The 
inner fire flashes forth, and the outer finds a way in and is extinguished in the 
moisture, and all sorts of colours are generated by the mixture. This affection is 
termed by us dazzling, and the object which produces it is called bright.24
Although Plato never attempts a systematic discussion of the optical process, we 
can gather from pieces of his work the general idea that he favoured the theory that light 
was emitted from the eye and mixed with light from the sun in order to facilitate the 
detection of motion in the visible world. Moreover, particles ‘emanate from all bodies’ 
which, when interacting with the medium of eye-light and daylight, produce colours and
22 Timaeus, 45b2-d3, (pp. 731-732).
23 David C. Lindberg. Theories o f Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1976), p. 5.
24 Timaeus, (pp. 655-656).
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various other optical phenomena. For Plato, then, the eye is not a passive instrument
receiving stimuli from its environment. Rather, it issues a ray of fire which mixes with
existent daylight to transmit the awareness of motion -  be it of large bodies or of
particles -  to the rational soul.
Aristotle sees this theory as completely untenable. Flatly, he states:
If vision were the result of light issuing from the eye as from a lantern, why 
should the eye not have had die power of seeing even in the dark? It is totally 
idle to say, as the Timaeus does, that the visual ray coming forth in the darkness 
is quenched.25
Aristotle’s theory of vision depends chiefly on his valuation of the medium 
between the eye and the object of vision. This transparent medium (air) must be 
present, as ‘neither an object separated from the eye by void space nor an object 
placed directly on the eye can be seen’.26
Light, therefore is the actualisation of the transparent medium through which the 
motions of colour are made visible. If time permitted, this theory could be discussed in 
relation to phantasm and the concept of memory as it serves as a facility of maintaining 
that original sensational imprint. However, it must suffice at this time only to realise 
that, according to Aristotle, the sights are objects of vision, not agents of vision as 
previously postulated by Plato.
Major developments in the field can be attributed to Euclid, Ptolemy and al- 
Kindi (mathematical extramissionists) on the one hand, and Galen, Avicenna, Averroes
97(intromissionists) on the other. However, it is important to note, as Lindberg does, 
that the different theoretical disciplines are difficult to compare, as they are directed 
with different aims. In other words, although we cannot implicitly compare the 
mathematical concerns of Euclid with the anatomical discipline of Galen simply on the 
basis that both deal with the eye, we cannot, on the other hand, deny that many 
‘anatomical’ and ‘mathematical’ works are heavily influenced by religious and 
philosophical concerns.
25 On Sense and the Sensible, 437b 11-16, (p. 695).
26 Lindberg, Theories o f Vision, p. 7.
27 A complete discussion of the progress can be found in Lindberg, above.
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Similarly, when speaking of the medieval development of optics, we need to 
mention, if only briefly, Augustine as a major influence in the field simply for the 
reason that everything he wrote seems to have been widely read and accepted by most 
thinkers after him in the Middle Ages. In his writing, we see evidence of an established 
return to the extramission theory of vision, a recession that can only be explained by the 
lack of availability of the Arabic Alhazen and the ubiquity of encyclopaedic references 
to Plato’s Timaeus provided to the early Middle Ages by Calcidius. Augustine, in On 
the Trinity, expresses his extramission theory clearly: ‘For the same rays, as they shoot 
forth each from its own eye, are affected several [...]’.28 Although Augustine does not 
elaborate much on his extramission theory (or at least on his agreement of the existing 
Platonic notion), the fact that he takes as certain the reality of the emanation of light 
from the eye re-enforces his Platonic influences and his neo-Platonic interpretation of 
the original material.
Further developments in the field of optics between the relative times of 
Augustine and Chaucer would add fuel to the debate and further reinforce the 
importance of vision as a means to acquire knowledge. William of Conches, Abelard of 
Bath and Robert Grosseteste developed optical theories in the Middle Ages which 
incorporated their own discoveries and utilised the information brought about by the 
twelfth-century revival of neo-Platonism and discovery and ‘assimilation of Arabic 
learning’.30 In general, theories of optics developed further as the understanding and 
accessibility to ancient works grew. By the time we arrive at Chaucer’s most 
contemporary author on the subject, Roger Bacon, most optical theorists were familiar 
with at least some of the writings of Euclid, Avicenna, Aristotle, and al-Kindi.31 What
28 On the Trinity, in The Works o f Aurelius Augustine, ed. by Rev. Marcus Dods, 15 vols (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1873), vn, p. 266.
29 Lindberg, however, does note that Augustine makes another comment on the extramission of rays of 
light from the eye in his commentary on Genesis (p. 90).
30 Lindberg, Theories o f Vision, p. 93.
31 Lindberg, Theories o f Vision, p. 94.
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Bacon does with this wide variety of information and points of view is to set the stage 
of optical theory for the next 300 years.
Although primarily a mathematician and experimental scientist, Bacon’s 
research and commentary on the issue of perspectiva laid the cornerstone of 
mathematical theories of optics and the philosophical implications thereof for 
generations to come. By examining Bacon’s work, primarily his Opus Majus, we can 
not only trace the development of scientific thought concerning the sense of sight, but 
also recognise the philosophical ramifications of such theories which would have been 
present at the time of the writing of The Franklin’s Tale.
Working from a knowledge base rooted in ancient Greece, Bacon begins his 
examinations of the process of vision where Plato, Aristotle, Euclid, Augustine and 
Isidore of Seville leave off.32 At the time of Bacon’s Perspectiva, there were two 
dominating theories of light, neither of which had claimed a complete victory over the 
other. On one hand, many medieval contemporaries held the Platonic view that vision 
rays were emitted from the eye to external things.33
In the fourteenth century, Plato’s and Aristotle’s respective theories of the 
extramissionist or the intromissionist nature of sight are to be replaced by Bacon’s 
somewhat confused and self-contradictory amalgamation of the two. In the end, 
although he was able to present a sophisticated understanding of the mathematical and 
anatomical natures of vision, he was unable to reconcile the debate between the 
Platonists and the Aristotelians as to whether light was emitted from or received by the 
eye. In fact, it becomes clear from examining his work that, although he began his
32 As Lindberg reminds us, however, it is clear that the Greek discoveries of ‘Euclid, Aristotle, Ptolemy 
and others’ were not directly available to the Latinate of the Middle Ages. See his Roger Bacon and the 
Origins o f Perspectiva in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. xxv-xxxil, for more 
details of the transition from the Greek schools of optics through the encyclopaedic resources of the early 
Middle Ages to Bacon’s time.
33 Lindberg, Origins o f Perspectiva, p. XXIX.
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studies as a staunch Aristotelian in regard to optics, he was undoubtedly influenced by 
Platonic, neo-Platonic and Pythagorean methodologies.34
Ultimately, the state of optical theory in Chaucer’s time, is likewise unclear. On 
one hand, the age inherits a strong sense of Platonic extramission theory through the 
philosophical, medical and theological records. On the other, the scientific community 
stressing theories of Aristotelian intromission, and struggling to find a balance between 
evidence of radiation (which would support extramission) and experiments with human 
vision which support intromission. Bacon is particularly representative of the state of 
indecisiveness that pervades the thinking concerning vision at the time of The 
Franklin’s Tale. Although the general knowledge concerning the principles of optical 
anatomy has improved, the overall understanding of process of sight is left in a state of 
scientific limbo, and would remain in this state of confusion until Kepler and Galileo. 
This fundamentally precarious state of optical affairs is the medical environment into 
which Chaucer was bom and which envelops the writing of The Franklin’s Tale.
With this state of indecision in mind, the characters in The Franklin’s Tale can 
be seen in a new light. One of the central themes of The Franklin’s Tale is vision itself. 
The tale itself can be seen as an implicit investigation of the points covered by this 
contemporary debate. The characters can be interpreted in terms of elements of 
contemporary optical theory discourses and their respective roles in the text re­
emphasise the current lack of scientific consensus on the matter.
Two Optical Theories and The Franklin’s Tale
The Franklin’s Tale can be read as a dialogue about the issues inherent to the 
medieval debate of optical epistemology. Medieval optical tradition has support in all 
three camps of theoretical possibility: sight as a receptive effect, sight as active 
causation and sight as a physical and metaphysical combination of the two. A character
34 Lindberg, Origins o f Perspectiva, p. XXIX.
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representing the projection of light or of movement, would be concerned as acting as an 
agent of vision, of creation and of relative causality. Such a ‘mover’ would need to be 
invested in producing a visual stimulus, rather than receiving it. Such a character is, of 
course, Aurelius. The reception of visual stimulus, however, would be represented by 
someone who is largely affected by external forces: someone who receives images and 
may be seen to demonstrate the difficulties in epistemology encountered in such 
reception.
Readers with neo-Platonism in mind might recognise Dorigen as a receptive 
object of the optical process. In contrast to Aurelius, Dorigen’s tale is intimately 
concerned with how she is affected by the things she sees, rather than how she projects 
herself to others. She is described physically in only one almost throw-away generic 
poetic line of superlative hyperbole: ‘For she was oon the faireste under sonne’ (v.734). 
She is given few, if any, physical attributes other than that. At no time are we 
specifically told how she appears to others. As she is not described by how she appears, 
the text chooses to portray her by that which appears to her. As a result, readers are only 
informed of her entirely by descriptions of how she responds to visual stimuli. Her 
actions, on the whole, are limited in description by how and what she sees. Even more 
accurately, Dorigen’s psychological relationship to knowledge is based consistently 
upon what she does not see. In other words, Dorigen’s happiness (or lack thereof) is 
centred primarily on the knowledge she receives through a relative vacuity of visual 
input. What she does not know does indeed hurt her, as she is psychologically and 
physically affected by that which she cannot see. For instance, as soon as her husband is 
removed from her sight, she begins to suffer:
For his absence wepeth she and siketh,
As doon thise noble wyves whan hem liketh.
She moometh, waketh, wayleth, fasteth, pleyneth;
Desir of his presence hire so destreyneth
That al this wyde world she sette at noght. (v.817)
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In this passage, Dorigen’s actions are controlled by her lack of vision. As her 
husband is removed from her company and therefore her sight, she is distressed. It is 
only the consolation of her friends which finally impresses upon her hope and reason; 
yet another example of Dorigen more as a receptive object rather than as an agent of 
causality.
In fact, it is clear that many of Dorigen’s activities are likewise defined. Even 
when she finally agrees to come out of isolation and take a walk in the countryside, she 
is disturbed by the sight of the ships on the sea, none of which carry her lord home to 
her (v.853-6). Another such walk yields the vision of the ‘grisly rokkes blake’ (v.859) 
on the shoreline which keep her husband from returning. Such is the despair caused by 
such a sight that she initially questions the fundamental (neo-Platonic) principle that all 
things, even the shore’s rocks, are good because they emanate from God. The 
conclusion of her friends is to lead her away from the shoreline which is causing her so 
much ‘disconfort’ (v.896), to a walled garden where the images which enter her vision 
can be controlled. More importantly, the garden represents a place where images that do 
not enter her vision can also be controlled.
Not surprisingly, it is in this confined and controlled space that the characters of 
Aurelius and Dorigen are introduced to each other. Aurelius’ demonstrations of courtly 
love and Dorigen’s eventual observation and realisation of his intentions are initially 
met with disbelief: Dorigen claims not to have seen what he meant in his attentions. The 
apparent initial alarm, however, is resolved by a contract of Dorigen’s inception: that 
the offensive and dangerous rocks be removed stone by stone from the shoreline, ‘that 
ther nys no stoon ysene’ (v.996). By making the demand, Dorigen has challenged 
Aurelius to remove the rocks from sight, thus relieving her of her torment. This 
challenge sets up the series of events which demonstrate Aurelius’ role as the allegorical 
extramissionist, as well as the climactic conclusion to the two characters’ interaction.
153
Appearance, Projection and the Courtly Man
From his first appearance in the tale, Aurelius is someone who is concerned to
project images of courtly pursuit:
That fressher was and jolyer of array,
As to my doom, than is the month of may.
He syngeth, daunceth, passynge any man 
That is, or was, sith that the world bigan.
Therwith he was, if men sholde hym discryve,
Oon of the beste farynge man on lyve;
Yong, strong, right vertuous, and riche, and wys,
And wel biloved, and holden in greet prys. (v.927)
Aurelius is a visual character: all of his attractive qualities are meant to be observed, and 
most are to be seen. Only his singing and his wisdom are observable in a way other than 
by sight alone; the other virtues attributed to him are ways in which he is perceived 
primarily through vision. This, of course, is in perfect agreement with courtly 
convention, but also serves to illustrate that in Aurelius we find a man who produces 
images, someone who projects a vision of courtly sexuality. He is, in fact, the best 
projector of such an image the world has ever seen: he is a personification of a 
fourteenth-century courtly suitor. From his introduction, Aurelius is not presented as a 
character who is affected by the others, but rather how he affects the vision of his 
audience.
This trend continues throughout his appearances in the tale. At most times, he is 
described in terms of the image he projects. He asks Phoebus to ‘se the teeris on [his] 
cheke’(v.l078), after which he immediately collapses in a demonstrative heap (v.1080). 
While he again exhibits the signs of courtly distress and lovesickness by weeping and 
wailing in his brother’s company (v.l 116), his brother is inspired to seek out the help of 
the man who will in turn inarguably cement Aurelius’ role as a producer of vision: the 
Clerk of Orleans.35
35 Potentially the subject of another doctorate, the effect of ‘lovesickness’ on Aurelius does, in this case, 
serve to remind us that Aurelius is concerned with the extramissional powers of sight.
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The Clerk-magician of Orleans is the most accessible demonstration of the
power to produce images. Upon his introduction to Aurelius and his brother, the Clerk
initiates a series of illusions to impress the desperate men:
[the magician] shewed [Aurelius], er he wente to sopeer,
Forestes, parkes ful of wilde deer;
Ther saugh he hertes with hir homes hye,
The gretteste that evere were seyn with ye.
He saugh of hem an hondred slayn with houndes,
And somme with arwes blede of bittre woundes.
He saugh, whan voyded were thise wilde deer,
Thise fauconers upon a fair ryver,
That with hir haukes han the heron slayn.
Tho saugh he knyghtes justyng in a playn;
And after this he dide hym swich plesaunce 
That he hym shewed his lady on a daunce,
On which hymself he daunced, as hym thoughte.
And whan this maister that this magyk wroughte 
Saugh it was tyme, he clapte his handes two,
And farewel! al oure revel was ago. (v.1189)
Here, we see that the magician is not only a creator of images, but a causality of 
sight as well. It is important to note that the word ‘illusion’ —  especially in the 
medieval sense of deception —  is not used in the description of the events. Aurelius 
‘saugh’ everything that is presented. All of the images -  harts, hounds, forests, women, 
falcons, etc. -  are seen by Aurelius and his brother. Even after the vision abmptly 
disappears, and Aurelius and his brother realise that they have not moved from the 
magician’s study, they are said to have seen a ‘sighte merveillous’ (v.1206) and not 
portrayed to have been mistaken. In other words, the magician has joined Aurelius as a 
personification of the argument for extramission in what can be seen as a demonstration 
of the true power of image production and external stimuli. The Clerk of Orleans has 
shown us that images can be produced which can then be received by a sense organ or 
an audience (nothing more than a group of sense organs) in order to facilitate vision. As 
he then becomes the employee of Aurelius, Aurelius once again is established as the 
senior agent of image production.
155
The reader is left, then, with two presentations of optical theory. On one hand, 
we encounter Dorigen, who is offered to us in terms as an optically-passive recipient of 
information. On the other hand, we have the Clerk of Orleans and Aurelius, who are 
primarily concerned with the production of images and the disbursement of information 
or, as is the case, misinformation. Rather than reading the tale allegorically as a line-by- 
line investigation into medieval optical theory, it is more useful to look at The 
Franklin's Tale as an acknowledgement of the inherent possibilities and relative 
shortcomings of the feuding schools of metaphysics and optics: one that localises both 
camps’ respective fundamental weakness in the common problem of authority. In other 
words, both the intromissionists and the extramissionists must ultimately deal with the 
source of their sensory information and how the awareness of that source affects the 
validity of the information provided.
Illusion and the Black Rocks
At this point, the discussion turns from optics to epistemology, moving beyond
the realm of how we might see and into the convoluted discussion of what such sight
can tell us in terms of its relationship to reality. Undeniably, the most important passage
of the tale in terms of epistemology is the scene in which the Clerk of Orleans, acting as
an agent of sight, interacts with both Aurelius and Dorigen, both of whom are reliant on
the Clerk for their information. As far as this relationship is concerned, the central scene
involves the ‘removal’ of the rocks from the shoreline by the Clerk of Orleans. It is of
course, at most a deceitful magic trick and at worst a well-timed acknowledgement of
the unusually high tides predicted from charts. As the Franklin tells us:
This is to seye, to maken illusioun,
By swich an apparence or jogelrye -
I ne kan no termes of astrologye -
That she and every wight sholde wene and seye
That of britaigne the rokkes were aweye,
Or ellis they were sonken under grounde. (v.1264)
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Even if it were not supported later in the text, it is clear by this passage alone 
that the miracle for which Aurelius has prayed will not come to be through factuality. 
This, of course, is a key difference between Chaucer’s tale and its probable source in 
Boccaccio: whereas Boccaccio’s heroine is required to taste of the fruit grown in the 
factual garden created by the herbalist, Dorigen is not even asked to inspect the 
shoreline which has been relieved of its rocks.36
It must come as no surprise, then, when the rocks are ‘taken’ from the shore by 
means of some unknown magical phenomena:
But thurgh his magik, for a wyke or tweye,
It semed that alle the rokkes were aweye. (v.1295)
Of course, it has been the topic of much discussion that the rocks are, in fact, not gone 
at all, but only ‘semed’ to be so. The terms of the agreement between Aurelius and 
Dorigen have not actually been met, and it is only through a misrepresentation of reality 
that Dorigen feels obliged to commit either suicide or adultery. Wood in 1966 pointed 
out that the Clerk assists in the propagation of false knowledge.37 What has been largely 
ignored in scholarship since Chauncey Wood’s article is the role in which the Clerk also 
participates in the propagation of the false knowledge. Wood’s work on the tides of 
medieval Brittany claims that there exists a convincing argument that the unusually high 
tides that covered the shore’s rocks were in fact not caused by magic, but predicted by 
science.
The long passage describing the Clerk’s preparation for the required task is 
riddled with language which suggests that all of the fuss-making was a mere delay and 
distraction, smoke and mirrors, much like mechanical devices used in court to supply
36 Chauncey Wood, ‘Of Time and Tide in the Franklin’s Tale’, Philological Quarterly, 45 (1966), 688- 
711 (p. 709). For Boccaccio’s version, see the fifth story of the tenth day of The Decameron (London: 
Penguin Books, 1995), 736-731.
37 Wood, pp. 700-701.
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the visions reported by Aurelius’ brother . The use of words to introduce the display 
such as ‘japes’ and ‘wrecchednesse’ indicate not only the Franklin’s disposition towards 
non-Christian “miracles”, but the level of deceit that is necessarily to be employed in 
their working. What follows is an elaborate display of astronomical knowledge, 
designed to divert the audience’s attention away from the fact that the show is merely 
one of illusion and the calculations are important not only in that they look impressive, 
but also in that they buy the Clerk the time he needs for his natural occurrence to appear 
supernatural in origin. Ultimately, after ‘no lenger maked he delayes’ the ‘illusioun’ is 
ready and the rocks seem to disappear. The Clerk, in agreeing to deceive Dorigen that 
the rocks have been removed, has also succeeded in tricking Aurelius into believing that 
he is a great magician, or, in fact, that he did anything at all.
In regard to optical theory, the resolution of the tale is as problematic as the 
events that lead to it. In optical terms, there is ultimately no real resolution presented.39 
It becomes increasingly clear, then, that if we are ostensibly dealing with a tale about 
the physical process of vision, we are ultimately dealing with a tale which is addressing 
the common problem in both of the predominant optical theories: that neither the 
intromissionists nor the extramissionists can escape being epistemologically useless if 
we do not first question the authority of our information. In the end, this interpretation 
of The Franklin ’s Tale suggests that the text rejects the great undecided state of affairs 
in late medieval epistemology. Chaucer’s text has taken the argument of medieval
38 See Laura Hibbard Loomis, ‘Secular Dramatics in the Royal Palace, Paris, 1378, 1389, and Chaucer’s 
Tregetoures’, Speculum, 33 (1958), 242-44; and (V. 1139): ‘For I am siker that ther be sciences / By 
whiche men make diverse apparences, / Syche as thise subtile tregetoures pleye. / For ofte at feestes have 
I wel herd seye / That tregetours, withinne an halle large, / Have maad come in a water and a barge, /And 
in the halle rowen up and doun. / Somtyme hath semed come a grym leoun; / And sometyme floures 
sprynge as in a mede; Somtyme a vyne, and grapes white and rede; / Somtyme a castel, al of lym and 
stoon; / And whan hem lyked, voyded it anon. / Thus semed it to every mannes sighte’.
39 Of course, there are other significant considerations of Dorigen in general and her role in the gender- 
charged resolution of the tale. For specific discussions of Dorigen, see Nina Manasan Greenberg, 
‘Dorigen as Enigma: The Production of Meaning in The Franklin’s Tale’, The Chaucer Review, 33 
(1999), 329-49; Francine McGregor, ‘What of Dorigen? Agency and Ambivalence in The Franklin’s 
Tale\ The Chaucer Review, 31 (1997), 365-78; or Anne Thompson Lee, “‘A Woman True and Fair”: 
Chaucer’s Portrayal of Dorigen in The Franklin’s Tale’, The Chaucer Review, 19 (1984), 169-178.
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knowledge away from inconclusive arguments regarding the processes by which 
humans might come across information and reminded the reader of the value of first 
evaluating the authority of the information itself. As Traugott Lawler says in his 
discussion of relationships with the one and the many, the principle of authority defines 
many aspects of the Tales, including the way in which characters ‘unwittingly’ become 
authorities themselves by telling their tales.40 Although it is not necessary to apply 
Lawler’s theories of exemplum to the tale, his insight demonstrates how important the 
concept of authority is in determining the value of information we receive. Once it can 
be determined how best to communicate information regarding reality, how to 
communicate that information to others can then be considered. As the next chapter 
attempts to cover, the mode of communication of the truth to others is just as important, 
and just as rife with binary categories of opposition, as the method of its discovery.
40 Traugott Lawler, The One and the Many in the Canterbury Tales (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1980), 
pp. 83-4.
Poetry Does Philosophy
The Squire’s Tale as a Argument for the Epistemological Utility of Poetry
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For the melodies of Olympus are derived from Marsyas who taught them, and these, 
whether they are played by a great master or a miserable flute-girl, have a power which
no others have
Symposium 547
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Criticism of The Squire's Tale has focused particularly on the issues of its 
unfinished state, its affinity with chivalric romance, its preconception of the East, but, 
above all, questions of style and rhetoric have attracted the most attention. This chapter 
proposes to explore the idea that it may address a developing fourteenth-century anxiety 
about the justification for fiction and secular poetry. Whereas this question has been 
addressed in relation to other Tales, it has yet to be considered at length in relation to 
The Squire's Tale.1 Specifically, this chapter proposes that The Squire’s Tale ultimately 
seeks to validate the fantastic, unimportant, unfinished poetry that it embodies.
The following chapter intends to discuss how the tale addresses the medieval 
inheritance of ancient Platonic, Aristotelian and neo-Platonic themes of poetic theory in 
order to establish a claim of significance not only for the Squire, but for the craft of 
poetry as a whole. It must be stressed that the goal of such a discussion is not to 
presume that the text speaks directly to any contemporary understanding or immediate 
knowledge of Platonic source material. The argument can only be made that the 
influence is residual in contemporary culture, and must be made only as an attempt to 
add some minor repost to the ongoing critical discomfort with the unfinished, 
unresolved, and arguably under-appreciated tale.
A suspicion of the fictional is not new to Chaucer or to the late fourteenth 
century; it runs right through the culture of the Christian Middle ages. Such distrust is 
implicit in the famous Anglo-Saxon question ‘What has Christ to do with Ingeld’?2 In 
the late fourteenth century, suspicion about the morality of fictions was raised anew and 
powerfully by Wycliff and his followers.3 There is significant evidence to suggest that 
the ancient philosophical themes and, in some cases, commentaries on the original texts 
themselves existed and were prominent enough for Chaucer to be aware of the
1 See Lee W. Patterson, ‘The Parson’s Tale and the Quitting of the Canterbury Tales’, Traditio, 34 
(1978), 331-80, for discussions on the Parson’s, the Manciple’s and the Physician’s tales.
2 See Michael D. Chemiss, ‘Ingeld and Christ: Heroic Concepts and Values in Old English Poetry’, 
Speculum 50 (1975), 482-485.
3 Helen Phillips, An Introduction to the Canterbury Tales (Baskingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 221-2.
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fundamental enmity they held for poetry.4 This is strengthened in Christian culture by 
the tradition that distrusted fiction, an attitude associated with Wycliffite thinking and 
represented by Chaucer’s Parson who establishes himself as a ‘Southren man’ who 
ignores alliterative verse and also as one who dismisses fables as ‘wrecchednesse’.5 
Lines 31-35 of The Parson’s Prologue, which draw on I Timothy 4.7, and II Timothy 
4.4 further remind the reader that the question is partly a religious one, to do with 
Christians’ use of their time, but it remains also partly a philosophical one, with its 
history going back to Plato’s distrust of what was not ‘true’.6 It will be on that general 
distrust of fiction that this chapter focuses, as well as on the craft of the story teller 
which, as Helen Phillips argues, is in part what The Squire’s Tale is about.7
Ancient Influences on the Medieval Perception o f Poetry
By Chaucer’s time, the philosophical perception of poetry has made only 
relatively minor advances since its damning evaluation by Plato, especially as it is 
represented in Books Nine and Ten of the Republic. The major development, however, 
is the effect of Christian belief on ideas about the justification for fictional and secular 
reading—especially for members of religious orders (the main educated group in the 
earlier Middle Ages). Chaucer would not have known the Republic directly. The 
absence of a text, however, does not ensure the absence of the themes it presents. 
Commentaries on the original texts themselves existed and were prominent enough for
4 As for the medieval awareness of poetic theory, the philosophical issues addressed by Plato’s Republic 
are potentially problematic. Although there is little evidence to support a claim that Chaucer would have 
been able to turn the pages either of the Republic or one of its commentaries, that is not to say that some 
evidence does not exist that he was aware of their content. We know, for example, that Averroes wrote a 
commentary on the Republic in Arabic around 1177, at the same time that he was commenting on 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (E.I.J. Rosenthal, Averroes’ Commentary on Plato’s Republic 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 10. However, we also know that no version that 
Chaucer could have read was available until Jacob Matinus’ Latin translation of 1539, leaving Chaucer 
either three centuries too late or nearly one and a half too early for any direct reading of Plato (Rosenthal,
p. 8).
The geographical association of the Parson in the South, is in geographical and attitudinal opposition to 
the North, ‘where much alliterative poetry was written’. Riverside Chaucer, p. 287 (X, 34-44).
6 Riverside Chaucer, p. 955.
7 Introduction to the Canterbury Tales, pp. 133-6.
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Chaucer to be aware of the fundamental enmity they held for poetry. This is 
strengthened in Christian culture by the traditions, both orthodox and Wycliffite, 
represented by Chaucer’s Parson.
Although the text itself was not available, the ideas presented in the Republic 
seemed to have fed into medieval Christian culture. Sherron Knopp traces ‘the 
Chaucerian Imagination’ to Augustine and, by extension, to the Platonic, Aristotelian 
and neo-Platonic foundations upon which he built the pillars of Western medieval 
thought. Book I of Augustine’s Confessions refers directly to ‘Plato’s magisterial
o
indictment of poetry in the Republic’. Knopp argues that Augustine’s early experiences 
with poetry reflected Plato’s dismissal of poetry and ultimately ‘generated the cliche of 
patristic and scholastic diatribes: and created the paradigm for subsequent discussions of 
poetry in the Middle Ages’.9 Chaucer’s narrators are, Knopp argues, ‘caught up in all 
the well-known [Platonic/Augustinian] indictments of poetry: it traffics in fantasy and 
illusions, it contains no truth’; Augustine himself focuses on the ‘fantasy and illusion
inherent in the images of poetry’, while Chaucer ‘emphasises their incontestable
, 10 power .
These Platonic indictments carried on without the Platonic text are to surface in 
the late fourteenth century as what A.J. Minnis and A.B. Scott would identify as the late 
scholastic theories which ‘classified [poetry] as the lowest branch of logic’.11 However 
insistent Minnis and Scott are that late medieval poetic theory was based on ‘the terms 
of reference of Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics' , they must concede that these 
principles, as well as those established by Aristotle’s Poetics, ‘reinforced trends which
8 Sherron E. Knopp, ‘Augustinian Poetic Theory and the Chaucerian Imagination’, in The Idea o f 
Medieval Literature, ed. by James M. Dean and Christian K. Zacher (London: Associated University 
Press, 1992), pp. 91-107 (p. 93).
9 Knopp, p. 94.
10 Knopp, p. 95 and p. 102.
11 A.J. Minnis and A.B. Scott, eds, Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism: The Commentary Tradition 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 9.
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were already well established and in which other sources, notably the pseudo-Dionysian
17discussions of imagery and symbolic language, [that] figured far more largely’.
As far as the Poetics itself is concerned, the possibility of its more direct 
influence on late fourteenth-century thought is perhaps more easily appreciated. Minnis 
and Scott demonstrate the general availability of Hermann the German’s Latin
17translation of Avicenna’s Middle Commentary on the Poetics of 1256. It seems likely, 
then, that the ideas presented in the Platonic and Aristotelian texts were enjoying critical 
attention long after (or between) the accessibility of the texts themselves. The concern 
of this chapter is with the identification of those ideas and not with mapping the direct 
connection between Chaucer’s texts and the texts from which some of their 
philosophical themes may have sprung.
In the Republic, Plato questions the ability of art of any kind to be 
epistemologically accurate. The arts (sculpture, paintings and especially poetry), 
according to Plato and due entirely to his fundamental view that material things are 
imperfect copies of unknowable forms, are relegated to being ‘thrice removed from the 
king and from the truth’.14 The inability of an artist to illuminate any kind of truth is 
best illustrated in Book Ten of the Republic, where the speakers discuss the ‘thrice 
removed’ model of the artisan’s relationship to reality as it relates to the production of a 
bed. God, the ‘the author of this and of all other things’, is a ‘creator’. A carpenter is 
also a creator. However, a painter is ‘imitator of that which the others make’ who ‘is 
third in the descent from nature an imitator’. This argument is then applied to the Poet, 
who ‘is thrice removed from the king and from the truth’.15
12 Minnis and Scott, p. 3, parenthetical interjection mine.
13 Minnis and Scott, p. 3. For a more complete discussion of the transmission of Aristotle’s Poetics to the 
West from the Arabic commentaries, see Ismail M. Dahiyat’s Avicenna’s Commentary on the Poetics o f  
Aristotle (Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1974), especially page 9, which graphically details the 
transmission of the text from its lost Greek manuscript around 700 AD to Hermann’s translation of 1256.
14 Republic, 597e7-8 (p. 471).
15 Republic, 597dl-e8 (p. 471).
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Plato clearly has little time for the artists; they are merely ‘imitators’ and as 
such, cannot contribute any epistemological value to the State. Having established God 
as the only true Creator, the carpenter (and therefore all craftsmen) as at least partially 
creative, Plato is not content with dismissing the artist as merely imitative.16 He goes on 
to describe the poet as ignorant, able to gain an appreciative audience only of 
simpletons.17
According to Platonic authority, poets are represented generally as being at 
worst liars and, at the very best, maliciously deceptive. The intention of poets is that of 
trickery or manipulation of well-targeted audiences who would seem to know less about 
the subject of the art than the artist themselves. The Squire’s Tale presents its magic 
gifts as a form of intricate ‘craft’. Sentiments of distrust are evident in the reception of 
the gifts presented to the court in The Squire’s Tale. Joyce Tally Lionarons points out 
that, ‘even if the so-called “magic” is really technology; it is still suspect precisely 
because it is based on uncommon knowledge and can therefore be used by the learned
1Rto deceive the ignorant’. This mistrust occurs most sharply in regard to the brass horse 
which is, ironically, the only gift for which full operational instruction is given by the 
text.19 As the text puts it, ‘they kan nat the craft’ (v.185). The text begins by addressing 
the Platonic assumption that poetry is deliberately misleading, and that those who do 
not understand it are being manipulated by its conventions. The point that poetry is a 
tool by which the artist can manipulate the unaware is furthered when Plato comments 
that any lover of poetry finds merit in it ‘because he himself was unable to analyse the
16 Republic, 598al (p. 471).
17 Republic, 598b6-c4 (p. 472).
18 Joyce Tally Lionarons, ‘Magic, Machines and Deception: Technology in the Canterbury Tales', The 
Chaucer Review, 27 (1993), 377-386 (p. 379).
19 For a better discussions of the mechanics of the horse and the reason for its detailed explanation by the 
text, see Lionarons, ‘Magic, Machines and Deception’, or Craig A. Berry, ‘Flying Sources: Classical 
Authority in Chaucer’s Squire’s Tale', English Literary History, 68 (2001), 287-313. Each offers 
explanations as to why the text takes considerably more time to explain the mechanisms behind the horse 
than it does in presenting the other gifts.
166
nature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation’.20 In other words, poets are most 
successful when they are able to fool those more foolish than themselves.21 By 
positioning poets as the deceptive entertainers of ‘children or simple persons’, Plato is 
making a specific accusation about the lower mentality and the malignant intention of 
the poet. He is also beginning to set up the true nature of his attack on poets: that they 
are a tax on the producers of a society and ultimately dangerous to the well-being of the 
State.
In contrast, by the fourteenth century, poetry, the craft of composing poetry has 
(as we have seen in the General Prologue) a distinctly social role and validation. It is 
part of the skill required for a nobleman, something taught in youth. The Squire is 
introduced in these terms. This social justification for secular poetry is itself an 
opposition, in Chaucer’s time, to the centuries-old doubts of the Church about the role 
of fiction in a Christian society.
Considering all of Aristotle’s debts to Plato and, therefore, the influence of Plato 
through Aristotle on medieval neo-Platonism, it is surprising to note that poetry comes 
out slightly better with Aristotle than it did with his predecessor. In fact, Aristotle’s 
view that Forms exist inseparably to and in participation with Matter enables him to be 
much more accommodating when it comes to the value of the arts in society as well as 
in epistemological concerns. Halliwell alludes to the immensity of the task attempted by 
Aristotle if he is to overcome successfully the stigma attached to poetry by Plato:
20Republic, 598d4-5 (p. 472).
21 Republic, 601a6-b5 (p. 475): In like manner the poet with his words and phrases may be said to lay on 
the colours of the several arts, himself understanding their nature only enough to imitate them; and other 
people, who are as ignorant as he is, and judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cobbling, 
or of military tactics, or of anything else, in metre and harmony and rhythm, he speaks very well-such is 
the sweet influence which melody and rhythm by nature have. And I think that you must have observed 
again and again what a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of the colours which music 
puts upon them, and recited in simple prose.
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That poetry could continue to be regarded as a vehicle of truth did in fact depend 
on much broader assumptions, in particular on the supposition that poets could 
claim to portray, as no one else before the philosophers could plausibly do, the 
nature of the divine world and its control over the world of men. And if poets
y y
had religious truths to offer, they could also arrogate moral wisdom.
In other words, the task set before Aristotle is that he must be able to 
demonstrate the epistemological value of poetic insight without directly opposing 
Plato’s views.23 Halliwell is able to suggest that Aristotle and Plato differ fundamentally 
only on the use of the term mimesis, or imitation, and to what extent mimesis can 
actually be truthful or productive. Whereas it has been shown that Plato views artistic 
mimesis to be ‘parasitic on reality’ and artistic works to ‘deceive, or are intended to 
deceive; their credentials are false’, Aristotle is allowed to take a different turn on 
poetry based on his different interpretation of the function, utility and nature of 
imitation.24
Aristotle tends to turn the measure of poetic value inward, rather than the 
outward scrutiny with which Plato approaches the subject. Much of what is considered 
to be the first of four parts of the Poetics concerns itself with a new evaluation of the 
mimetic process and the ability of such an endeavour to reveal something of nature.25 
Although Aristotle agrees with Plato that art is an act of imitation, Aristotle suggests
22 Stephen Halliwell, Aristotle’s Poetics (London: Duckworth, 1986), p. 11.
23 Halliwell calls this ability of Aristotle’s ‘subtle, revisionist position’ to Plato (p. 22).
24 Halliwell, p, 22. The term ‘mimetic’ should be clarified, as there seems to be a difference between the 
way Plato and Aristotle use the word and the way that critics such as Shirley Sharon-Zisser uses the term 
in ‘The Squire’s Tale and the Limits of Non-Mimetic Fiction’, The Chaucer Review, 26 (1992), 377-94.
In essence, the definition of the term ‘mimesis’ is the same in that both the classical sources and modem 
critics mean the way in which a piece of work imitates reality. The fundamental difference in the two uses 
of the term is what constitutes ‘reality’. Sharon-Zisser seems to adopt a modem distinction between 
‘mimetic fiction’ and ‘speculative fiction’, which implies that mimetic works are those which accurately 
reflect persons, events or conditions that are to be rationally expected in experience. By this terminology, 
the events of The Squire’s Tale are non-mimetic in that they do not depict such realistic criteria. However, 
Plato and Aristotle have a different definition of mimesis, in that they have a very different definition of 
‘reality’. Their definition of ‘reality’ would be that which is perfect. In this case, all physical 
manifestations of things are, in some respect, mimetic. Poetry is especially mimetic in that it copies in 
words what has already been copied in creation. So although Sharon-Zisser’s use of the term is accurate 
in a modem critical context, it is important to note that the classical definition of the term ‘mimesis’ has 
very different consequences for all manifestations of artistry.
25 George Depue Hadzsits and David Moore Robinson, Our Debt to Greece and Rome (New York: 
Cooper Square, 1963), p. 15.
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that the act of imitation is natural to the human being and, indeed, one of the factors that
separates him as a higher being.
It is clear that the general origin of poetry was because of two causes, each of 
them part of human nature. Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of 
his advantages over the lower animals being this, that he is most imitative 
creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation. And it is also natural for all 
to delight in works of imitation.26
Aristotle attempts to establish imitation as natural and, more importantly,
educationally useful. The ability of the human being to learn by way of imitation has
helped him rise above the other animals and has, therefore, been the organisational
factor in his Nature that has allowed him to establish the State that Plato insists
imitation threatens. Aristotle goes on to state that all men, regardless of mental capacity,
enjoy participating in imitation as a learning process. In fact, as this part of the Poetics
continues, Aristotle addresses the separation of Philosopher and Poet proposed by Plato:
To be learning something is the greatest of pleasures not only to the philosopher 
but also to the rest of mankind, however small their capacity for it; the reason of 
the delight in seeing the picture is that one is at the same time learning -  
gathering the meaning of things, e.g. that the man there is so-and-so; for if one 
has not seen the thing before, one’s pleasure will not be in the picture as an 
imitation of it, but will be due to the execution of colouring or some similar
27cause.
Aristotle asserts that the act of imitation that is intrinsic to the human learning 
process is the same for all mankind regardless of his knowledge base. It therefore, 
cannot be seen as a dependent form or creation, as Plato suggests by his distinction 
between the Craftsmen and the Artist, as Aristotle points out that even people who are
26 Aristotle, Poetics, 1448b5-9, in The Complete Works o f Aristotle, trans. by I. Bywater, ed. by Jonathan 
Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1984), II, pp. 2316-2340 (p. 2318). It is 
interesting to note that the Gutenberg e-text (taken from Butcher) translates this section differently, with a 
few minor changes: ‘Poetry in general seems to have sprung from two causes, each of them lying deep in 
our nature. First, the instinct of imitation is implanted in man from childhood, one difference between him 
and other animals being that he is the most imitative of living creatures, and through imitation learns his 
earliest lessons; and no less universal is the pleasure felt in things imitated,’ S.H. Butcher, trans, 1999. 
Although one key difference is the use of the term ‘implanted’, one also needs to recognise the use of the 
word ‘universal’ in that it represents an allusion to the human form of the soul, a reference that Barnes 
does not make directly. Both translations are fundamentally consistent, with minor differences in 
emphasis.
27 Poetics, 1448b 12-20 (p. 2318).
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not familiar with the subject matter of a piece of work can still appreciate its appearance 
and delight in its presentation.
A Chaucerian Defense o f Poetry: the Gifts o f Cambyuskan
Elements reminiscent of Plato’s specific arguments against poetry are found in 
The Squire’s Tale by way of the gifts mentioned in the tale. The four magical presents 
given to the court can be seen as mindful of the criticism aimed at poetry by Book Ten 
of the Republic. One of the ways to regard the mysterious gifts is to look at them in 
terms of what poetic functions they can be seen to perform; each gift can be seen to be 
addressing a specific epistemological element of poetry.
The most overtly unusual gift is a horse that can, when operated properly, take 
its rider anywhere in the world in the space of 24 hours (v.l 15-131). The myth of a 
flying horse is not unknown to the fourteenth century; nor is ancient Greek mythology 
their only antecedent. However, there are interesting connections to be made between 
the Squire’s flying horse and those referred to in Plato. Craig A. Berry is among recent 
critics to notice a link between the brass horse and the mythical Pegasus, not only in the 
textual reference to the beast (v.207), but to other aspects of the brass horse’s 
functionality that link it to classical sources as well.29 However, although Berry is quick 
to acknowledge the original appearance of a Pegasus-like myth in the Phaedrus, he does 
little to elaborate on any further connections between The Squire’s Tale and Plato’s 
dialogue. The Phaedrus makes reference to two ‘winged steeds’ as the nature of a soul. 
In reference to the Gods, each horse is of a noble breed and they work together in
28 See the argument about craftsmen being twice removed from the king (above), as opposed to artists 
who are thrice removed from the truth.
29 Berry, ‘Flying Sources’. Berry advises that, for an earlier recognition of the prevalence of the Pegasus 
myth in literature, see A. Bartlett Giamatti, ‘Headlong Horses and Headless Horsemen: An Essay on the 
Chivalric Epics of Pulci, Boiardo and Ariosto’, in Italian Literature, Roots and Branches Essays in Honor 
o f Thomas Goddard Bergin, ed. by Giose Riminalli et al., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 
265-307. It may be worth noting here that the connection drawn with Pegasus deals solely with function, 
not form; Pegasus was believed to be a living (as opposed to mechanical) creature.
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harmony. In Man, however, one horse is noble and the other ignoble. Simply put, it is
the enduring task of Man to manage the two horses together.
The soul in her totality has the care of inanimate being everywhere, and 
traverses the whole heaven in divers forms appearing; - when perfect and fully 
winged she soars upward, and orders the whole world; whereas the imperfect 
soul, losing her wings and drooping in her flight at last settles on the solid 
ground -  there, finding a home, she receives an earthly frame which appears to 
be self-moved, but is really moved by her power.30
The flying horse of the Soul is able to transport its ‘rider’ heaven-ward towards 
the unchanging perfect world of Platonic forms, and thereby transcend the limitations 
imposed by the ever-degrading, ever changing material world. Poetry, specifically 
written poetry, is theoretically likewise able to lift its reader metaphorically to a higher 
state of understanding, to refer to unchanging truths and to reveal the true nature of 
things. Poetry, like the flying horse, necessarily must be comprised of both the physical 
and the intangible: the written word serves as the corporeal wings which are, in turn, the 
material things ‘most akin to the divine’, in that they are able to carry things that would 
normally tend to sink to earth, instead upwards towards ‘beauty, wisdom, goodness and 
the like’.31 Poetry is, like the horse, a physical thing that can lift Man; whereas the horse 
physically lifts the rider, poetry elevates the mind to the Good. Even if the text does not 
refer to the Phaedrus, by referring to the long-standing traditions and well-known 
implications of flying horses (specifically, the Pegasus myth), the text embraces and 
incorporates the epistemological elements of that myth into the abilities of its own 
flying horse. Although a brief reference, the horse -  and therefore poetry in general -  is 
able to ‘traverse the whole heavens’ and uplift its rider physically as well as spiritually.
Ultimately, the tale’s horse is able simultaneously to speak to several aspects of 
Aristotelian and Platonic critical theory. By acting as an embodiment of the human soul 
and, as Berry suggests, the act of reading and of writing, the mechanical horse is able to 
empower the acts of reading and writing with the uplifting capacities of intellectual
30 Phaedrus, 246b7-c6 (p. 153).
31 Phaedrus, 246el (p. 153).
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wings. Reading and writing, when done skilfully, are no longer limited to the mundane 
imitations of man, but are able to traverse the heavens and to temporarily return the 
flesh-bound human soul to a semblance of its more glorious intellectual inspiration.
The Mirror o f True Intentions
The next gift is that of the mirror which allows its bearer to see the true
intentions of its subject. Again, the reader is given a simple story that can be seen as a
reply to the ancient doubts about poetry and fiction. That the mirror allows its user to
see truth can work as a rebuttal of Platonic concerns regarding poetry. The mirror, by its
very nature of reflection and distortion, is an established symbol of the Platonic theory
of the third degree of removed formal representation. In other words, what a mirror does
is to reflect that which is physical -  that what is already twice removed from God or the
Good. Mirrors provide nothing real -  only two-dimensional images of three-
dimensional imitations of Form. As Plato states in Book Ten of the Republic, a mirror is
just as useful as an artist in that it provides the appearances of reality, not reality itself.
When asked how one could become a Creator, Plato answers:
An easy way enough; or rather, there are many ways in which the feat might be 
quickly and easily accomplished, none quicker than that of turning a mirror 
round and round -  you would soon enough make the sun and the heavens, and 
the earth and yourself, and other animals and plants, and all the other things of 
which we were just now speaking, in the mirror.
Yes, he said, but they would be appearances only.32
Plato makes a connection between the mirror and the act of artistic
reproduction. In the Timaeus, Plato again uses mirrors (as well as all reflective
surfaces) as a demonstration of inaccuracy:
I l l
[Reflective surfaces] are to be reckoned among the second and co-operative 
causes which God, carrying into execution the idea of the best as far as possible, 
uses as his ministers. They are thought by most men not to be the second, but the 
prime causes of all things, because they freeze and heat, and contract and dilate, 
and the like. But they are not so, for they are incapable of reason or intellect; the 
only being which can properly have mind is the invisible soul, whereas fire and 
water, and earth and air, are all of them visible bodies.34
Through both texts, Plato makes the argument that mirrors and artists create 
nothing but appearances and, therefore in light of Plato’s views concerning imitation 
and its proximity to the Truth of reality, can tell their viewers nothing about either. 
Mirrors and poems are ‘deprived of intelligence and always produce chance effects 
without order or design’.35 Artists are creators of falsities: ‘the imitator or maker of the 
images knows nothing of true existence; he knows appearances only’.
On the other hand, the Squire gives the mirror the ability to tell its bearer the 
ultimate truth of its subjects. Berry sees the mirror as a symbol of the poem, specifically 
of a courtly poem. He argues that ‘the mirror, like any good courtly poem, gives the 
ruler insight into the designs of his enemy and exposes treachery in love’.37 Unlike 
images reflected in a ‘Platonic’ mirror, the things reflected in the Squire’s mirror are no 
longer simple representations of appearances; they are, in fact, the undeniable truths -  
the reality -  of whatever is reflected in its glass. The Squire’s mirror does not provide 
reality thrice removed -  it promises reality itself. Furthermore, not only does this
32 Republic, 596d6-e5 (pp. 469-470). This thesis will turn at its close to Chaucer’s use of the concept of 
Forms in his ‘Philomela’: apparently clear evidence in his interest in this philosophical idea in relation to 
poetry.
I would propose that poetry and painting can be seen as identical in this analogy, as both are seen by 
Plato to be acts of imitation: ‘For as a painter by a knowledge of figure and colour can paint a cobbler 
without any practice in cobbling, so the poet can delineate any art in the colours of language, and give 
harmony and rhythm to the cobbler and also to the general; and you know how mere narration, when 
deprived of the ornaments of metre, is like a face which has lost the beauty of youth and never had any 
other. Once more, the imitator has no knowledge of reality, but only of appearance. The painter paints, 
and the artificer makes a bridle and reins, but neither understands the use of them -  the knowledge of this 
is confined to the horseman; and so of other things. Thus we have three arts: one of use, another of 
invention, a third of imitation; and the user furnishes the rule to the two others. The flute-player will 
know the good and bad flute, and the maker will put faith in him; but the imitator will neither know nor 
have faith-neither science nor true opinion can be ascribed to him. Imitation, then, is devoid of 
knowledge, being only a kind of play or sport, and the tragic and epic poets are imitators in the highest 
degree’ (Republic, p. 294).
34 Timaeus 46c9-d8 (p. 733).
35 Timaeus, 46e6-8 (p. 733).
36 Republic, 601bl l-c2 (p. 475).
37 Craig A. Berry, ‘Flying Sources’, p. 292.
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particular mirror demonstrate the ability of poetry to portray simple or obvious truths,
but it also endows it with the unique ability to uncover hidden truths as well:
If he be fals, she shal his tresoun see,
His newe love, and all his subtiltee,
So openly that ther shal no thynge hyde. (v.139)
The tale’s mirror is the antithesis of both Plato’s mirror and his denunciation of
poetry.
The Sword
Just as the mirror presents a two-fold defence of poetry against Platonic
condemnation, the sword, another of the mysterious guest’s gifts to the court, also has a
duality of purpose. The magic blade is given the following introduction:
‘This naked swerd, that hangeth by my syde,
Swich vertu hath that what man so ye smyte 
Thurghout his armure it wole kerve and byte,
Were it as thikke as is a branched ook;
And what man that is wounded with the strook 
Shal never be hool til that yow list, of grace,
To stroke hym with the plat in thilke place 
Ther he is hurt. (V.156)
The sword is thereby given the powers both to make an eternal wound by slicing 
through any armour and to be the only cure for that wound. In this sense, the sword 
serves as venom and antidote, bane and boon. As Derrida suggests when discussing 
Plato’s use of the term pharmakon, the audience must be able to see that writing, like 
the sword, can be seen as both the ‘remedy and the poison’ to forgetfulness. While we 
cannot know that Chaucer was aware of the ideas in the Phaedrus, the ideas that Derrida 
draws from Plato on this point seem to illuminate the tale. There are two aspects of the 
term pharmakon that Derrida raises in Dissemination, both of which are relevant to our 
discussion of the sword and of the tale itself. The first characteristic of the term is that, 
in its original form, the term pharmakon has two opposing meanings: that of a remedy
38 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, (London: Athlone Press, 1993), p. 94.
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and that of a poison. As I discuss in detail below, Plato presents writing as an inferior 
form of communication compared to speech. This opposition is furthered by the notion 
that, like the Squire’s sword, writing is simultaneously good and bad. In some ways, 
writing is good in that it promotes the recollection of things already learned. In a much 
more important way, however, writing is distracting to the natural pursuit of Man 
because it is not a medium of knowing: it is a medium of recollection only.
Plato’s Phaedrus tells the tale of Theuth, the Egyptian who invented writing. 
Theuth claims to King Thamus that the art of writing ‘will make the Egyptians wiser 
and give them better memories; it is a specific both for the memory and the wit’. 
Thamus denies the claim, insisting that Theuth is too close to his invention to be 
adequately critical, much like a parent to his child. As a rebuttal, Thamus reminds 
Theuth that writing ‘will create forgetfulness in the learners’ souls, because they will 
not use their memories; they will trust to the external written characters and not 
remember of themselves [...] And so the specific which you have discovered is an aid 
not to memory, but to reminiscence’.40 In other words, writing cannot, by definition, 
claim any grounds to knowledge; in fact, although it helps to ‘remedy’ the power of 
recollection, in doing so it destroys the act of actual learning.
In his discussion of Plato’s work in relation to writing and the notion of 
pharmakon, Derrida insists that pharmakon inevitably acts as both poison and remedy 
in the establishment of the State. Whereas Plato, Derrida states, ‘is bent on presenting 
writing as an occult, and therefore suspect, power’, one cannot escape the fact that 
Plato’s use of the term pharmakon must represent both ‘poles’ of its meaning 41 In the 
Phaedrus, writing is presented as the problematic remedy to forgetfulness. In other 
words, writing helps to preserve what the mind cannot retain or recall, but at a 
significant price. This point of view is taken as the position of ignorance; the King
39 Phaedrus, 274a3-e5 (p. 184).
40 Phaedrus, 275a3-8 (p. 184).
41 Derrida, p. 97.
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Thamus’ response to the proposition of writing as a remedy exposes Theuth as a 
‘simpleton or flimflam artist.’42 Derrida argues that Plato is both reliant on and 
dismissive of the two-fold notion of pharmakon; he chooses to accentuate the 
destructive power of writing, rather than to emphasise its curative properties.
The Squire’s sword is the antithesis of this argument. Whereas Plato, in his quest 
to exclude writers from his State, dismisses writing as deceptive and destructive, the 
text is attempting through the sword to reinstate literature’s full potential. It can, as 
Plato would suggest, act as a destructive force: cutting through the thickest political or 
religious skin to inflict social damage. No one would suggest that Chaucer’s text affirms 
writing as a potentially purely good thing, nor could anyone suggest responsibly that 
Chaucer would deny the power of the written word to inflict unjust damage. The use of 
the sword as the metaphor for writing insists that its destructive powers are being 
recognised. However, by giving the sword the power to heal the wounds it inflicts, the 
text chooses to reinstate the healing powers of writing and is thereby revitalising the 
original sense of pharmakon as potentially both poison and remedy. Whereas Plato 
would have us dismiss the healing properties of writing and accept all writers as dangers 
to society, The Squire's Tale is at least willing to accept that writers can be both conmen 
and legitimate benefits to the State. Such an interpretation of the tale’s argument 
supposes that the text relies upon the same use of the notion of pharmakon that Plato 
uses in the Republic. Unlike Plato, however, the tale does not concentrate on the 
destructive aspects of writing’s capabilities, but, rather, recognises both the destructive 
and the reparative aspects of writing as pharmakon.
There is another aspect of pharmakon that informs a neo-Platonic reading of the 
tale. The notion is derived by Derrida from the Phaedrus:
42 Derrida, p. 98.
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But, in truth, writing is essentially bad, external to memory, productive not of 
science but of belief, not of truth but of appearances.. .Plato thinks of writing, 
and tries to comprehend it, to dominate it, on the basis of oppositions as such. In 
order for these contrary values (good/evil, true/false, essence/appearance, 
inside/outside, etc.) to be in opposition, each of the terms must be simply 
external to the other.43
In the case of the current argument, writing is external to knowledge: it is in
opposition to it and therefore cannot participate in it. Rather than limiting the opposing
distinctions to the subject matter or general content of a tale, writing itself becomes the
‘exotic other’ that is so threatening to the courtiers in The Squire's Tale. Writing is the
tool, or the gift, that must be used by its keepers in such a way so as to harm or to heal
its subjects. Derrida states that writing, like any other pharmakon, is ‘a force whose
effects are hard to master, a dynamics that constantly surprises the one who tries to
manipulate it as master and as subject’.44 Whereas Plato would have the audience
believe that writing is alone subject to this kind of unwieldy power; The Squire's Tale
tells us differently. In fact, much of the framework of this particular tale (and, indeed,
much of the modem criticism surrounding it) is concerned with the suggestion that the
Squire’s knowledge is not nearly as good as his recollection. What was previously seen
as a typical example of professional occupatio, in light of the concept of the pharmakon,
can now be interpreted as an admission of the spoken word’s inordinate sociological
position above that of writing:
But for to telle yow al hir beautee,
It lyth nat in my tonge, n ’yn my konnyng;
I dare not undertake so heigh a thing 
Myn Englissh eek is insufficient.
It most been a rethor excellent
That koude his colours longynge for that art
If he shoulde hire discryven every part
I am noon swich, I moot speke as I kan. (v.34)
The Squire is not only acting out the expected role of a humble story-teller. The 
language employed by the text suggests that oration itself is susceptible to the same
43 Derrida, p. 103.
44 Derrida, p. 97.
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epistemological scrutiny that writing suffers at the hands of the Platonic environment of
contemporary criticism of poetry. The art of oration, the art of story-telling, in which the
Squire has invested himself, is no less the art of imitation of style and of recollection of
events that writing is deemed to be. In fact, the Squire admits this himself as he
compares his own rhetorical skills to those of the strange knight:
And after this, bifom the heighe bord,
He with a manly voys seide his message,
After the forme used in his langage,
Withouten vice of silable or of lettre;
And for his tale sholde seme the bettre,
Accordant to his wordes was his cheere,
As techeth art of speche hem that it leere.
A1 be that I kan nat sowne his stile,
Ne kan nat clymben over so heigh a style, (v.98)
The first part of this selection sets up the strange knight as an exemplar of good 
story-telling skills, regardless of the fact that he is speaking with a different syntax or 
language altogether. The wondrous knight speaks at least as well as Gawain, and is able 
to carry off his story as well as anyone. The Squire, on the other hand, is not as adept: in 
fact, Chaucer’s use of the term ‘I kan nat sowne his stile’ implies several things, the 
most innocuous of which is that he is trying to mimic the knight’s skills. The definition 
of the word ‘sowne’ is given by Benson as to ‘repeat, imitate’ {Riverside Chaucer, p. 
170), which is bome out by the entry in the MED: ‘to show, indicate, reveal, reflect, 
signify, express [...] also, imitate (someone’s style)’. Although the simple defmition 
suffices for the simple interpretation, the entry also indicates that the word could be 
used mistakenly instead of sounden: ‘to heal and cause to regenerate’ (315). Once again, 
the reader is reminded of the ongoing argument between the art of imitation and the 
power of regeneration.
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The Ring
Last in the discussion of the parade of gifts offered by the mysterious knight is a
ring that enables the reader to understand the speech of every living thing. This ring or,
rather, its function, seems to continue the debate already raised regarding the relative
values of speech and writing.
The vertu of the ryng, if ye wol heere,
Is this: that if hire lust it for to were 
Upon hir thombe or in hir purs it bere,
Ther is no fowel that fleeth under the hevene 
That she ne shal wel understonde his stevene 
And knowe his menyng openly and pleyn,
And answere hym in his langage ageyn;
And every gras that groweth upon roote 
She shal eek knowe, and whom it wol do boote,
A1 his woundes never so depe and 
Wyde. (v.146)
The source of the ‘ring’ portion of the tale is discussed exclusively and at length
by Vincent DiMarco in an attempt to address the ‘paucity of references to Moses’ magic
ring, indirectly alluded to in V(F) 247-51, in comparison with the numerous Jewish,
Islamic and Christian legends regarding the magic rings of Solomon’.45 DiMarco
attributes the source of the ring to be a passage from Bacon’s Opus maius, in which a
young Moses makes two rings: one for remembrance and one for forgetfulness.46
Moses’ two rings, alluded to by the text in lines 247-251 as a source of magic
comparable to the mysterious knight’s ring, had two powers: one made its wearer
remember, the other made its wearer forget:
[Moses] made, since he was a skilful astronomer, two images on rings, one of 
forgetfulness which he gave to the woman, and the other of memory, which he 
kept for himself, and thus was freely departed from her with his army and 
without war 47
45 Vincent DiMarco, ‘A Note on Canacee’s Magic Ring’, Anglia, 99 (1981), 399-405 (p. 399).
46 DiMarco, ‘A Note on Canacee’s Magic Ring’, p. 403.
47 Roger Bacon, Opus Major, trans. by Robert Belle Burke (Philadelphia, 1928), quoted in Vincent 
DiMarco, ‘A Note on Canacee’s Magic Ring’, p. 403.
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This brief reference to Moses as the source of the ring’s literary antecedent 
introduces the idea of being able to function as both poles of pharmakon. Just as Plato 
laments, the gift has the ability to both help and to hinder its wearer. Forgetfulness is, of 
course, the main ‘side-effect’ of writing, according to Plato in the concluding argument 
of the Phaedrus. However, as a matter of reference, it serves immediately to note that 
Plato argues against writing as opposed to speech because, according to Derrida, in Rob
AO
Boyne’s phrase, ‘writing is inferior, a substitution for original thought or speech’.
Plato makes this point as he states that:
in the garden of letters [the writer] will sow and plant, but only for the sake of 
recreation and amusement; he will write them down as memorials to be 
treasured against the forgetfulness of old age, by himself, or by any other old 
man who is treading the same path. He will rejoice in beholding their tender 
growth; and while others are refreshing their souls with banqueting and the like, 
this will be the pastime in which his days are spent.49
A writer sows seeds and reaps fruit that is ultimately inconsequential and pleases
only those who are interested in similar trivialities. The Squire admonishes himself for
wasting time in his tale with irrelevant facts: ‘I wol nat taryen yow, for it is pryme / And
for it is no fruyt but los of tyme’ (v.73). The Squire’s admission of frivolity and
fruitlessness is directly opposed to the bountiful harvest of words enjoyed by the skilled
orator of the Phaedrus. And, although no direct link can be responsibly inferred, the
contrast is noteworthy:
who, finding a congenial soul, by the help of science sows and plants therein 
words which are able to help themselves and him who planted them, and are not 
unfruitful, but have in them a seed which others brought up in different soils 
render immortal, making the possessors of it happy to the utmost extent of 
human happiness.50
If it were at all unclear as to Plato’s opinion of writing and speech, the final 
remarks in the Phaedrus leave the reader with little doubt:
48 Rob Boyne, Foucault and Derrida: The Other Side o f Reason (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 95.
49 Phaedrus, 276dl-9 (p. 186).
50 Phaedrus, 276e5-277a4 (p. 186).
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But he who thinks that in the written word there is necessarily much which is not 
serious, and that neither poetry nor prose, spoken or written, is of any great 
value,.. .and who thinks that even the best of writings are but a reminiscence of 
what we know, and that only in principles of justice and goodness and nobility 
taught and communicated orally.. .is there clearness and perfection and 
seriousness.. .this is the right sort of man; and you and I, Phaedrus, would pray 
that we may become like him.51
Phaedrus is admonished to aspire to be like the orator rather than the writer.
Oration is the process of knowledge, whereas writing is only privy to the powers of
recollection. In the Phaedrus, the groundwork is laid so that writing is linked to
forgetfulness (in that it causes the mind to get lazy) and speech is correlated to
knowledge. In the Republic, Plato mentions another ring with magical powers; this one
renders its wearer invisible to the rest of the world:
Now the shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might send their 
monthly report about the flocks to the king; into their assembly he came having 
the ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the 
collet of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he became invisible to the rest 
of the company and they began to speak of him as if he were no longer present. 
He was astonished at this, and again touching the ring he turned the collet 
outwards and reappeared; he made several trials of the ring, and always with the 
same result -  when he turned the collet inwards he became invisible, when 
outwards he reappeared.52
This passage provides a neat opposition to the ability of the rings in the 
Phaedrus and in The Squire's Tale. In other words, whereas the Republic's ring makes 
its wearer invisible, the Squire’s ring makes the wearer linguistically intuitive and 
reveals rather than conceals meaning. Language, the medium of oral conversation, and 
the relative spiritual value of specific uses of linguistic styles, are central to the 
Republic, and are therefore to be addressed in a more complete manner by the text. 
Although the description of the ring in both works is brief, it is the only one of the 
Squire’s gifts whose benefits are actually realised in the tale, perhaps giving more 
credibility to the argument that the relative primacies of different types of language are 
as central to The Squire's Tale's defence of poetry as it is to the Republic and the
51 Phaedrus, 277e3-278b5 (p. 188).
52 Republic, 359el-360a2 (pp. 200-201).
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Poetics. In one paragraph, the Squire has established that the ring, when even kept close 
to the body, can serve not only as an interpreter for all languages, but can also reveal the 
cure for any wound inflicted on the speaker in question.
The Squire’s task is to present speech, literally, as an art form. Whereas Plato 
sees good writing as better than speech, the Squire, like Derrida, sees speech as an 
intricate form. Of course medieval poetry was written to be spoken; the text of the 
Squire’s tale presents speech as at least as complicated and as problematic as writing. 
Some modem critics argue that The Squire's Tale does not really do much other than 
force its audience to recognise the skill (or lack thereof) displayed by the Squire. As 
Scala remarks, partially correctly, *[...] The Squire's Tale can do nothing but reveal its 
teller; its substance or subject is so empty that reader can do nothing but turn to the
o
voice that utters it’. Scala is partially correct because it is only at first glance that the 
tale presents itself so devoid of valuable substance or subject. On closer inspection, the 
tale reveals itself to be heavily engaged in the very serious debate about the intrinsic 
value of poetry as an art form and of the social role of the poet himself. Furthermore, 
the text suggests that the epistemological advantage supposed by Plato and maintained 
throughout the fourteenth century to be inherent in speech and missing in writing is no 
more present in the Squire’s spoken words than in the text that reports it. For all of his 
skills as a public speaker, the Squire is telling the audience nothing new. Like all of the 
poets Plato dismisses from the Republic, the Squire’s unconventionally problematic 
story is not engaged in knowledge but rather in recollection; his spoken word is no more 
or less truthful than the best poetry and, as such, no more or less a work of art to be 
scrutinised by its audience. If, as a demonstration of the fallibility of speech, the story 
challenges Platonic theories of knowledge and authority; as a piece of written work it 
challenges the very presuppositions made by Platonic theory against poetry and the rigid
53 Elizabeth Scala, ‘Canacee and the Chaucer Canon: Incest and Other Unnarratables’, The Chaucer 
Review, 30 (1995), 15-39 (p. 29).
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classification of poetic elements indoctrinated by Aristotle’s writings. The Squire's 
Tale, in theory and in form, defies categorisation and refutes any claims that poetry, 
more or less than any other art form, is devoid of meaning or utility.
In doing so, the tale establishes itself as a significant rebuttal of the Platonic, 
Aristotelian and neo-Platonic themes of absolute contrariety that were dominant forces 
not only in medieval poetic theory, but in many other aspects of medieval culture as 
well. Just as we have seen other tales address specific cases of binary opposition at work 
in medieval concepts of the body, the soul, sex and epistemology, so too does The 
Squire's Tale challenge classical philosophical themes of polarity. In fact, The Squire's 
Tale serves to position poetry as the ultimate argument against such rigid structures of 
opposition; poetry is the medium of mediation. Not only does good poetry have the 
ability to mediate across otherwise incompatible cultures and languages, but it also 
serves as the responsible halfway-house between oration and scholastic writing; it is the 
buffer between the necessary transience and mutability of the oral tradition and the 
timeless, static dogmatic formality of presumed authority. Poetry links the rational with 
the passionate; its characters blur the supposed immovable boundaries between religion 
and secularity, while they simultaneously flirt between good and evil, mortal and 
eternal, male and female, perfection and privation. The late medieval poets have at their 
disposal the power to challenge all of the contemporary conscripts of culture that inform 
their audiences’ perceptions of their society and of themselves. The Squire's Tale 
demonstrates this power not only in its form but in its function: at once portraying and 
embodying the potential of poetry to replace rigid concepts of contrariety with the 
sometimes frustratingly inconsistent flexibility of continuity. The Canterbury Tales 
shows recurrent curiosity and anxiety about the status of fiction and poetry: the claim 
made in the General Prologue ( ‘words must be cousin to the deed’, 1.741) was that 
Chaucer was giving his audience trust, not invention. Chaucer uses Plato to back up the
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idea that ‘truth’ is superior to invention. Yet, of all course, the citation is a joke: The 
Canterbury Tales is invention, not reporting of the truth at all. The Parson’s Tale, as 
Patterson has argued, represents a final challenge to the whole business of story­
telling.54
The Parson destroys the poem, in other words, in order to release the poet from 
his fiction-making, to turn him finally from the shadows to reality. The benefice 
the Parson offers can be fully appreciated only when we recognize how 
persistently Chaucer has asked the moral questions raised by his kind of poetry, 
and how persistently he has refused to answer them.55
The Squire’s Tale seems to offer further exploration of these themes, with its 
‘craff and rhetoric, and its use of a narrative frame to frame a lyric poem. The Squire is 
the pilgrim -  not ‘Chaucer the pilgrim’ -  who is explicitly presented as a poet and artist. 
Chaucer seems to use the figure of the Squire that introduces the theme of artistry. Yet 
in his society, despite religious doubts about the validity of ‘fables’, the concept of the 
courtly man provides a social justification for cultivation of the arts of composition, in 
contrast to the doubts about utility of such acts to wellbeing of State, as presented by the 
ancient philosophers.
54 Patterson, pp. 370-80.
55 Patterson, pp. 376-7.
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Conclusion
The previous chapter has argued that The Squire’s Tale offers Chaucer’s readers an 
opportunity to consider a problem about the status of fiction, a problem that originates 
from Plato and Aristotle and continued to perplex Western medieval Christian society.
At other times, Chaucer makes his debt to Platonic traditions much more explicit. 
Chaucer invokes Plato at peculiar times; he is clearly interested in conceiving the 
authors’ task in relation to the ancient philosophers, without necessarily being willing to 
align his texts consistently with the philosophical tenets that such an association might 
usually be inclined to imply.
This eagerness to cite classical philosophers, while departing creatively from 
what they actually say is evidenced in at least two ways. Firstly (and perhaps more 
superficially), ‘Plato’ himself appears in a few places. ‘Plato’ is mentioned directly in 
the General Prologue (1.741), several times in the Canon Yeoman’s Tale (VII.1448- 
1463), the Manciple’s Tale (IX.207), and twice in the House o f Fame (759, 931). Of 
course, many people are mentioned by Chaucer who do not have a significant impact on 
the reading of his work.
However, the way in which Platonic influences undulate and trickle through the 
texts, appropriated and re-constructed by Chaucer, causes the reader to consider 
Chaucer’s awareness of Platonic theories, and to contemplate what relationship the 
author intends with the ancient texts and their philosophies. For example, Benson argues 
that The Knight’s Tale draws upon the Empedoclean principle of ‘love’s fatal glance’, 
which in turn is based on Platonic optical theory.1 Later, the tale recounts the Platonic 
notions of a Prime Mover and the ‘chain of being’, fundamental to the neo-Platonic 
worldview. (1.2987-3089). The Miller retells a version of the tale told by Plato in
1 Riverside Chaucer, p. 830.
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Theaetetus, changing the philosopher’s well into the Campus Pits of Milham Ford.2 As 
previously mentioned, the ascension of Arche’s soul in Troilus invokes Platonic 
theories relating to the body/soul relationship, as well as the fundamental structure of 
the universe.
Plato’s influence appears twice in the Legend o f Good Women. As well as the 
Platonic principles used in the re-telling of the story of Alceste (as mentioned earlier in 
this thesis), Chaucer introduces the Legend o f Philomela with Platonic vocabulary, in 
Latin and in English: Incipit Legenda Philomene. / Deus dator formarum. / Thow yevere 
of the formes, that hast wrought / This fayre world and bar it in thy thought’ (F 2228-9). 
A few lines later, he mentions the neo-Platonic principle of a stratified heaven (F 2236). 
These lines are particularly interesting in that they are much more than a casual 
reference to Plato, or to a Platonic theory Chaucer may have read somewhere else. 
These references come at the reader fiill-on, and provide the introduction to a story that 
has a significant subject: these concepts of Platonic Forms and hierarchical levels of 
Being introduce a story which is itself a text about signs, writing and expression. 
Chaucer, here, does more than drop Plato’s name in here and there; he uses Plato, but 
also clearly has something significant to say about how Plato should be used. As with 
the passage referring to ‘words and deeds’, Chaucer takes a Platonic theme, and applies 
it to the business of being a poet; he employs it for the processes of creativity.
Chaucer draws three times upon the same passage and sentiment regarding the 
relationship of words to actions as that found in Plato’s Timeaus. Once in the General 
Prologue (1.742), once in the Manciple’s Tale (IX. 104), and once in the shorter poem, 
Lak o f Stedfastnesse, Chaucer makes the point that ‘the wordes moot be cosyn to the 
dede’.4 The Platonic source makes the same argument more sternly:
2 Riverside Chaucer, p. 846.
3 Riverside Chaucer, p. 1057.
4 In Lak• ‘And now it is so fals and deceivable /  That word and deed, as in conclusioun, /  Ben nothing lyk, 
for turned up-so-doun’ (3).
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Now it is all-important that the beginning of everything should be according to 
nature. And in speaking of the copy and the original we may assume that words 
are akin to the matter which they describe; when they relate to the lasting and 
permanent and intelligible, they ought to be lasting and unalterable, and, as far 
as their nature allows, irrefutable and immovable-nothing less. But when they 
express only the copy or likeness and not the eternal things themselves, they 
need only be likely and analogous to the real words.5
From Plato on, to Ockham, words (signs) can be believed to correspond to 
realities (philosophical Realism). Ockham argues that it is incorrect to conflate the 
names of things and the things themselves, and by doing so, adds to a medieval debate 
about Realism and Nominalism (which, in turn, has fuelled a modem debate about the 
inclinations in Chaucer to subscribe to one or the other).6 Chaucer’s insistence on 
loosely appropriating this principle of literary Realism, and his subsequent and 
immediate refusal to abide by it, complicates and enriches our understanding of his use 
of philosophical themes. Furthermore, Knapp argues that The Knight’s Tale, while 
attempting to endorse an essentially Platonic world of essences (a realist world view), is 
undermined, partly by the doubts about the benevolence of the cosmos, within his tale, 
and partly by the juxtaposition of it with The Miller’s Tale. The Miller’s Tale, Knapp 
argues, is ‘nominalist’ in spirit because in it words do not mean what they seem to 
mean. B.L. Jefferson sees a Platonic epistemology in Chaucer's picture of the Golden 
Age in 'Lak of Steadfastnesse'. This is interesting because Jefferson points out that in 
that poem Chaucer introduces not only the tradition of the Gold Age and Boethian ideas 
about the contrast between the stable and the mutable, but also, quite specifically, ideas 
about ‘word and deed’ (1.4). He argues that Chaucer has transformed the idea of a
5 Timaeus, 29b. Chaucer would have come across phrase this through Boethius, De Cons., Ill prosa 12 
(205-7).
6 See Paul Vincenet Spade, 'Ockham’s Nominalist Metaphysics: Some Main Themes', in The Cambridge 
Companion to Ockham, ed. by Paul Vincent Spade, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 
76-99. This is one of several contributions to die ongoing debate among Chaucer critics (as well as 
medieval intellectuals) about Realism and Nominalism.
7 Knapp, pp. 21-3, 38. Some have criticised Knapp for seeming to create too much of a rigid dichotomy, 
whereby Realism is rigid authoritarianism and Nominalism a rebellious questioning of authority. See 
Stephen Penn, ‘Literary Nominalism and Medieval Sign Theory: Problems and Perspectives’, in 
Nominalism and Literary Discourse: New Perspectives, H. Keiper, Christopher Bode and Richard J. Utz, 
eds, (Atlanta: Rodopi, 1997), p. 173.
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corruptible world into a model of language: word and deed should be the same, a 
Platonic idea.8
In contrast, and still trying to decide where Chaucer stands philosophically on 
the question of ‘word and deed’, Paul Beek Taylor sees the passage in the General 
Prologue as a comic overturning of the Platonic ideal to a nominalist attitude, because 
he (Taylor) thinks Chaucer means ‘cosyne’ to be taken ironically. Word and deed, 
signifier and signified ought to match (Platonic ideal)—they ought to be cousins—but 
they often don't—the words may cheat (cozen in the other sense). The possibility that 
there is no reality relating directly to the words is, Taylor argues, anti-Platonic, if only 
in jest.9
Chaucer is at once subscribing to and also challenging the criteria set forth by 
both Plato’s words and his own. Chaucer appears to be considering how fiction might 
relate to real life, or how words relate to experience. In one sense, Chaucer is 
acknowledging the premise that authors of any period or genre have a responsibility to 
do their best to give an accurate account of events. The apology in the General 
Prologue centres on an admission that the narrator might fail in this duty. 
Simultaneously, the apology also recognises the stylistic allowances and 
epistemological limitations of re-telling old tales. Chaucer’s texts, especially those that 
aim to re-tell well-known stories, need only approximate the originals; they must retain 
and convey the spirit of the original, not necessarily the letter.
In another sense, however, Chaucer rebukes the Platonic admonishment for 
factuality (a theme that has been discussed in relation to ‘fable’ in his writing already) 
and perfect re-presentation in regards to philosophical truths by appropriating, 
manipulating and employing Platonic principles when and how it suits him or the tale 
he is trying to tell. Perhaps, by choosing how to interpret Plato and how best to utilize
8 B.L. Jefferson, Chaucer and the Consolation o f Philosophy, (New York; Gordian Press, 1968), pp. 106- 
7.
9 Paul Beek Taylor, ‘Chaucer’s Cosyn to the Dede’, Speculum, 57 (1982), 315-27.
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the conveniently pliable and accessible aspects of his philosophies, Chaucer is 
suggesting that such a of degree artistic licence is the prerogative of anyone ‘whoso kan 
hym rede’ (1.741).
It has been the argument of this thesis that Chaucer’s writing is philosophical, 
even arguably Platonic, at times. It has argued that Chaucer’s work is not necessarily 
following Platonic and Aristotelian ideas faithfully or, indeed, accurately, in his writings 
and in finding some ancient philosophical principles a creative inspiration. It seems 
indicative of this impulse that when he cites a Platonic theme, such as words being 
cousin to deeds, that his independent refashioning of the implications of the principle 
should concern the writer of fiction and his creative freedoms and constraints.
Chaucer’s invocation of the philosophical concept of Platonic Forms in Philomela 
similarly shows him invoking a philosophical theme with reference to the work of the 
poet: philosophy as inspiration (not just a source) for creativity. Perhaps, at least for 
Chaucer’s use of the ‘words and deeds’ passage seems to point to a problem for the 
writer (how words relate to experience), but not actually answer the question: he is 
moreover pointing out to his audience, rather provocatively, the fictionality of his 
pilgrims and their tales while invoking an authoritative principle about writing only 
reflecting factual truth. When the ‘worde’ was a classical philosophical tenet, and the 
‘deede’ was a modem fictional composition, ‘worde’ and ‘deede’ could arguably remain 
consonant yet allow for creative freedom. Yet Chaucer’s freedom lies in the way he, as 
a creative artist, uses the ancient philosophers and the way his writing constitutes its 
own testimony to the power over his imagination and thought of some of their ideas, 
either directly or mediated through writers of later centuries. For Chaucer, the word 
might not always need be as closely related to the deed as he would have us believe.
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